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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates, and contributes to, the use of wargaming in cyber security 
education. Wargaming has a rich history of pedagogic use, but little work exists 
that addresses the critically important subject of cyber security. Cyber security is a 
global problem that frequently makes news headlines, yet the field is dogged with 
a reputation as a domain only for technologists, when in fact cyber security 
requires a whole gamut of approaches to be properly understood. 
 
The thesis is broadly divided into three parts. The first part is a comprehensive 
literature review of wargaming scholarship, analysing the benefits and drawbacks 
of wargaming, and some of the justifications for why a tabletop boardgame may 
be more effective than a game enhanced by technology. Following on from this, 
the thesis provides an outline of current work in cyber wargaming by analysing 
existing games, evaluating their contributions as educational tools, and identifying 
successful game mechanics and components. 
 
The second part of the thesis outlines the design process of an original wargame 
created for cyber security education and awareness training. The analysis outlines 
what the game design intends to achieve in terms of pedagogical outcomes and 
how the design evolved through the development process. In this part some 
methodological considerations around the research are also analysed, including 
how the thesis uses grounded theory and ethnography as academic 
underpinnings, and issues around the researcher’s positionality during fieldwork. 
 
The final part of the thesis reports on the deployment of the original game to a 
wide variety of organisations. Both quantitative and qualitative data is analysed to 
ascertain what players learned from playing the game and evaluates the 
effectiveness of the game by comparing it to previous theoretical findings. Finally, 
the researcher's experiences of conducting the thesis are evaluated with close 
reference to the identified methodological considerations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction – why 
cyber wargaming? 
 
Wargaming is an activity that at some level of abstraction attempts to model and 
simulate conflict. Jim Dunnigan, a giant of the wargaming community, has stated 
that wargaming is most simply understood as ‘glorified chess.’1 A more elaborate 
expression, from Peter Perla, another wargaming giant, defines a wargame as ‘a 
warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of 
actual military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, 
affected by the decisions made by players representing the opposing sides.’2 Used 
in this way, wargaming is a study of humans that can help us to better understand 
events of the past, present, and future. 
 
But wargaming is not limited to military use and has made its way to other 
contexts where conflict, perhaps better framed as competition, is prevalent, such 
as policymaking or business environments. This thesis explores all three of these 
contexts with regards to one specific topic: cyber security. The thesis has three 
key research objectives: 
• Create a wargame for cyber security education. 
• Analyse the capacity for the game to create learning moments and enable 
players to share knowledge and ask the right questions. 
• Reflect on the researcher’s experience as a wargaming practitioner. 
 
In order to address these objectives, the researcher has developed an original 
tabletop wargame and deployed it to a variety of organisations to gather data 
about its pedagogic efficacy. The entire research process, from scoping and 
methodology through to game design and wargaming practice, is documented in 
this thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Dunnigan (1992), p. 13 
2 Curry (2011), p. 157 
11 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
This thesis is motivated in the first instance by the critical importance of cyber 
security. With computers, networks, and digital devices becoming near-ubiquitous 
for people and organisations, cyber threats have been recognised as one of the 
most prevalent and impactful risks facing society today. In the UK, the most 
recent National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (from 
2015) ranked cyber threats as a Tier One risk – the highest – stating that ‘cyber 
risks underpin many of the other treats we face.’3 Outside the national security 
context, cyber security is also high on agendas. In a survey of treasury and finance 
professionals, the Association for Finance Professionals states that cyber security 
‘disproportionately occupy’ concerns, with 52% of respondents ranking it as a top 
three risk.4 Insurer Allianz, meanwhile, reports that cyber incidents are rated as 
the top business risk in 11 countries but that they are simultaneously the most 
underestimated risk.5  
 
Despite recognition of its importance, knowledge and understanding of cyber 
security remains underdeveloped. In addition to a global skills shortage (discussed 
in Section 4.2.2), cyber security is often viewed as a niche technical subject 
requiring a computer science degree just to grapple with its impenetrable jargon. 
This view is severely mistaken. Cyber security is a multifaceted subject extending 
beyond technology into the realms of psychology, international relations, 
sociology, geography, ethics, and more. As a problem to solve, cyber security 
requires more than technical solutions, including processes enabling 
organisational responses, and well-trained people recognising risks.  
 
The latter of these is of particular importance; people are often viewed as the 
weakest link in the security chain (see Section 4.5.1), yet with education and 
training they can be turned into the first line of defence. This thesis attempts to 
create and measure the effectiveness of a tool for such education in the form of a 
tabletop wargame. The theoretical target audience for the game are senior policy- 
and decision-makers who understand that cyber security is important but may not 
                                                          
3 HM Government (2015), p. 85 
4 Association for Finance Professionals (2018), pp. 7, 10 
5 Allianz (2018), pp. 10-11 
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have had an opportunity to closely engage with key cyber concepts and 
terminology. This audience was targeted because buy-in and understanding at the 
top of an organisation is crucial to building a robust cyber security culture. 
Moreover, top executives are often the targets of cyber fraudsters, particularly 
spearphishing attacks.6 However, although this was the theoretical target 
audience, in practice the game was played by a range of participants (see 
Appendix C). 
 
In using wargames as educational tools, this thesis also answers a call to arms 
from wargaming academic Philip Sabin. Referring to his own success in using 
historical wargames to teach university students, Sabin encourages those with an 
interest in gaming to ‘come out of the closet’ and embrace wargaming for 
education.7 Despite targeting a different audience, the present research is an 
attempt to use wargames in a way that is accessible, acceptable, and in no way 
“closeted.” 
 
1.2 A dearth of cyber games 
 
As illustrated at multiple points throughout the thesis (notably Section 2.1 and the 
introduction to Chapter 3), wargaming has a rich history of use, especially in the 
military but also in various civilian contexts. Wargames, both professional and 
hobby, cover all of the four traditional military domains (land, sea, air, and space) 
at every level ranging from grand strategic games to operational games to squad-
based tactical simulations. Meanwhile, the ideas of gamification and serious play 
have garnered significant traction with businesses as means for customer 
engagement and retention, and for employee training. Relatedly, games have 
been used in educational settings, both academic and professional, to teach a 
multitude of subjects. A systematic mapping study by Darina Dicheva et al found 
an exponential increase in the use of gamification in education between 2010 and 
2014.8 Anecdotal observations suggest this trend has continued in the intervening 
years. 
                                                          
6 FireEye (2016), p. 2 
7 Sabin (2015), p. 346 
8 Dicheva et al (2015), p. 76 
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The authors of the mapping study also found that computer science and 
information technology educators were most likely to adopt gamified elements in 
their curricula, but evidence exists of games designed to teach a diverse range of 
subjects.9 Consider the following non-exhaustive list: 
• Games for environmental education10, including climate change11, sea 
ice12, and glaciers.13 
• Games for young children’s education, including communication and 
social skills14, and preschool reading and mathematics.15 
• Games for biology and medical education, including sex education16 and 
burn care.17 
• Games for teaching the American Revolution.18 
• Games for teaching homeland security.19 
• Gamification in designing open governance platforms.20 
Indeed, simply consulting leading journals in the field, such as Simulation & 
Gaming, reveals a myriad of academic endeavours presenting innovative games or 
gamified systems. 
 
Amidst this wealth of examples and expertise is a notable omission: cyber 
security. NATO has declared cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare, yet very 
few military wargames about cyber security exist, at least ones that are accessible 
to the public.21 As Joseph Miranda has outlined, some military wargames have 
included cyber operations as tools available to commanders to achieve effects but 
did not focus exclusively on these.22 In the hobby sphere, cyber security games 
                                                          
9 Dicheva et al (2015)., p. 81 
10 Bedwell (1977) 
11 Eisenack (2012); Taylor (2017) 
12 Berry Bertram (2008) 
13 Knight (1994) 
14 Collins et al (2011) 
15 Weisberg et al (2015) 
16 Kashibuchi and Sakamoto (2001) 
17 Whittam and Chow (2017) 
18 Smith (2013) 
19 Cozine (2015) 
20 Kelley and Johnston (2012) 
21 Paganini (2016) 
22 Miranda (2016), pp. 673-678 
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have largely been subsumed in the cyberpunk genre, which is related but 
concerned more with science fiction than contemporary security concepts. Some 
games for cyber security education do exist (see Chapter 3), and some of these 
are rather good too, but in the current state of affairs wargaming remains a 
woefully underutilised tool for cyber security education. 
 
This thesis represents an attempt to ameliorate this situation by plugging the gap 
in cyber wargames. 
 
1.3 Genesis of the thesis 
 
Unlike many PhD theses, in which the central focus, perhaps even the core 
question, is closely defined before research commences, this thesis had more 
informal beginnings. The thesis started out as a summer project conducted in the 
first year – a training year – of the Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security 
(CDT) programme at Royal Holloway, University of London. The project was to be 
equivalent to a Masters-level dissertation on any topic of the researcher’s 
choosing. The CDT has a number of external partners, and projects could be 
conducted in conjunction with one of these, outside the confines of pure 
academia. One of the partners is a professional services firm providing audit, tax, 
and advisory services. The researcher decided to partner with the firm for their 
project, not with any particular research topic in mind, but simply to gain some 
experience collaborating with the private sector.  
 
After receiving assent from the firm to collaborate, the researcher was tasked 
with coming up with some project ideas and the firm would then decide which 
idea it thought was most worthwhile and could provide support for. Amongst 
others, one of the ideas was cyber wargaming, though at this stage the idea was 
embryonic, and the researcher had only suggested it because they saw it briefly 
mentioned in a press release.23 Despite being so unrefined, wargaming was the 
topic the firm elected to pursue and the researcher was given a point of contact 
who would assist with the project. 
                                                          
23 Smelkovs (2015) 
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Crucially, and serendipitously (a theme returned to in Section 7.1.1), the contact 
person had previously been a senior UK civil servant, where they had 
commissioned a report on cyber wargaming called ‘The Global Cyber Game’ (see 
Chapter 3, Game 6). Moreover, the person was aware of the shortcomings of this 
report and was keen to see something more actionable created.24 Actionability 
therefore became the key word which the project strived towards, resulting in a 
prototype tabletop wargame involving players navigating computer networks to 
capture digital loot. Ultimately, the project was well-received, and the researcher 
was encouraged by positive reactions to the prototype game at the Connections 
UK wargaming conference held in London in September 2015. On the back of this, 
it was decided to pursue the topic more thoroughly for the PhD thesis. 
 
It is important to be cognisant of these origins because they have fundamentally 
shaped the thesis in two ways. Firstly, the actionability brief which drove the 
summer project echoed through to the thesis. Rather than create a purely 
academic endeavour, the researcher wanted to produce something with potential 
for real-world impact and the most direct method to do this was to develop a 
game for people to play. By design, the thesis would thereby interact with the real 
world in a very hands-on, actionable, way.  
 
Secondly, although the prototype game was successful in demonstrating the 
possibility of wargaming cyber security, it was also limited in what it could 
achieve. Practically, the game was for two players and resource-intensive to 
facilitate. The game could therefore not scale to larger playing groups, limiting the 
amount of people that could be exposed to it. More theoretically, the game 
depicted a tactical cyber operation, but ample tools already existed for training 
network operators in simulated environments. It was therefore decided to realign 
the design approach to the national strategic level, for which no games exist, 
resulting in the game presented in Chapter 4. 
 
This thesis therefore had less than orthodox origins, but the work presented 
herein holds both academic merit and represents impactful research. 
                                                          
24 Author telephone conversation with firm contact, 26 May 2015 
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1.4 Thesis structure 
 
Aside from the introduction and conclusion, the thesis contains six substantive 
chapters. Chapter 2 forms an initial literature review, the aim of which is to 
embrace the interdisciplinary nature of wargaming. Although there is an 
abundance of wargaming literature, wargaming is not by itself an academic 
discipline, but instead draws on a range of disciplines. In addition to references to 
standard wargaming texts from the likes of Dunnigan and Perla, the literature 
consulted in Chapter 2 includes works of history, philosophy, geography, and 
computer science. The chapter’s originality stems from the intersection of all 
these disciplines, drawing out themes particular to cyber wargaming which have 
not hitherto been analysed in the existing literature. 
 
Chapter 3 forms a second literature review, surveying the cyber wargaming 
landscape. Despite there being a dearth of such games, as previously outlined, 
there are nevertheless some games in the field and these must be taken into 
account, partly to position the thesis and partly to inform game design. The 
chapter identifies 25 games, spread across wargames, educational games, hobby 
or entertainment games, and some which fall into neither of these categories. 
Overall, it is found that several of the games contain components or mechanics 
which fulfil useful educational purposes and can be used for inspiration in future 
game design. 
 
In Chapter 4, these inspirations are realised through the design of an original 
tabletop cyber wargame. The game is loosely based on the UK National Cyber 
Security Strategy (both 2011 and 2016 versions) and the purpose is to expose 
players to a wide range of cyber security concepts. The intention is that players 
learn lessons by engaging with these concepts through the game. As well as taking 
into account fundamental game design principles such as realism versus 
complexity, gameplay phases, and visibility, the chapter justifies the inclusion (and 
exclusion) of the cyber security elements of the game by relating their real-world 
importance.  
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The first three chapters having formed the theoretical components of the thesis, 
the next three are more practical in nature. Chapter 5 outlines the research 
methodology of the thesis, with particular attention paid to ethnographic practice 
and the role of positionality. Two types of positionality are defined: strategic 
positionality, encompassing the background of the researcher; and tactical 
positionality, referring to the researcher’s behaviour during the research. Tactical 
positionality is further delineated into two strands with different tensions: one 
concerning the running of games, where there are tensions between the role of 
designer and facilitator/adjudicator; and one concerning data collection, where 
there are tensions between the role of facilitator/adjudicator and researcher. The 
chapter draws on ethnographic literature, wargaming literature, and the 
experience of other researchers to establish a robust research methodology. 
 
In Chapter 6, findings from the fieldwork are presented. The original game was 
deployed in 33 game sessions across a variety of civilian and military 
organisations, both in the UK and overseas. The data collected from these 
sessions is analysed in three ways. First, quantitative data is interpreted using 
techniques which might be found in analytical wargames, although the intention 
here is to illustrate how such techniques can be used, rather than to draw any 
concrete conclusions. Second, directly addressing the central thesis objectives, 
qualitative data about player discussions is analysed, organised thematically by 
learning moments and aligning these with the purposes served by different game 
components. Finally, qualitative data about player engagement with the game is 
compared to the advantages of gaming found in Chapter 2, for example 
corroborating Peter Perla and Ed McGrady’s assertion that games provide a ‘story-
living experience.’25 
 
In the last substantive chapter, the researcher writes from a personal perspective, 
analysing their experiences as a wargaming practitioner. This covers the creation 
of research opportunities, particularly the role of serendipity, and the researcher’s 
experience as a wargame facilitator, particularly the physically and mentally 
exhausting nature of facilitation. Some challenges of working on the edge of 
classified environments are also discussed, followed by an analysis of the 
                                                          
25 Perla and McGrady (2011), p. 112 
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important role of humour during game sessions. These personal stories are 
important because they are largely lacking in extant wargaming literature yet are 
exceptionally useful for understanding the realities of wargaming in practice. 
 
1.5 Key original contributions 
 
The concluding section in each chapter summarises the original contributions 
made, and Chapter 8 reinforces these. However, by way of providing the bottom 
line up front, it is worth highlighting some of the key contributions this thesis 
makes to cyber wargaming. 
• The creation of an original game in Chapter 4 represents a novel addition 
to cyber wargaming. The game is pioneering in that it tackles cyber 
security from a strategic level, yet also showcases the value of 
understanding the wargaming landscape and being able to transpose 
useful mechanics from other games (evaluated in Chapter 3). 
• The researcher’s experience as a wargaming practitioner, particularly in 
organising and facilitating game sessions, were of crucial importance. 
Extant wargaming literature is largely devoid of experiential accounts of 
wargamers, so by providing a candid reflection on the researcher’s 
experience some of the seemingly unwritten assumptions about the 
practice of wargaming could be challenged (Chapter 7). 
• Most crucially, the research positively addresses the central thesis 
objectives. As illustrated in Chapter 6, the game was successful in 
generating discussions around a multitude of cyber security topics ranging 
from key actors in cyberspace to attack and defence dynamics, thereby 
creating learning moments for players. The research illustrates that 
wargames can be an effective learning tool in cyber security education 
and awareness training.  
19 
 
Chapter 2: Uses, advantages, and 
limitations of wargaming 
 
The literature that informs this thesis comes from a broad range of academic 
disciplines. The primary source is wargaming literature, but this is not a 
standalone discipline, nor does it belong exclusively in any other discipline, 
instead drawing on and straddling several fields. This is not to say that wargaming 
lacks academic merit on its own, but rather that it faces a number of challenges 
which prevent it from being confined within one discipline. With regards to the 
interdisciplinarity of wargaming, Robert Stemp writes of operations research 
‘integrating the conventional academic disciplines’26, and Rudolph Darken and 
Curtis Blais state that modelling and simulation does not ‘fit neatly into a 
traditional academic department.’27 Another challenge is that of acceptance. 
Sabin notes that wargaming carries a ‘stigma’, especially among historians28, and 
that ‘one would scarcely know from academic literature that wargaming even 
existed,’29 while Robert Rubel writes that wargaming ‘is still more a craft than a 
discipline,’ suggesting this as a hindrance to professionalisation.30  
 
Rather than resist interdisciplinarity, this thesis seeks to embrace it by 
interrogating a multiplicity of sources with regards to their applicability to 
wargaming, creating a novel intersection where previously unrelated bodies of 
literature can meet and enhance one another.  
 
This Chapter is broadly divided into three sections. Section 2.1 covers the uses of 
wargaming, firstly by constructing a high-level categorisation of the uses of 
wargaming, based on deficiencies identified in existing categorisations, notably by 
Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik. This is followed by close analysis around three 
                                                          
26 Stemp (1991), p. 15 
27 Darken and Blais (2017), p. 152 
28 Sabin (2015), p. 344 
29 Ibid., p. 330 
30 Rubel (2006), p. 109 
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themes. Firstly, the theme of exploring futures and anticipation draws on diverse 
writers such as geographer Ben Anderson, philosopher Alexander Galloway, 
historian Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi. Secondly, the theme of gaining skills draws on 
testimony from various participants in the 2010 Schriever Wargame as evidence 
for specific cyber security-related skills, and on material from wargamers such as 
Robert Specht and Graham Longley-Brown for the capacity of wargames to 
generate self-learning. Thirdly, the theme of play and playfulness uses arguments 
from John Gray and Johan Huizinga, among others, to elucidate the close links 
between war and play and the important role of playfulness in wargaming. 
 
Section 2.2 outlines the advantages of wargaming, particularly the advantages of 
manual gaming over computer gaming, and wargaming vis-à-vis other methods of 
learning and training. Here, the wargaming literature is rich with analysis and 
evidence, and the section references many standard works from Jim Dunnigan, 
Peter Perla, and Ed McGrady, in addition to lesser-known writers like Sanu 
Kainikara.  
 
The chapter is rounded off by Section 2.3, which continues to draw on much of 
the same wargaming literature to balance against the positives by providing an 
overview of some of the limitations of wargaming in how it can be used and what 
it can achieve. A concluding section summarises the main contributions of the 
chapter: the creation of a succinct categorisation of the uses wargaming, 
intersecting diverse literatures on futures, and using computer science literature 
to corroborate claims in wargaming literature about the advantages of paper over 
computers. 
 
2.1 Uses of wargaming 
 
The uses of wargaming are highly dependent on the context of the game, the 
players and the organisation. The history of wargaming shows us that at various 
times, different countries and sectors have used wargames in different ways, and 
with varying attitudes towards the activity. The German military, for example, 
having pioneered the use of kriegsspiel in the 19th century viewed wargaming as 
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indispensable to tactical, operational and strategic planning. Count Schlieffen, in 
architecting his eponymous plan for war with France, experimented with 
wargaming.31 Similarly, the invasion of Poland in 1939, the invasion of France in 
1940, the abandoned invasion of England in 1940, the invasion of Russia in 1941, 
and the Ardennes campaign in 1944 were all planned using wargames.32 
Additionally, in an extraordinary turn of events, as Allied forces were assaulting 
the Normandy beaches on D-Day in 1944, German high command were playing 
out a wargame of this very scenario. As the news of the landings reached the 
officers, ‘reality had overtaken the game’s hypothetical premise’ and ‘the German 
commander ordered the game to proceed, not as a game but a command tool.’33 
 
As a contrasting example, take the declining fortunes of wargaming in the US in 
the 1950s and 60s. The industrial scale of the Second World War, combined with 
the destructive power of nuclear weapons, resulted in future war being envisaged 
not as battles involving intricate strategy, tactics and skills, but as contests of 
attrition in which efficient machinery of war would win the day. In this context, 
kriegsspiel, as practiced by the Germans, was foregone in favour of operations 
research, systems analysis and cost-benefit trade-offs, a ‘new theology which 
buried wargaming beneath a deluge of mathematical analyses and computer 
simulations.’34 One of the catalysts of this change was Robert McNamara who had 
been appointed US Secretary for Defense in 1961, after spending a number of 
years improving the operations of the Ford motorcar corporation. It is perhaps 
little wonder that the major conflict of this era, the Vietnam War, was ‘fought as 
much with spreadsheets and statistics as bullets and bombs.’35 
 
2.1.1 Categorising the uses of wargaming 
 
The previous brief history of wargaming provides some idea of the context-
dependent applications of wargames. This illustrates the difficulty of generalising 
                                                          
31 Perla (1990), p. 41 
32 Brewer and Shubik (1979), p. 46 
33 Dunnigan (1992), p. 234 
34 Perla (1990)., p. 109 
35 Comments made by Ian Shaw at Royal Holloway University of London Geography 
Department seminar, 24 November 2015, referencing Gibson, James William (1986), The 
Perfect War (Atlantic Monthly Press: New York) 
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how they have been, are, and can be used. Nonetheless, perhaps the most the 
most concise attempt at a categorisation comes from Garry Brewer and Martin 
Shubik who summarise the uses of wargaming as: 
 
'...to attain a better balanced understanding of likely enemy reactions and 
actions; to determine beforehand how plans, procedures, and processes 
could fail; to pool expert knowledge from various areas of competence; to 
help make the abstract more concrete; to generate alternative courses of 
action and new information...; and to test alternatives in a simplified and 
well understood setting before trying to use them in a complex, poorly 
understood, and uncontrolled one.’36 
 
Brewer and Shubik were writing primarily for a business audience, and this is 
evident in their use of forward-looking verbs: attain, determine, pool, help, 
generate, test. While none of what they suggest is incorrect, it is also not a wholly 
useful perspective. This is partly because their approach is too far removed from 
the military context which made wargames so successful to start with, and partly 
due to their omission of the utility of history. With this in mind, the researcher 
proposes the following short categorisation for the uses of wargames: 
 
Wargaming can be used to understand events of the past, plan operations 
and organisations for the present, and explore envisaged futures. 
 
Although perhaps vaguer than Brewer and Shubik’s definition, this reflects an 
attempt to draw on a wider variety of wargaming literature to encompass a 
broader scope. It is worth breaking the definition down and outlining its three 
major facets: 
 
1 – understand events of the past 
The vast majority of publicly available wargames, especially in the hobby sphere, 
concern historical battles and wars.37 Every major epoch of warfare has been 
covered in gaming format, from ancient melee combat, to pike and shot, to 
interstate industrial conflict, to counterinsurgency. Aside from allowing those who 
                                                          
36 Brewer and Shubik (1979), p. 52 
37 Sabin (2002), p. 199-200 
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have an interest in these settings to explore them in an interactive way, there is 
also something to be said for the value of learning from history. Although this 
thesis is not an appropriate place to debate the efficacy of historical studies, the 
oft-quoted George Santayana neatly sums up the sentiment: ‘Those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’38 If you want to avoid mistakes 
in the future it is worth looking back to see if those mistakes have already been 
made by someone else and consequently how you might avoid them yourself.  
 
To take an example, consider the Battle of Waterloo of 18 June 1815. According to 
gaming compendium website BoardGameGeek, some 58 different titles cover this 
battle, making it one of the most popular settings for wargames.39 Players of these 
games can discover the dynamics of the battle and potentially experiment with 
counterfactual outcomes. Should Napoleon have committed more troops to 
overcome the British defences at Hougoumont? What would have happened if 
Blücher’s Prussians entered the fray two hours later than they did? These are the 
sorts of questions that can potentially be explored with a wargame and enable 
players to identify where the commanders of the time may have made erroneous 
decisions. Although specific lessons pertinent to the warfare of the Napoleonic 
era do not translate to modern combat, classic concepts such as force-to-space 
ratios and Schwerpunkt transcend technological differences and are as applicable 
today as they were historically.40 
 
In a non-military setting the utility of historical wargaming should not be 
discounted. Consider a situation where a large company wants to mount a merger 
or takeover of a rival. One potential tool of value here could be to conduct a game 
of a failed past merger, for example Kraft Heinz’s aborted $143 billion takeover of 
Unilever in February 2017, to closely understand why that deal broke down.41 
Assuming there are enough similarities between the game scenario and real life 
(industry area, size of companies etc.), there are likely to be direct lessons which 
can be applied in the real-world situation. On a more general level, perhaps for 
                                                          
38 Santayana (1906), p. 284 
39 BoardGameGeek website 
40 See, for example, the use of Lanchester’s Laws in Adams and Mesterton-Gibbons (2003); 
or Taylor (1974) 
41 Buckley and David (2017) 
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business students, such a game might be used to explore overarching ideas and 
concepts – the corporate equivalents of force-to-space ratios and Schwerpunkt. 
George Kurian attests that Japanese businesses have used such ideas, specifically 
Lanchester’s Laws, to study business competition and competitive advantage.42 
 
2 – plan operations and organisations 
The earlier mentioned historical examples, particularly from the Second World 
War, are illustrative of the uses of wargames for military operational planning. 
Wargames that are accurately modelled on real military units and operating 
environments can allow commanders to play through an envisaged manoeuvre 
and evaluate its success. Multiple iterations of this enable an optimal plan to be 
formulated based on which decision permutations produced desirable outcomes. 
Of course, the accuracy of the game is pivotal to the applicability of this method, 
because if the game inaccurately models the real world the in-game outcomes will 
not be replicable in real life (see Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 for further discussion). 
 
A notable example to demonstrate this tenet comes from the Gulf War. As news 
of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait broke, ‘one of the first thing Pentagon officials did was 
to wargame out the unfolding situation.’43 Based on their findings from this game, 
the officials could predict the disposition of Saddam’s forces and consequently 
work out their subsequent reactions. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
resulted from this. 
 
For organisational planning purposes we can again consider a non-military 
scenario. If a company is seeking to expand it may have a choice of investing 
money into research and development to create new products or reach out to 
new geographical territories to find new customers. The first option puts an 
emphasis on hiring scientists, engineers and designers, while the second option 
favours sales and marketing staff and office managers. It is entirely possible to 
conduct a game around this situation, perhaps exploring the consequences of 
making the opposite decision – i.e. hiring business staff while focusing on R&D or 
hiring product staff while focusing on new territories. 
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It is notable that the organisational planning principles apply equally in the 
military context. Commanders with limited budgets need to make decisions about 
their force composition. Should they procure new submarines at the expense of 
combat aircraft? What ratio of airborne to mechanised infantry brigades do they 
need? The answers to such questions will depend on the posture of the force and 
its current and future missions.44  
 
3 – explore envisaged futures 
The whole point of planning is that it is done for the future. You cannot plan for 
things that have already happened or are happening – this is reacting. Planning 
tackles events and situations that will or may happen. Wargames provide 
powerful tools for devising and exploring these futures. Put simply, a future-
looking wargame would model the world as it is now, then remove or add one or 
more components depending on how the future is envisaged. As an example, a 
naval strategy game set in 2030 would model British forces in line with the 
expected commissioning and decommissioning schedules of current vessels. As 
such, several ships will have left Royal Navy service, but two new Queen Elizabeth 
Class aircraft carriers will be operational, significantly altering the makeup of the 
UK’s naval forces – and, in the words of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security 
review, ‘transform[ing] the Royal Navy’s ability to project our influence 
overseas’.45 
 
An alternative use of wargaming futures is to ascertain how to get from where 
you are now to where you want to be. Continuing the business example from 
above, the company might decide that in ten years’ time it wants to have 
launched four new products and gained a foothold in two new geographical 
markets. This is their desired future model of the world. The current model is 
represented by their present products and markets, as well as their organisational 
makeup. Getting from the current model to the future model will require a 
number of decisions along a timeline, each of which can have different 
consequences, opening up new decisions while shutting off others. In this 
                                                          
44 Which is part of the rationale behind publications like the UK Ministry of Defence’s 
Global Strategic Trends report (2014) 
45 HM Government (2015), p. 30 
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scenario the company will have to hire staff both for the product and business 
functions, but which should it do first? If it hires a load of engineers it will create 
new products but might miss a window of opportunity where a rival moves in and 
dominates a target market, closing this off. A game can be created based on a 
series of decision points that allows the company to play through and make 
decisions to see what the outcome is. If the outcome aligns with the desired final 
model, these decisions should probably be emulated in real life. If the outcome 
does not align with the desired model the company will have to either revisit 
some of the decisions or adjust their expectations in line with what the game 
suggests can be achieved.  
 
2.1.2 Futures and anticipation 
 
Continuing with the final facet of the definition developed above, the various 
ideas surrounding futures resonate through much of the relevant literature, even 
from disparate disciplines. This section ties some of these threads together to 
provide an overview of how wargaming, in its multitude of manifestations, 
concerns futures. 
 
Imagining futures 
 
The future is an uncertain time, and the further into the future we attempt to look 
the more uncertain it becomes. Where uncertainty reigns, imagination thrives, 
and several strands of literature pick up on the theme of imagining futures. In his 
study of competitive chess, Gary Fine asserts that ‘the line’ – the player’s planned 
moves that constitute a strategy – is the core mechanic in chess, not the moves 
themselves.46 Planning, of course, requires an ability to imagine the context in 
which future moves are made, which in chess (and other antagonistic games) 
includes anticipating the other player’s strategy.47 By contrast, in the context of 
emergency exercises which Ben Anderson writes about, the anticipated future is 
‘assumed to be “unimaginable” or “incalculable”.’48 This is of course hyperbole, 
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48 Anderson (2010), p. 229 
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because the future is indeed being imagined and calculated – it would not be 
possible to design and run an emergency crisis exercise without developing an 
idea of the potential causes and impact of an emergency. Anderson is concerned 
with exercises relating to events of terror, which are particularly detestable and 
deplorable, but not unimaginable. The moves on a chess board are innocent and 
harmless compared to the death and destruction associated with terrorism, but 
both the game of chess and emergency exercises require an imagined future to be 
constructed.  
 
This is also the case in a broader political sense. Pericles of ancient Athens was an 
early master of constructing and communicating political futures. A Periclean 
future was ‘drawn from existing reality but moved beyond it’ and ‘its plausibility 
derived from its practicability.’49 By contrast, in a more modern context, a superb 
biographical essay by Alexander Galloway about Guy Debord and his later-life 
forays into wargaming concludes with the following passage: 
 
For the left, the 'historical present' is one of immediate justice won through the 
raw facts of struggle and sacrifice. In short, the historical present is always true, 
but forever at the same time bloody. But the future, the utopian imagination, is a 
time of complete liberation forged from the mould of the most profound 
injustice. In short, utopia is always false, but forever at the same time free. [Italics 
in original]50 
 
In his first wargames, Debord tried to capture this struggle, but eventually he 
became obsessed with ‘the sublimation of antagonistic desire into an abstract 
rulebook.’51 This rulebook was embodied in a chess-like wargame which had more 
to do with military logistics than it did with political strife. Therefore, in imagining 
futures for wargames, unattainable Debordian utopias are likely to be less 
successful than Periclean rhetoric.  
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Actioning futures 
 
It is imperative to keep in mind that while wargames require an imagined future, 
this future is not constructed for its own sake, but as something which requires 
action. Professional wargames are not frivolous pastimes but are intended to 
derive lessons that help organisations realign their structure and behaviour in 
order to mitigate threats and exploit opportunities that not only may, but likely 
will materialise. Reports from the ‘Schriever Wargame’ played by the US Air Force 
in 2010 attest to this actionability as the key outcome of the wargame. ‘The 
lessons identified...are not futuristic concepts,’ says Hon. George Foresman – 
stressing the immediacy of the imagined future the game constructed.52 Similarly, 
General Robert Chekan attests that his team ‘gained insight into real issues that 
we confront now and will likely confront in the future.’53 For both Foresman and 
Chekan it is clear that the wargame provided a greater understanding of how their 
organisations should position themselves to tackle the issues brought to bear by 
the imagined wargame scenario. Unlike the abstractness of Fine’s chess or 
Debord’s utopia, wargames require the lessons learned to be actionable as they 
relate to a potentially very real future. 
 
Indeed, actionability was a key driver in the genesis of this thesis. As outlined in 
Section 1.3, the original idea to research cyber wargaming came from a project 
conducted in partnership with a professional services firm. The researcher’s 
contact at the firm was, at the time, on secondment to the company from their 
role as a senior civil servant. In this role they had commissioned a study which 
resulted in The Global Cyber Game report (analysed in detail in Chapter 3, Game 
6), but in initial conversations with the researcher they lamented that, although 
interesting, such reports had limited utility because they lacked actionability. 
From the researcher’s efforts they were therefore exceptionally keen to see 
something tangible and actionable that people could get their hands on and use.54 
Although the firm did not play any role in the remainder of the thesis beyond the 
progenitor stages, the game design presented in Chapter 4 and results discussed 
in Chapter 6 hopefully fulfil the actionability brief. 
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Anticipating futures 
 
Where some literatures refer to imagining and actioning futures, others refer to 
anticipation. Anticipation can be considered a combination of imagination and 
action – envisaging the effects of a future and reacting appropriately. In a paper 
on using geodesign to model and simulate wildfires, David Hulse et al draw close 
links between anticipation and surprise.55 They conclude that modelling can help 
address surprise in two ways: 
 
‘1) when and where surprising departure from expectation is due to events, to 
actions, or to the unanticipated interplay of both; 
2) when, where and how “reducible ignorance” can be most effectually reduced 
vis-à-vis anticipated surprises.’56 
 
As established in Chapter 1, wargaming is fundamentally concerned with 
modelling and simulation, so these findings are entirely applicable to wargaming. 
Indeed, understanding or reducing surprise through anticipation can be 
considered a key use of wargames. Because wargames involve human participants 
experiencing events, players gain insight into the source of surprise similar to the 
first finding above (see Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.5 for further discussion). 
Furthermore, as an introspective learning activity, players can identify gaps in 
theirs and others’ knowledge and seek ways to bridge these gaps. Vincanne 
Adams et al have even gone so far as to claim that ‘anticipation is not only an 
epistemic orientation towards the future, it is also a moral imperative.’57 
 
While this thesis makes no claims about the ethics of creating knowledge, it is 
clear that anticipation is closely related to subjectivity and emotion. In everyday 
parlance this is evident through how we often think of surprise as a positive or 
negative feeling – being pleasantly or unpleasantly surprised. Roy Baumeister et al 
provide the additional insight that ‘anticipation of emotion is more important 
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than the actual emotion’ for driving human behaviour.58 These are findings which 
help inform the uses of wargaming because games are closely linked with 
competition and personal performance (see Section 2.2.4), so understanding the 
imperatives that cause people to act, or not act, provides foundations for 
analysing player behaviour. 
 
Preventing vs. enabling futures 
 
As related to this thesis, there seems to be some dissonance in the futures 
literature between pessimism and optimism, and a disjunction between tactics 
and strategy. Anderson, for example, focuses on pessimism and tactics. He writes: 
‘the aim of security is, supposedly, to control and manage the future, ensuring 
that an event does not come to pass.’59 The focus here is on preventing a single 
negative event from occurring. The idea of prevention is pessimistic because it 
presupposes that something bad will happen, while narrowing the scope to an 
event is tactical because it does not take into account the bigger picture. The 2016 
UK Cyber Security Strategy, on the other hand, is comparatively optimistic and 
strategic (as the name implies). It is optimistic because in its attempts to ensure 
security and prosperity it is enabling rather than preventative, and it is strategic 
because it draws upon a wide gamut of society to achieve its goals while being 
situated in a larger context.60 This is not to say that either approach is more 
correct than the other, but merely to recognise that there are different 
approaches to the topic of futures.  
 
Wargames can fall anywhere on this spectrum depending on how they are 
designed and the learning outcomes desired. It can be difficult to envisage a truly 
optimistic enabling game, as games usually have a set endpoint after which the 
future the game imagines effectively ceases to exist, and therefore any decisions 
and achievements made within the game are rendered moot. This is not 
representative of the real world which, of course, does not have a set endpoint 
but continues onward uninterrupted. To reflect this, a game would likewise have 
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to continue ad infinitum. While this falls outside the scope of this thesis, 
organisations like the US Department of Defense have the resources and 
capability to run such games. The National Decisionmaking game, for example, 
uses players from Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) programmes to model 
193 countries spanning a 50-year timeframe. Any time conflict arises, the 
situation is turned into a wargame, ‘complete with a “history of the future.”’61 
This is perhaps the ultimate wargame solution, combining prevention, enabling, 
strategy, and tactics to allow players to shape the future according to what they 
envisage, whether that is pessimistic or optimistic. 
 
Cyber futures 
 
Finally, although futures are imagined, they are not merely conjured from 
nothingness. Instead, knowledge and understanding of the present is used to 
extrapolate what the future might look like. Writing about wargaming during the 
Cold War, Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi asserts that ‘the technical horizon within which 
future wars would be fought would change constantly, albeit uncertainly.’62 While 
this is true to an extent, a more accurate assessment (made with the infinite 
benefit of hindsight) is that Cold War wargaming was based on a future that had 
already arrived, and which would only evolve incrementally. Although the 
destructive power of nuclear weapons increased and their delivery mechanisms 
became more sophisticated, the overall character of these weapons remained 
unchanged (and does so to this day).  
 
By comparison, the future of cyber weapons and cyber security is very much in an 
embryonic stage.63 Although we have seen glimpses of what cyber capabilities 
might look like – for example the Russian attack on Estonia in 2007, the Stuxnet 
operation of 2010, or the NotPetya malware of 2017 – there is real difficulty in 
predicting the character of future cyber capabilities. It may be entirely possible 
that cyber capabilities have plateaued like nuclear ones and we will not see new 
technologies beyond incremental improvements in levels of destruction or 
                                                          
61 Garretson (2015) 
62 Ghamari-Tabrizi (2000), p. 164 
63 Brangetto et al (2015), p. 18 
32 
 
sophistication of delivery mechanisms. On the other hand, it is also likely there 
are things to come which no one can foresee. Imagining the cyber future is 
therefore very difficult and represents a particularly thorny, if satisfying, challenge 
for wargame designers. 
 
2.1.3 Skills 
 
Much of the literature surrounding wargames points out the lessons learnt from 
games that have already been played, particularly cyber defence exercises. These 
can be categorised in terms of the takeaway skills that have been developed by 
participants in the game, or areas where skills are deficient and need to be 
cultivated. This section will explore these partly with a view to postulating what 
kind of lessons may be derivable from the wargames used in this thesis, and partly 
to determine where the focus has been so far, thereby demarcating where there 
is scope to make original contributions. 
 
Networking and communication 
 
Wargames in which players can collaborate to achieve goals allow players to forge 
connections they might not otherwise have, and transfer knowledge and ideas 
across departments and domains. On a theoretical level it has been postulated 
that massive multiplayer online games engender skills ‘closely parallel those 
required by a military transforming itself to operating under the concept of 
network centric warfare.’64 Although the hype around network-centricity has 
abated from its heydays in the 1990s, cyber may well provide an environment 
where this concept is worth revisiting. On a practical level, evidence from the 
Schriever Wargame and others suggests that the social aspects of wargames are 
fulfilling important functions. General Chekan attests that Schriever allowed his 
team to ‘establish both connections and even friendships’ that would allow them 
to progress with inter-departmental integration.65  
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From another US Department of Defense wargame, two key lessons about 
communication were identified: firstly, a need for a ‘common lexicon in relation 
to cyber’, and secondly that there are ‘barriers to cooperation...hampering 
information sharing.’66 With regards to the latter, the experience of Chekan 
demonstrates that such barriers can be negated through further wargame 
participation. As to the former, the challenge appears to be a semantic one that 
can be ironed out through continued collaboration and communication. 
Networking (in the human sense), is the best way to overcome such challenges, 
and wargames provide structured environments in which to build these links and 
relationships. (See Chapter 6 for examples of participants in this thesis 
establishing personal connections through a game, particularly to enable peer-
didacticism and knowledge exchange as in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.5) 
 
Deterrence 
 
Very much related to the need for inter-departmental networking and 
relationships is communication on an international level. Specifically, the 
Schriever Wargame demonstrated that traditional assumptions about deterrence 
do not translate to cyberspace.67 Deterrence strategies are built on a combination 
of directed policy statements and signalling through force composition and 
posture. Effective deterrence relies on communicating one’s intentions to a 
perceived adversary. The Schriever Wargame highlighted that these tools and 
methods are lacking in cyberspace.68 If cyber intentions cannot be communicated, 
there exists a real risk of unrestricted escalation with the potential for conflict. 
International communication skills are therefore a paramount requirement in 
order to avoid major military cyber confrontations. 
 
In recent years, the cyber deterrence debate has transitioned from theory to 
practice. In particular, the 2016 UK National Cyber Security Strategy contains an 
explicit focus on deterrence, with some eight pages (14 percent) of the content 
devoted to this concept.69 Despite such lengthy treatment, the Strategy still seems 
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to suffer from the problems of communication highlighted in the Schriever 
wargame some six years prior. As an example, one of the pivotal problems of 
cyber deterrence is the problem of anonymity which creates uncertainty and 
undermines credibility. The Strategy states that one of its approaches to 
countering hostile foreign actors is to ‘attribute specific cyber identities publicly 
when we judge it in the national interest to do so.’70 This suggests that the UK has 
some sort of technical capability to identify actors in cyberspace, effectively 
overcoming the problem of anonymity. Although certainly positive, there are two 
key caveats which must be taken into account, both relating to the issue of 
transparency. First, because this technical capability is merely a conjecture 
publicly, there is no way for the UK to provide proof of their attribution without 
giving away the secrets of the technology. As long as attribution remains 
unsubstantiated it is little better than finger-pointing. Second, judging what is 
considered to be ‘in the national interest’ is highly transient and difficult for 
outsiders to predict. Using this as the criterion for disclosing attribution does not 
promote certainty nor credibility.71 
 
Scale and speed of reaction 
 
The ubiquity of computer networking and rate at which signals can travel along 
fibre optic cables makes scale and speed the hallmarks of the cyber domain. 
Humans managing cyber operations and equipment therefore need particular 
skillsets tailored to this expansive, fast-paced environment. Participants in both 
the wargames referred to above provide evidence that the effects of a cyber 
attack will not be constrained to a single geographical locale, but have a global 
impact.72 Commanders faced with the decision to launch cyber attacks therefore 
need to be equipped with a broad understanding of geopolitical situations in 
order to fully comprehend the potential ramifications of their decisions. Simply 
understanding the tactical situation is not enough; the wider strategic picture 
must also be kept in mind. 
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The speed of reaction required to respond to events in cyberspace is often 
beyond human capabilities. A human cannot gather, interpret, and act on the data 
which constitutes a cyber attack as fast as a computer can. Even when the data is 
collated by a computer and presented to a human in the form of a decision-
making point, this decision is likely to come too slowly. Owing to this, Werner 
Dahm and Eric Silkowski assert that the Schriever Wargame showed that 
‘cyberspace will demand increasingly autonomous capabilities.’73 From the point 
of view of this thesis, the requirement for autonomy demonstrates that a board 
wargame which attempts to simulate a tactical cyber engagement is pretty moot, 
and it is instead better to focus on the higher strategic level, where human 
decisions still reign. 
 
Self-learning 
 
On a more general level, wargaming can enhance players’ capacity for auto-
pedagogy. This means that players identify their own learning outcomes and 
evaluate whether these were achieved, plus any remedial steps necessary. Nina 
Wilhelmson and Thomas Svensson say these skills can be embedded within the 
game design process by involving players from the outset.74 This certainly seems 
to echo established norms in wargame design, where games are constructed 
bottom-up with the learning objectives as basis. One caveat to keep in mind with 
this approach is that players may be able to anticipate events during the course of 
the game because they had specifically requested them to be included, which can 
negate the impact these events were intended to have. The extent to which the 
design of the game is player-led is therefore a balance.  
 
Perhaps the most glaring vindication of the usefulness of wargaming for self-
learning comes from Robert Specht, who says that ‘the player teaches himself in a 
manner more convincing than any lecture can possibly be.’75 Wargames go 
beyond mere showing and telling, instead employing the idea of learning-through-
doing. There are few more powerful pedagogical tools than the ones where 
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participants actively engage with the material in a highly sensory way that 
provides instant feedback on their performance. In the words of Graham Longley-
Brown: ‘I hear I forget; I see I remember; I do I understand.’ 76 In this sense, 
wargaming is not quite Pavlovian, but it is certainly very effective. 
 
2.1.4 Play and playfulness 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the capacity of wargaming to generate tangible 
benefits in the form of learned skills, the relationship between wargaming and 
ideas of play have historically been fraught. How different wargaming 
communities employ terminology is emblematic of this schism. Professionals tend 
to use the separated “war gaming” while hobbyists prefer the contracted 
“wargaming” (with the hyphenated “war-gaming” also occasionally making an 
appearance in both camps). The reasons for the dichotomy are not entirely 
evident, but Perla postulates that it may have something to do with professionals 
seeking to distance themselves from the jovial ‘gaming’ aspects of the activity.77 
Physically separation of the words leads to a logical separation the professional 
domain (war) from the playful domain (gaming). It would be a mistake, however, 
to wilfully introduce distance between wargaming and play, for two reasons.  
 
Historical links between war and play 
 
First, war, the activity at the heart of wargaming, has strong historical linkages to 
play. Philosopher John Gray, interpreting the writings of Homer, posits that in 
ancient Greece war was a sporting activity filled with rivalry and glory.78 Similarly, 
historian John Lynn has pointed out that in medieval times, chivalric ethos 
dominated warfare and concepts of courage and honour were boasted in 
tourneys, organised – as a display of war – for this purpose.79 Even Aristotle found 
need in his Nicomachean Ethics to address the question of frivolity in war, 
although he disagreed that is has playful content, concluding that war has no 
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place for leisure because war is a means to an end, not an end in itself.80 Gray 
tentatively supports this position, building on his earlier argument by concluding 
that ‘wars are not fought to stave off boredom….but once it is underway, war is 
often embraced as a release.’81 Gray’s point is that although wars are started for 
serious purposes, their conduct ‘has become another entertainment’82, perhaps a 
reference to the Gulf War which because of its extensive television coverage has 
been called the ‘first Nintendo war.’83 
 
The point, then, is that while war is a very serious activity – quite literally a matter 
of life and death – it nonetheless contains elements of playfulness such as 
sporting or entertaining qualities. To deny the links between war and play 
therefore does a disservice to war, because it removes essential elements that 
help us better understand war as a phenomenon. The reader will note that this 
thesis uses the contracted “wargaming”, partly as an attempt to maintain the 
close links between war and play. 
 
Applicability of ludology to wargaming 
 
Second, concepts of play can do much to inform wargaming practice. As 
established at other points in this thesis (Section 2.2.2), wargaming is 
fundamentally a study of human events. Scholars of play have long used 
ludological lenses to study the human condition, of which war and conflict are an 
intractable part, so it is prudent to draw on this material when analysing the uses 
of wargames. One of the earliest recognised pioneers was Dutch cultural historian 
Johan Huizinga, whose seminal Homo Ludens opens with the assertion that 
playing games has a ‘significant function’ [italics in original] in shaping society and 
culture.84 He proceeds to argue and illustrate how play has influenced many 
fundamental aspects of humanity, from epistemology to law to art. With regards 
to war, Huizinga finds it inexorably linked with play: ‘Ever since words existed for 
fighting and playing, men have been wont to call war a game.’85 This is not mere 
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linguistic gymnastics, however, as human behaviour in war has been shaped by 
ludological practices – notably in the idea of judicial duels which are rooted in the 
same chivalric ethos Lynn referred to.86  
 
In these general senses, we can use Huizinga’s writings to inform our 
understanding of player behaviour in wargaming. If wargames emulate war, 
players are likely to act in war-like manners while playing the games. Moreover, 
these behaviours stem from humanity’s roots as a playing animal. Of particular 
relevance, Huizinga notes how competition, ‘the innate desire to be first’, drives 
people to conflict.87 This directly ties in with modern ideas that seek to harness 
this competitive spirit to fuel creativity and innovation (see Section 2.2.4).  
 
Another ludological practitioner and writer is Bernie de Koven, who is less 
celebrated – indeed largely unreferenced in wargaming literature – but no less 
relevant. A central figure in the New Games Movement which flourished in the US 
in the 1970s, de Koven made singularly effective use of games and play in his 
career as an educator, which he documented in The Well-Played Game.88 In the 
book, de Koven draws on his extensive experience to analyse what prompts 
people to create, start or join games, to avoid games, to end games, and to 
change games for greater enjoyment.  
 
A central theme to de Koven’s book is that player participation in games is 
ultimately individualistic. Even in team games and sports, what prompts players to 
join and actively take part is that they see a way for themselves to play the game 
in a way they want to. Consider the (real) example of the girl who refused to play 
hide and seek until she had sufficiently acclimatised to the playing group through 
distant observation and decided it was safe to join89, or the (hypothetical) 
example of a volleyball player who grows tired of following the rules and so 
changes them, with the permission of the other players, to suit their desires at 
that particular time.90 What is being demonstrated here is closely aligns with the 
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advantages of wargaming, particularly the principles of safety (Section 2.2.7) and 
flexibility (Section 2.2.6). 
 
The intent of this discussion has been to illustrate that concepts of play and 
playfulness have received thorough treatment in disparate literatures, ranging 
from philosophy to history to cultural studies. These literatures show that the idea 
of play cannot be separated from war and therefore should not be separated 
from wargaming, and that treatises on play can provide new lenses by which to 
analyse aspects of wargaming. 
 
2.2 Advantages of wargaming 
 
The uses of wargaming, as specified with regards to futures and skills, are not 
necessarily unique to wargaming. Other analytic and pedagogical activities can 
potentially be used to achieve similar outcomes. However, the literature reveals 
that wargaming confers a number of advantages over alternative methods.   
 
2.2.1 Advantages over computers 
 
Given the growth in availability of computers and their processing and graphical 
power, astute commentators will question the choice to create a manual game as 
opposed to a computer game – particularly for this thesis where the topic of the 
game is cyber security. There are certain things computers are more capable of 
doing than humans, particularly complex calculations and computations. 
Computers are also more flexible when it comes to graphical display, being able to 
manipulate digital images to suit the needs of the game, as opposed to the 
relatively static display offered by paper. In the inaugural 1981 issue of Computer 
Gaming World, Chris Crawford presciently outlined five capabilities which 
distinguish computer wargames from board games: performing more extensive 
and realistic calculations, limited intelligence (visibility and knowledge), solitaire 
games against computer opponents, real-time play, and networked multiplayer 
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games.91 Almost 40 years later, these capabilities have been realised many times 
over and can readily be seen in commercial computer wargames in various 
genres, from the grand strategy game Hearts of Iron to the first-person shooter 
Call of Duty. Despite some clear benefits, however, there are good reasons for 
choosing a manual game over a computer game, as elucidated in the following 
sections. 
 
Inaccessible mechanics 
 
Computers, though easy to access and use, are not simple mechanically. Getting 
to grips with the internal workings of computer hardware and software requires a 
significant degree of technical knowledge and understanding. To those without 
these skills, the operations of the computer remain shrouded in mystery. A 
manual wargame is built as a fully-accessible system, where all the information is 
available to the players, including rules, procedures, numbers and probabilities.92 
In a computer wargame this is largely hidden from the player. The downside of 
this is that the player does not know why the game behaves as it does, which in 
turns limits the learning potential of the game. This is especially true of ‘pre-play 
analysis’ where the players scope out the game’s various aspects in order to 
understand how it works before actually playing the game.93 In order to fully 
utilise the pedagogical dimensions of wargaming, it is therefore often better to 
design and play a manual game rather than a computer game. 
 
Modifiability 
 
Following on from this, without easily accessible mechanics, computer wargames 
become very difficult to modify. Once the game has been created its rules, 
procedures, numbers and probabilities will remain constant as determined by the 
game developers. The players have no opportunity to make their own changes to 
fit their needs. Changes might be needed to reflect changes in the real world, or 
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to adapt the game to different training needs.94 Part of the allure of manual 
wargames is that players can adapt game parameters as required, even mid-
game. With a computer game this would have to be done by the developer on 
request of the players, incurring both time and monetary costs.  
 
Alternatively, a developer might anticipate, or the customer requests, that 
parameters need to be changeable and build this function into the game’s 
interface. However, as Sabin points out, the computer game developer thereby 
becomes a gatekeeper to the game mechanics, preventing modifications ‘beyond 
those explicitly allowed for by the designer.’95 It could also be contended that 
such solutions suffer from problems of scalability. Changing a few parameters 
may be simple (for example the amount of starting resources or the destructive 
capacity of a weapon), but to be truly modifiable, every parameter and every 
algorithm needs to be changeable. With a board wargame this is as simple as 
grabbing a pen and making edits to the rule sheet. With a computer game, 
however, even if the interface is designed to enable modifiable algorithms, the 
user would likely need to understand the principles of constructing an SQL query 
to utilise it.  
 
Affordability 
 
In this way, manual wargames are also more affordable than computer games. 
The initial development of a computer wargame, involving extensive consultations 
with a professional game design and programming team, can drive costs to six-
figure sums and beyond, to which must be added the costs of ‘constant fine-
tuning to make it relevant to emerging scenarios.’96 A manual wargame, on the 
other hand, while it might require the consultation of a professional to create it, 
does not come with the same attendant costs, either in initial production or 
subsequent adjustments. Another aspect to this is of course that manual games 
are played on paper game boards using paper or plastic game markers and dice. 
These are orders of magnitude cheaper than computers, even low-specification 
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ones. The investment required to get a working wargame is therefore much less 
with manual games than computer games. 
 
Compatibility 
 
In the same vein, manual wargames do not suffer from any compatibility issues, 
as a computer wargame might.97 A wargame created for a particular computer 
configuration is not necessarily transferrable to other computers or may cease to 
function if the configuration changes. The repercussions of this is that a computer 
wargame can potentially have limited applicability, only being usable by the 
organisation which originally commissioned it and this only being the case for a 
finite amount of time. For example, a game created for the Air Force might not be 
usable by the Navy because they have different computer specifications, and the 
Air Force can only use it until such time that they perform a system update which 
relegates the game to legacy software. Paper and dice are unaffected by this, 
being self-contained and not reliant on any additional hardware. With computer 
games having such short shelf-lives compared to the indefinite lifespan of manual 
games, Sabin estimates that ‘the entire corpus of board wargames outnumbers 
currently accessible computer game titles by at least a factor of ten.’98 
 
Human expertise 
 
Finally, in the process of replacing human ingenuity with computer processing 
power as the adversary in a wargame, a lot of the finesse of wargaming is lost. 
Conflict is, at heart, a human activity, replete with quirks and foibles which are 
beyond the grasp of a computer game. In the past three decades computers have 
bested humans at certain conflict games like chess – notably IBM’s Deep Blue 
versus Garry Kasparov in 199799 – and more recently Go – Google’s AlphaGo 
versus Lee Sedol in 2016.100 However, a well-designed wargame does not lend 
itself to being playable by an algorithm, no matter how complex or powerful. Jim 
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Dunnigan writes that despite advances in artificial intelligence, these ‘routines 
usually have problems with strategy and are not quick to catch on to changes in 
the big picture.’101 This observation precedes the feats achieved by Deep Blue and 
AlphaGo, yet is not invalidated by these events, even if the terminology “routines” 
is somewhat outdated. In a tactical engagement the computer may be able to 
crunch numbers better than humans, a point emphasised in James Somers’ 
explanation of Kasparov’s defeat, but it still has a hard time planning a long-term 
strategy and dealing with unexpected variables.102 It is in these situations the 
power of the human brain becomes evident – the ability to create and innovate. 
With computer wargames, the creativity and innovation which underpins game 
design and play can be diminished or lost, yet it is these facets which provide the 
most striking learning opportunities.103 In adversarial settings, a manual wargame 
is therefore preferred to a computer one, because we still rely on human 
expertise computers simply cannot match.104 
 
With regards to the limitations of computers, a singularly insightful and 
provocative remark which neatly summarises this section comes from an unlikely 
source: Pablo Picasso. In conversation with William Fifield, Picasso reportedly said 
of computers: ‘But they are useless. They can only give you answers.’105 This is an 
important point which will be returned to later (Section 2.3.3). 
 
2.2.2 The human factor  
 
The point about human expertise is significant because it indicates the very core 
of what wargaming is about. The optimal use for a wargame is not to test a 
specific strategy or tool, but to test the people in charge of implementing the 
strategies and tools. Whatever the granularity of a wargame, it can never simulate 
the real world with complete accuracy, yet the people who partake in the game 
are the same as they are in the real world. In this way, wargaming is, what Perla 
calls ‘an imperfect mirror of reality, reflecting it best in the decision-making 
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processes of its players.’106 Wargaming is about exploring different paths through 
scenarios, but the final outcome of a game is perhaps less important than the 
process of getting there. Wargaming is a participatory activity where human 
action and interaction is central to the experience, and it is this experience which 
is one of the most important things a wargame can offer.107  
 
Interactions between humans provide some of the most dynamic and 
unpredictable situations in life and ensure that no two iterations of a wargame 
are alike.108 In Go, for example, the number of possible moves famously exceeds 
the number of atoms in the universe.109 Through the course of a wargame, players 
make decisions that affect other players, creating a complex chain of 
interdependent decision-making cycles. Though this can result in a confusing web 
of interactions, wargaming ‘forces participants to think hard about a problem – 
hard enough...to make the elements of the problem explicit and logically 
consistent.’110 Wargaming challenges players to think clearly about issues and 
provides insights into that which was previously obfuscated. Few other activities 
can have this effect, especially not at the same time as allowing the people 
making decisions to play them out and live the experience.  
 
Here we see the limitations of an alternative approach to problem solving: game 
theory. Game theory breaks constituent parts of a problem down into 
mathematically definable elements, and then crunches the numbers to arrive at 
an optimal solution. Such an approach removes the unquantifiable human 
elements which introduce uncertainty, instead supposedly providing robust 
scientific answers backed up by rigorous numerical reasoning. Where game theory 
falls short, however, is precisely in its removal of the human element, which, as 
Brewer and Shubik assert, ‘real experience has forcefully and repeatedly proven’ 
to be a ‘critical feature of actual operations.’111  Scenarios involving human action, 
interaction, and decisions cannot be reduced to just the objective data. The 
subjective experience of each participant is critical in determining how events 
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unfold, and wargaming provides a method of integrating these when exploring 
scenarios and solving problems. 
 
Indeed, historical experience has shown that pure number crunching yields only 
impartial or even counterproductive results. In the 1960s, the United States Joint 
Chiefs of Staff’s ‘push to reduce the role of human players in so-called “analytical” 
games, undoubtedly contributed to the self-deluding tendencies exhibited by 
many of the games played about the conflict in Vietnam and other potential 
trouble spots even today.’112 Humans are at the centre of every conflict and 
attempts to examine and analyse these activities need to take this into account. 
For wargaming to be effective it should include and embrace the human element, 
and players should, as Dunnigan phrases it, ‘get the feeling that they are 
participating in a study of human events, which is exactly what they are doing.’113 
 
2.2.3 Cost 
 
Perhaps the most obvious benefit of using wargaming to gain experience as 
opposed to mounting actual combat operations (or launching a business venture) 
is that it is significantly cheaper. This is in terms of money, manpower, and 
political investment. When testing new equipment, strategies or tactics, rigorous 
scientific analysis will always be costlier than a wargaming implementation. When 
testing new hardware, for example, the great expense with such ‘realistic 
experimentation,’ says Sanu Kainikara, stems from the need for ‘building up 
multiple copies of devices using emerging and unproven technologies.’114 This is 
perhaps especially true of the cyber domain, where the pace of technological 
advancement is particularly swift. 
 
The cost-saving aspects of wargaming were enshrined in US Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Robert O. Work’s memorandum of February 2015, in which he asserted a 
‘need to reinvigorate, institutionalize, and systematize wargaming across the 
Department [sic]’ in order to, amongst other things, ‘make the best use of limited 
                                                          
112 Perla (1990), p. 126 
113 Dunnigan (1992), p. 54 
114 Kainakara (2003), p. 6 
46 
 
resources.’115 This is ample evidence that the cost benefits of wargaming have 
been recognised at the highest level of policy-making. 
 
2.2.4 Creativity 
 
In being a participatory activity, wargaming has an immense capacity for 
exercising the uniquely human capability to create and innovate. In part this is 
because ‘wargaming forces participants to look at reality from a different 
angle,’116 an angle the game designer can impose, but also because ‘great games 
capture meanings that have never been said.’117 This leaves games open to 
interpretation by the players, allowing them to exercise their creative capabilities. 
In this way, a wargame actively forces players to escape from their comfortable 
reality, yet it does not necessarily provide an alternative view, instead 
encouraging players to imagine their own alternate realities.  
 
The benefit of this is that players construct the reality of the game according to 
their particular needs, which not only helps serve the learning outcomes of the 
game, but also challenges stagnant visions of operations and procedures. In the 
words of Alfred H. Hausrath, ‘Gaming challenges the competitive spirit and spurs 
the contenders to do their best in any given situation. It stimulates the search for 
new and more effective ways of meeting situations and encourages innovation.’118 
It has also been highlighted that this is particularly the case when players are 
drawn from decision-making echelons of organisations: ‘The genius of modern 
professional wargaming,’ says Mark Herman et. al., ‘is that it...provides a 
methodology to get at the things that one leader, no matter how visionary, 
cannot grasp on his or her own.’119 Wargaming provides an effective tool for 
inspiring the flow of creative juices and, importantly, provides an outlet where 
these juices can fuel planning, training and learning. 
 
                                                          
115 Work (2015), p. 1 
116 Perla (1990), p. 181 
117 Perla and McGrady (2011), p. 122 
118 Quoted in Brewer and Shubik (1979), p. 52 
119 Herman et al (2009), p. 3 
47 
 
Other writers have noted that this also extends to the game developer. In the 
process of designing a game, the creator inevitably experiences many of the same 
things the eventual players do. According to John Curry and Tim Price, this can 
result in ‘unexpected real world insights’, which can be passed on to the players 
either indirectly through the game or directly through communication.120 
 
2.2.5 Experience and simulation 
 
One of the key benefits of wargaming as opposed to other forms of learning or 
training is that it provides a manner of ersatz experience of the real thing. By 
actively participating in the game, say Perla and McGrady in a seminal 2011 paper 
on the topic, players are provided with a ‘story-living experience...more akin to 
real-life experience than to reading a novel or watching a video. [Italics in 
original]’121 Simply having a scenario, and its outcomes, relayed to you, whether it 
is by text or imagery, through a second-party is never as engaging or effective as 
the first-hand experience.122 Additionally, traditional learning materials such as 
textbooks and instructional videos are relatively static, having been created at a 
certain point in time for a certain purpose. Wargames are updateable in real time 
as they are played and, because they centre on human participation, no two 
games are the same. Because of this, wargames ‘can help enlighten players about 
that fact that unexpected and unpredictable events, including embarrassing ones, 
do happen and that there are real consequences when they do.’123 
 
Making wargames come to life in this way turns them from models into 
simulations. Most simply defined, simulations are models exposed to time.124 
Whereas a model is a static representation of a system, a simulation represents 
the moving operations of the system and how it changes as it is exposed to 
conditions. An Airfix plane is a model; placed in a wind tunnel it becomes a 
simulation. Wargames, of course, are potentially more complex simulations than 
pure scientific experiments (such as wind tunnels) because they involve human 
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participants whose behaviour is not predictable in the same way physical objects 
are.  
 
Because humans are the agents of change in a wargame, it makes sense for the 
focus of study to be the participants rather than the game itself. As established in 
Section 2.2.2, the human is the magic ingredient to a successful wargame so it 
would be a mistake to relegate them to mere input into the system, only for their 
part to be churned over and a game outcome produced (although sometimes the 
outcome is also important). That churn is the key function where players derive 
value from a game because they experience the process in a lifelike way, with 
attendant unpredictable events and consequences. 
 
The point about consequences is important because consequences are the results 
of decisions. If the world was entirely predictable there would be no need to 
make decisions as the path of experience is known a priori. This is, of course, an 
absurd logical inconsistency and much of our experience of the world is entirely 
unpredictable. The burden of decision-making thrust on people thereby becomes 
a heavy one, for they cannot necessarily see what path the decision will lead 
down. A very accurate wargame may help illuminate some of these paths, but 
more importantly, a wargame will allow the player to actually make decisions, not 
merely imagine them.  As such, ‘games give players active responsibility for their 
decisions, similar to what they would experience in the real world, and force them 
to bear many of the same consequences of those decisions, both positive and 
negative.’125 Through exploring, repeating and reflecting on decisions, players gain 
actual experience that cannot be attained by reading a book or watching a 
video.126  It is here that one of the key benefits of wargaming is revealed. 
 
2.2.6 Flexibility 
 
Following on from the preceding paragraph, wargaming is an ideal way to tackle 
the complexity of the real world. Without belabouring the point, it must be 
emphasised that the human experience is only consistent in that it is inconsistent. 
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No two lives lived are the same, nor are any two given days, and varying contexts 
provide width and depth to the complexity of the world. That wargaming is the 
right tool to meet this challenging environment has been frequently reiterated.127 
 
It has already been argued that attempts to reduce the world to mathematically 
rigorous components are futile, and wargaming should be recognised as a 
superior method for analysing events, processes and people. This is because, 
unlike strictly scientific approaches, wargaming affords a great degree of flexibility 
in how it is applied. Wargames come in a huge variety of shapes, sizes, and 
configurations, all of which can be adapted as the situation requires. In his 
wholehearted endorsement of wargaming, Work makes this point very well: 
‘When done right, wargames spur innovation and provide mechanisms for 
addressing emerging challenges, exploiting new technologies, and shaping the 
future security environment.’128 The key words here are “innovation”, “emerging”, 
“new” and “future”, all of which indicate the complexity of the modern world. At 
the same time, however, the verbs “spur”, “addressing”, “exploiting” and 
“shaping” all show how wargaming is ably equipped to deal with this complexity, 
even taking advantage of it. No other learning tool has this capability. 
 
2.2.7 Safety 
 
The final benefit of wargaming analysed here is that of safety. Wargaming can 
take place almost anywhere, from business boardrooms to the hobbyist 
basements. The one place it does not take place, however, is on the actual 
battlefield. As such, wargaming is devoid of the actual dangers of conflict. Though 
initially counterintuitive, on reflection it is perhaps little wonder that H. G. Wells, 
an ardent pacifist, was the progenitor of the wargaming hobby. After all, only 
wargaming could provide ‘a harmless setting in which human beings could face 
some of war’s challenges without destroying lives, property, or nature, but also 
taught something of the reality of Great War to those not familiar with its 
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practice.’129 In the business world the benefits are very much the same, allowing 
players to ‘”experience” the future in a risk-free environment.’130  
 
Wargaming is an activity which provides safety not only from mental and physical 
trauma, but also from the adverse effects of a wrong decision. Without the 
attendant real-world repercussions, players can be encouraged to explore paths 
they may otherwise have been loath to go down, enabling ‘behaviours that might 
not occur in the real world – after all, “it’s only a game.”’131 This attitude, if taken 
in a serious vein, is key to getting the most out of the learning experience of a 
wargame. The thrill of a reckless charge ending in bloodbath or the exhilaration of 
a wild investment gone awry can be acted out without costing the lives of the 
Light Brigade or a plummeting stock price followed by summarily joblessness. In 
short, to borrow the Perla’s phrasing, wargaming ‘provides an opportunity for 
glory without gore and defeat without destruction.’132 
 
2.3 Limitations of wargaming 
 
For all the advantages contained within wargaming, the activity is not without 
limitations. Outlined below are a number of facets that should be taken into 
account when evaluating the utility of a wargame as an educational tool. 
 
2.3.1 Abstraction 
 
Wargames are imperfect reflections of reality. If they were perfect reflections 
they would be reality, thereby negating many of the benefits analysed above. 
Depending on the accuracy of the reflection, the games become more or less 
abstract. Abstraction can make a game more accessible, but there are also 
repercussions, particularly when it comes to post-game analysis. The complexity 
of analysis is in fact proportionally related to the amount of abstraction in the 
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game, and as the amount of abstraction increases so does the difficulty of 
learning the desired lessons from the game.133 
 
There is also a stringent need to ensure that players understand that the game is 
an abstraction. There are dangers contained in conflating the game and reality, 
especially for players who have limited experience of the activity the game 
represents. In this way, attests Perla, the ‘illusion can be a powerful and 
sometimes insidious influence’ and it is imperative to offset the realism of the 
game with realistic appreciations of what the game both is and is not.134 
 
The lack of actual experience can become a problem especially regarding cyber. 
Given that there are a limited number of publicly analysable cyber operations on 
which to base wargames, cyber games are to a larger than normal degree based 
on conjecture and extrapolation. This lack of a ‘solid foundation of metrics gained 
from actual combat operations’ will likely result in cyber wargames being quite far 
removed from the ‘reality of a future major international cyber crisis.’135 
 
Medium and fidelity 
 
An extension of the debate surrounding computer versus manual games 
(Section 2.1.1) is what level of fidelity is desired in wargames, by which it is meant 
to what degree the game accurately represents the real world. Low-fidelity games 
are usually less complex and therefore easier to play, but are further abstracted 
from the real world, whereas high-fidelity games decrease abstraction through 
increased complexity, which also sacrifices playability. 
 
There is no shortage of literature within wargaming extolling the virtues of 
manual board games over digital computer games. It is refreshing, therefore, to 
see that the computer science literature, contrary to what might be supposed of 
this field, also contains works that reinforce this notion. For instance, a study on 
fidelity in prototyping found ‘paper and computer media equally valid for testing 
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prototypes,’ and concludes that ‘prototyping on paper eases participatory design 
and enables testing in a more exploratory, dynamic way.’136 The ideas of 
participation and exploration are particularly interesting here, as they resonate 
with the goals of this thesis.  Further computer science work in the area of 
interface design supports these findings. A 2007 study found that computer 
prototypes ‘did not facilitate discussions on the overarching concept of the 
design, but did facilitate discussions on operational issues,’137 while scenarios 
‘promoted discussion concerning structure, and function at a general level 
including social and organizational aspects. [sic]’138 Strategy, which is at the core 
of this thesis, can be seen as an overarching design concept that emphasises 
social and organisational aspects, vindicating the move away from computer-
based tools.  
 
Some potential problems in this field have been recognised. Jagoda Walny, for 
example, points out that ‘one challenge is in knowing how to create interfaces 
that do not interfere with thought processes.’139 With regards to wargames, 
whatever the game board design, it will always limit – insofar as it guides – 
thought. However, as long as designers and players are aware of these limits and 
they are discussed, the learning objectives of the game can still be achieved. On 
this note, it should also be remembered that wargames are educational, not 
instructive. Games are great for promoting awareness about a topic, but less good 
for training people in processes. Steve Jackson, a prolific game designer whose 
work premises were raided by the US Secret Service in 1990 for alleged links to 
intrusion of federal computer networks (which were later proven false), included 
the following notice in the rulebook for Hacker – The Computer Crime Card Game: 
 
‘Important Notice To Secret Service! This Is Only A Game! These Are Not Real 
Hacking Instructions! You Cannot Hack Into Real Computers By Rolling Little 
Dice!’140 
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The point here is that games have a limited fidelity to the real world and are 
therefore limited in the lessons they can impart on players. It is important to 
recognise this, but not take it as an indictment of the usefulness of manual board 
wargames. The computer science literature highlighted above demonstrates that 
low-fidelity tools are particularly effective in promoting high-level thinking, which 
is exactly what this thesis is attempting to achieve. 
 
2.3.2 Opponents 
 
It takes two sides to make a wargame. Though hobbyists have a strange penchant 
for playing wargames solitaire, the games must nevertheless involve two or more 
opposing factions engaged in some manner of conflict.141 In professional 
wargames the “protagonist” team will be played by the people whom the desired 
learning outcomes are primarily targeted at. The opposition, meanwhile, will be 
made up of people, potentially from the same organisation, whose job it is to 
adopt the mindset of the “antagonists” and play the game as if they were the 
enemy. The success of a game hinges heavily on the ability of these players to 
fulfil their role well. If the wrong people are used the value of the game will 
significantly drop because the accuracy of the game will be severely 
compromised.142  
 
This places some great stresses on selection of these players who require ‘in-
depth knowledge of the adversary strategy, operational art and tactics.’143 It is not 
always possible to find people with the necessary knowledge and understanding 
to fulfil the role, so ideally the game designer will restrict actions of the enemy to 
reflect these. However, in the case of free Kriegsspiel where rules are very few, 
evaluation of how realistic a player action is falls to the umpire. In these cases, the 
stresses of opponent player selection are instead transferred to selection of the 
umpire, whose ‘judgement enters and colors the gaming process. [sic]’144 Player 
and umpire selection is a problematic issue which is not easily resolved, and it will 
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never be possible to completely rid a game of personal opinion. As Perla and 
McGrady summarise: ‘Even expert military Red Teams [opponents] are slaves to 
their own worldviews – and all players are subject to the sometimes insidious 
preconceptions of the controllers and assessors.’145 
 
This is particularly a problem with cyber wargames because knowledge and 
understanding of enemy plans and behaviours are very hard to come by. This is 
partly a feature of the cyber domain as one of heightened secrecy and 
inaccessibility (see Section 5.2.2 for further commentary on methodological 
constraints) but is also due to the lack of real-world examples from which to 
derive any information. Because of this, according to Curry and Price, ‘games must 
rely on “experts” in name only, anointed in some way by background or media 
exposure. The danger of agenda driven self-fulfilling prophecy is obvious.’146  
 
2.3.3 Outcome 
 
Players of wargames, as with any games, can become too fixated on the final 
outcome of the game – victory or defeat – and lose sight of the subtler lessons 
learned along the way with regards to the thematic content. In rousing the 
competitive, spirit which has previously been listed as a benefit of wargaming, the 
very same spirit can potentially cause the game to misfire if players attach too 
much importance to the result of the game. There are three facets to this, as 
outlined by Kainikara: 
 
‘The first is a flaw in the design process of the game itself wherein a 
predetermined outcome is factored in and the rest of the game is tailored around 
it....The second is to view the outcome of a game as an infallible indicator to real 
life situations....The third, less serious, pitfall is for the participants to think that 
the design of the game itself is at fault when it is not going the way they 
perceived a situation to develop.’147 
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With the first two problems, if players begin to believe that either of these are the 
case, the game will cease to be valuable. In the first instance, players will become 
disillusioned with the game and consequently disengaged, which will counteract 
any of the benefits from experience discussed previously. In the second instance 
players will attach too much value to the game’s realism and shy away from 
adventuring into the unknown territory previously made possible by the safety 
benefits. 
 
It is also important to not be overzealous in promoting the realism of a game. If 
players buy into the game and immerse themselves completely, the game can be 
too powerful. Players can be manipulated into ‘false beliefs and assumptions’ 
creating a belief that the ‘game has lied to the players, which will result either in 
their learning incorrect lessons or in their disbelieving the outcomes and 
recommendations that flow from the game.’148 Right from the outset it is 
imperative that the game designer is aware both of their position as marketer of 
the game and how the game is received, because ‘the difference between a false 
prophet and a real one is usually detectable only after it’s too late.’149  
 
Given the perils associated with game outcomes, it pays to recall the Picasso 
citation about computers being useless because they can only give you answers. 
Game designers can, and possibly should, adopt this attitude and insist that the 
game is approached with a mindset of ‘We may never know the right answers, but 
gaming can sometimes help us learn to ask the right questions.’150 If players are 
aware of this critical limitation from the outset they are less likely to get hung up 
on the results of the game and instead better absorb the pedagogical elements of 
the activity. 
 
2.3.4 Politics of representation 
 
An aspect of wargaming that ties together many elements from previous sections 
is the politics of representation in games. Because games are abstractly simplified, 
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set up with overly opposing sides, and hinge on a win-or-lose outcome, they are 
fraught with representations that carry political connotations. It is important to be 
cognisant of these because they may impose limitations on what a wargame can 
achieve. 
 
In modelling and simulating conflict, wargames by their nature set up scenarios 
with opposing sides. Unlike cooperative games (such as [d0x3d] analysed in 
Chapter 3, or the card game Hanabi) where players work together towards a 
common goal, wargames have players working against each other, not only to 
succeed themselves (as a player might in a game of Cluedo or Snakes and Ladders) 
but to actively see the enemy defeated. There are of course wargames where 
players form alliances, but the ultimate objective remains the demise of the 
enemy, whether that be a single player or an opposing alliance. In this sense, 
wargames represent a bellicose world of ‘us versus them’, perhaps expressed 
more strongly as 'us or them.' In setting up such zero-sum worlds, wargames do 
not necessarily represent the real world, which contains complex mixtures of 
positive-sum, negative-sum, and zero-sum situations. 
 
More revealing, politically, is how the factions in such antagonistic scenarios are 
labelled. In standard wargaming terminology, friendly forces are blue and hostile 
forces are red – notation which has its roots with Helmuth Moltke the Elder.151 
This dichotomy is really only a chromatic advancement on the original juxtaposed 
black and white found in progenitor wargames Go and chess. In practical terms, 
different colours can help easily identify pieces on a game board, for example by 
using colours of national flags. Michael Vlahos has described how US naval 
interwar gaming used orange for Japan, red for the Soviet Union, and black-silver 
for Germany and Italy.152 
 
The politically-charged implications of such colourisation become clear when we 
consider the default position of red as the enemy. Red has traditionally been the 
colour of the political left and was synonymous with Communist movements 
across the globe in the 20th century. During the Cold War, “the Reds” became a 
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byword, often used derogatively, to identify the Soviet Union, China, and other 
Communist factions.153 In the wargaming mindset, those who assume the red 
mantle automatically slot into the enemy category and become someone who 
must be defeated. Cooperation with a Communist country can thereby be seen as 
an impossibility, setting up the existential struggle between Communism and 
capitalism, and East versus West, which dominated the latter half of the 20th 
century. 
 
It is intriguing to note that such a worldview is entirely Western. William Simpson 
writes that ‘when Russia and China adopted modern wargaming they chose their 
national color of Red as friendly reversing the colors.[sic]’154 It could therefore be 
argued that wargamers, especially those in the West, need to be aware of the 
politicisation of aspects of gaming, because the conventions such as the colours 
used by teams can come to represent a narrow worldview. In general we want to 
avoid war and conflict, but if representations in games create political worlds with 
default enemies that must be defeated, it may be that players are left with the 
impression that war is a problem to be solved (or indeed a solution in itself) rather 
than one to be avoided. 
 
Chapter 2 Conclusion 
 
The literature that informs this thesis comes from a range of academic disciplines. 
Wargaming itself is highly interdisciplinary, and this thesis, combining wargaming 
with cyber security, is even more so. In addition to key texts in wargaming, this 
chapter has critically analysed works from fields including history, geography, 
philosophy, and computer science, while references to literature, mathematics, 
and business studies can also be found. Furthermore, a plethora of non-academic 
reports and government documents have been consulted, which, despite their 
lack of academic merit, are nonetheless crucial components of the corpus this 
thesis draws on.  
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The chapter has made three significant original contributions to our 
understanding of the uses, advantages, and limitations of wargaming. The first, as 
discussed in Section 2.1.1, is the creation of a new, succinct categorisation of the 
uses of wargames. In existing wargaming literature, there are many efforts to 
succinctly define what wargames are, and the most widely accepted seems to be 
Perla’s definition: ‘a warfare model or simulation whose operation does not 
involve the activities of actual military forces, and whose sequence of events 
affects and is, in turn, affected by the decisions made by players representing the 
opposing sides.’155 To find out what wargames are used for, however, one must 
peruse lengthy chapters from disparate sources, in part because wargames have 
such a wide field of applicability, from military operations to crisis exercises to 
business ventures. The categorisation in Section 2.1.1 brings all of these uses 
together under a generalised umbrella: Wargaming can be used to understand 
events of the past, plan operations and organisations for the present, and explore 
envisaged futures. This neatly captures what wargaming can be used for and 
readers who are interested in one or more of these strands can consult the 
additional paragraphs in Section 2.1.1 for practical examples and suggestions for 
further reading. 
 
The second contribution, found in Section 2.1.2 (and subsections), is intersecting 
diverse literatures around the theme of futures. Although much wargaming, as 
driven by hobbyists, concerns historical conflict, professional use of wargames 
often concerns the future. The literature, however, is replete with contrasts about 
futures. Where Fine found chess players employing ‘lines’ to imagine potential 
futures, Anderson considered the futures of emergency exercises ‘unimaginable.’ 
At the same time, these exercises were both pessimistic (preventative) and 
tactical, contrasting with the UK Government’s approach to cyber security which 
is optimistic (enabling) and strategic. Moreover, potential contrasts exist between 
Ghamari-Tabrizi’s assertions of technological progress setting the context for Cold 
War wargaming, while it could be said that in reality there was a lack of 
technological progress during this period – nuclear weapons became bigger, but 
they did not fundamentally change. It is unclear whether such a plateauing of 
technology has happened, or will happen, with regards to cyber security. To the 
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researcher’s best knowledge, no current work exists which brings together these 
divergent strands of literature, so the analysis in Section 2.1.2 should be 
considered a valuable and original contribution. 
 
Finally, in drawing on computer science literature, Section 2.3.1 concerning 
medium and fidelity is a novel contribution to wargaming. Extant wargaming 
literature recognises both the problem of abstraction and its implications for 
wargame deployment and analysis, as well as design (see Section 4.1). Having 
acknowledged the problem, the literature is also keen to highlight why abstract 
(board) games are still entirely useful, even advantageous over less abstract 
(computer) games (see Section 2.2.1). However, rather than rely on this literature 
itself as evidence for these assertions, Section 2.3.1 utilises studies from the 
computer science fields interface design and human-computer interaction to 
corroborate the claims. Contributions from Walker et al and Johansson and Arvola 
show that using paper over computers encourages participation and exploration, 
while scenarios are better than computer prototypes at prompting strategic 
thought. These are conclusions any wargamer would agree with but have hitherto 
not been backed by evidence from “hard” science. 
 
By embracing the interdisciplinarity of wargaming and amplifying this by 
consulting diverse strands of literature, this chapter has made original 
contributions which enhance our understanding of the uses, advantages, and 
limitations of wargaming. 
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Chapter 3: The state of play – 
existing cyber wargames 
 
Though this thesis is born out of an identified gap in existing wargaming products, 
there is nonetheless a smattering of games that tackle cyber in one way or 
another. It is essential to conduct a review of these games in order to analyse 
their strengths and weaknesses, which can then be used to inform the design of 
the original game of this thesis, as well as to help position the thesis in the 
wargaming landscape.  
 
This chapter draws on analysis of 25 games which are based around cyber security 
and/or cyberspace (see Table 1). Miranda has stated that with regards to cyber 
gaming, ‘it’s a matter of applying proven systems with radical new ideas.’156 Going 
forward in this spirit, this chapter is structured according to five aspects or 
features of games which have been deemed successful, either for their 
effectiveness at conveying a particular cyber security topic – thereby enhancing 
the potential for creating learning moments – or their contribution to gameplay. 
The aspects are: ludic components, adversarial nature, cards, simulating 
unpredictability, and marketplace. These features not only inform the design of 
the original game in this thesis  (Chapter 4), but also serve as guidance for other 
wargame designers seeking to tackle the topic of cyber security. 
Table 1: Games analysed in this chapter 
 Game Title Type Year Medium Availability157 
1 Enterprise Defender Wargame 2013 Manual Open 
2 All Your Secrets Are 
Belong To Us 
Wargame 2013 Manual Open 
3 Conspiracy! Wargame 2013 Manual Open 
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4 Media Wars Wargame 2013 Manual Open 
5 Tallinn Soldier Wargame 2013 Manual Open 
6 Global Cyber Game Other 2013 Manual Open 
7 CyberCIEGE Education 2014 Computer Open 
8 LOCKED SHIELDS Other 2010- Computer Closed 
9 [d0x3d!] Education 2013 Manual Open 
10 Ctrl+Alt+Hack Education 2013 Manual Open 
11 Operation Digital 
Chameleon 
Wargame 2016 Manual Closed 
12 Cybernauts Hobby 1996 Manual Open 
13 Cryptomancer Hobby 2016 Manual Open 
14 Game of Threats Other ? Mixed Closed 
15 Cyber Strike Wargame 2016 Manual Closed 
16 OWASP Snakes and 
Ladders 
Education 2014 Manual Open 
17 Top Threats Other ? Manual Open 
18 Privacy Education 2012 Manual Open 
19 Maelstrom Education 2016 Manual Open 
20 Anti-Hack! Education 2016 Manual ? 
21 Security Cards Education 2013 Manual Open 
22 Spot the Risks Education 2016 Computer Closed 
23 Secure Workspaces Education 2016 Computer Closed 
24 SyHacked Education 2016 Computer Closed 
25 Decisions & Disruptions Education 2016 Manual Open 
 
Of the 25 games, seven can be classified as wargames, twelve as educational 
games, two as hobby or entertainment games and four as other. Nineteen of the 
games surveyed are manual tabletop games, five are computer-based, and one is 
a hybrid solution. The reason for reaching out to a wide breadth of games is 
partially due to the dearth of pure cyber wargames – at least in the public domain 
(see Section 5.2.2 for further discussion of secrecy and classification problems). 
However, there are more than superficial reasons for analysing a variety of game 
types: these types are liable to inform and influence each other. 
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A potted history of 20th century wargaming serves to demonstrate how the hobby 
and professional sides of the activity have been mutually influential. Hobby 
wargaming was popularised by H.G. Wells’ Little Wars in 1913 and grew steadily in 
the following decades.158 In the 1960s wargaming suffered a downturn in 
popularity, owing to the rise of operational research, systems analysis and cost-
benefit trade-offs on the professional side159, while hobbyists struggled to 
‘reconcile playing at war when so many of their contemporaries and friends were 
dying in the reality of Vietnam.’160 In the 1970s two developments on the hobby 
side served to reinvigorate professional wargaming. First was the widespread 
introduction of science-fiction and fantasy games, led by Dungeons & Dragons in 
1973.161 Second were the efforts of wargames publisher Simulations Publications 
International whose “future history” games helped ‘civilians better understand 
the potentially violent world in which they lived.’162 In the US, military officers 
who had been playing these games recreationally brought their experiences into 
their professional lives as they moved up the ranks, thereby reviving the fortunes 
of wargaming by the 1980s.163 When the Pentagon wargamed the Gulf War within 
hours of receiving the news of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (see 
Section 2.1.1), they used commercial off-the-shelf wargame Gulf Strike. This 
mutually influential relationship endured into the 1990s and the first years of the 
21st century as video gaming gained popularity. The United States Marine Corps 
modified first-person video game Doom, released in 1993, into a training 
simulator.164 Going the other way, Full Spectrum Warrior was a direct derivative of 
a tactical infantry simulator, released as a video game in 2004.165 With such 
synergism between the hobby and professional sides of wargaming, it would 
therefore seem imprudent to ignore developments in one sphere or the other. 
Indeed, the analysis provided in this chapter may serve as a catalyst for further 
synergism with regards to modern cyber wargaming. 
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Broadening the types of games under consideration resulted in an increase in the 
number of games which could be analysed in the context of this thesis. Katrin 
Becker makes the point that as academic study of games has matured, it has 
become imperative to justify why we choose to analyse certain games over 
others, because proving their relevance enables us to ascribe them with wider 
impact.166 She further begrudges that in her survey of 89 ludic scholarly articles, 
only one applied a systematic technique to identify games, only one had 
described an exclusion rationale, and only one described the methodology used to 
select the game for the study.167 Although Becker’s study is now dated (in that the 
sample of eligible articles has grown), the sentiment remains valid – studying 
games without validating their purpose in the study undermines the value of the 
analysis. Therefore, as to not repeat these mistakes, the games in this chapter 
represent a final selection based on the following, admittedly simple, criteria.  
 
First, the primary theme of the game had to be cyber security, or a subtopic 
thereof (such as privacy or encryption). Games which contained a cyber security 
component, but which focused on some other aspect, were therefore not 
included. Megagames such as those run by the KCL Crisis Team in 2016 or at the 
Connection UK 2017 conference included cyber attacks as part of players’ 
offensive arsenals, but these were merely small features in larger games, 
therefore precluding them from analysis in this chapter.168 The cyber security 
theme was also considered distinct from cyberpunk, which is a popular board 
game setting heavily influenced by science fiction such as William Gibson’s 
Neuromancer.169 Website boardgamegeek.com lists nearly one hundred games in 
this genre.170 The criterion excluded games like Android: Netrunner, which 
contains many cyber-themed elements, but draws more on science fiction than 
security practices.171  
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Second, information about the game had to exist in the public domain. This thesis 
is written entirely at an unclassified level, so any games encountered behind 
closed doors could not be included. Public domain information includes published 
games, peer-reviewed publications, game reviews, publicity material, and, in the 
case of Cyber Strike, hands-on time with the game in a public forum. If no 
combination of these could be obtained, the game could not be included. 
 
To be clear, although all 25 games were reviewed as part of the process for 
deriving the themes for this chapter, not all 25 are explicitly referenced in the 
following sections. Readers interested in finding out more about a non-referenced 
game can find relevant entries in the bibliography. 
 
3.1 Ludic components 
 
The first aspect of note is that the games from the list which are most engaging to 
play – and therefore have a greater chance of capturing players’ attention – have 
strong ludic components. That is to say, they contain many of the accoutrements 
usually associated with games (game board, playing pieces, dice etc.) and employ 
gamified mechanics to challenge players and drive progress in the game.  
 
3.1.1 Games that are playable and enjoyable 
 
Many games on the list aspire to be fully-fledged games, but only a few succeed in 
providing sufficient ludic components and mechanisms to be both playable and 
enjoyable. 
 
Cybernauts 
 
Cybernauts, one of the most complex games analysed in this chapter in terms of 
number of game components, was designed by Joseph Miranda. Released as part 
of an issue of wargaming magazine Competitive Edge in 1996, Cybernauts takes 
advantage of a number of contemporary nascent cyber themes to create a future 
game world replete with political intrigue and technical terminology. The game’s 
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setting is heavily influenced by the Key Escrow/Clipper Chip conflict which was 
ongoing at the time172, as well as the recently transpired legal case against Philip 
Zimmerman’s PGP email encryption173, but is equally aware of wider geopolitical 
trends and strategic concepts. 
 
The game’s introduction provides a perfect summary of the setting: 
 
‘In the early 21st century, a global computer network called the Net is openly 
used by the STATQUO (government, corporations, organized crime, “the 
system”) to maintain global domination. STATQUO’s power is challenged by 
computer hackers called Cybernauts. The game revolves around the struggle 
between Cybernauts and STATQUO for control of the Net. One side, called 
the Netrunner, represents a group of active Cybernauts. The other side is the 
NSA, STATQUO’s Net Security Agency. The objective of the game is for the 
Netrunner to destroy or take control of as many electronic files on the Net as 
possible. The NSA uses its computer resources and agents to preserve the 
Net’s integrity by blocking Netrunner activities and by discovering the 
whereabouts of the Cybernauts and eliminating them through execution.’174 
 
Taken as political commentary, this passage clearly identifies the US National 
Security Agency (NSA) as a malevolent actor, while the proponents of encryption 
and internet freedom are a force for good. Indeed, the in-game NSA has a number 
of Security Service teams, referred to as SS units and whose icon resembles two 
red lightning bolts – a thinly veiled reference to the Nazi Schutzstaffel. We should 
recall that the target audience for the game were hobbyist wargamers, who more 
often than not are also avid historians. Additional aspects of audience-pleasing 
are several nods to popular culture science-fiction. For instance, two of the 
Cybernaut characters are called Decker and Gibson – the former referencing 
Harrison Ford‘s character in 1982 movie Bladerunner175, and the latter being the 
author of seminal 1984 cyberpunk novel Neuromancer.176 
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The game board is divided into two arenas: the real world (a geographical map) 
and the Net (a 10x10 square grid). The Netrunner player controls up to five 
Cybernauts selected from a list of ten, each of which has different attributes, 
while the NSA player has at their disposal a number of defensive ‘Cyberchits’ and 
aforementioned SS units. The game lasts ten turns, during each of which the 
Netrunner first conducts interaction and movement in the real world, followed by 
an optional ‘Netrun’ involving movement on the Net and ‘cyberstrikes’, which the 
NSA player has a chance to react to. A turn is then finished by NSA interacting and 
moving in the real world.177 The game is won by victory points, calculated by 
comparing how many files the Netrunners have destroyed or captured versus the 
number of Cybernauts the NSA player has eliminated.178  
 
Interestingly, the final five pages of the game are dedicated to an NSA strategy 
guide, while no such help is afforded the Netrunner player. Miranda justifies this 
by saying that ‘the NSA player has the more challenging task ahead of him, and it 
is the successful accomplishment of a challenging task that is the most 
satisfying.’179 Aside from the gendered language (remembering the target 
demographic for the game), it appears that the game is balanced in favour of the 
Netrunner, perhaps reflecting the political commentary from earlier. 
 
Although not designed as an educational tool, it is readily evident how Cybernauts 
may be a useful entry point for someone interesting in learning more about 
cyberspace and cyber security. A glossary, for example, provides a good overview 
of key cyber security terminology.180 As a caveat, however, certain parts of the 
game have not aged very well with references becoming outdated. The crypto 
wars debate, for example, has moved on from the Clipper Chip to post-Snowden. 
A 1990s audience would therefore probably have derived more educational value 
from the game than a 2010s audience might. Despite this shortcoming, 
Cybernauts retains immense value as a playable piece of astute strategic and 
political commentary. 
 
                                                          
177 Miranda (1996), pp. 14-15 
178 Ibid., p. 20 
179 Ibid., p. 25 
180 Ibid., p. 11 
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Cybernauts and [d0x3d!], on the other hand, are fully-fledged games with 
intricate, well-designed accoutrements and mechanics that force players to 
cognitively engage and make decisions about courses of action which in turn have 
repercussions on gameplay going forward. In order to make a meaningful 
contribution to the wargaming corpus, it is therefore important that a product 
which calls itself a game must actually be a game. 
 
[d0x3d!] 
 
Foremost among the educational games analysed in this chapter, [d0x3d!] is a 
card game designed by Zachary Peterson and Mark Gondree.181 The game has 
‘modest pedagogical objectives intended to expose young people to topics in 
computer security’ – a goal the designers motivate by identifying lacklustre 
participation rates in high school and university computer science courses, and 
‘curricular deficiencies’ across K-12 education.182 Players assume the role of white 
hat hackers who must infiltrate a network, locate assets (Personally Identifiable 
Information, Authentication Credentials, Financial Data and Intellectual Property) 
and recover these while remaining undetected.183 Gameplay is entirely 
collaborative, with players using limited actions represented by cards in their 
hand to navigate the network game board, perform actions, or trade cards with 
other players. The players win, as a team, if they recover all assets and lose if they 
are discovered and locked out of the network. 
                                                          
181 The name of the game is a stylised version of the word ‘doxed’, which is the practice of 
maliciously releasing someone’s personal information (for example address and phone 
number) online. 
182 Gondree and Peterson (2013), pp. 1-2 
183 Ibid., p. 3 
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[d0x3d!] is not a game designed from scratch, but instead based on the existing 
board game Forbidden Island.184 In effect, [d0x3d!] is simply a reskinned version of 
Forbidden Island, borrowing its highly-regarded gameplay mechanics while 
updating the graphical assets to reflect a cyber security theme. In a 2016 seminar 
at Royal Holloway University of London, one of the designers, Zachary Peterson, 
was asked about his experiences with this approach, to which the answer was 
twofold.185 Firstly, as a benefit, using an existing game significantly cut down 
playtesting time. Forbidden Island will have gone through a long process of testing 
and refinement by that game’s designer (Matt Leacock), meaning any derivative 
games which share the rules and mechanics inherit this testing process. On the 
other hand, as Peterson pointed out, this also meant that any tweaks they made 
to their game could have drastic effects, because the original was so finely tuned. 
Unless they wanted to invoke additional playtesting, they therefore had to keep 
changes in game mechanics to a minimum.  
 
                                                          
184 Gondree and Peterson (2013), p. 3 
185 Author conversation with Zachary Peterson, Royal Holloway University of London, 11 
October 2016 
Figure 1: A game of [d0x3d!] in action. Image courtesy of TableTopSecurity Flickr 
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/tabletopsecurity/8295763634/) 
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Secondly, as a potential pitfall, Peterson was aware of intellectual property issues 
that may arise from copying other material. In practice, it is not possible to claim 
copyright or file a patent on game mechanics, only game graphics.186 However, 
there is an unwritten code of conduct among game designers that when gameplay 
elements are borrowed or inspired by other games, these games should be given 
an acknowledgement, for example in design notes or promotional material.187 
This does not quite have the rigour of academic referencing, but should 
nonetheless be observed lest the designers, and by extension their game, come at 
odds with the gaming community. It is important to retain the support of this 
community, not only as a source of influence, but also as players and customers. 
 
Benefits and drawbacks notwithstanding, by repurposing Forbidden Island, 
[d0x3d!] inherits the eminent playability of the former game, making it relatively 
easy to pick up and play, which is important when targeting a demographic with 
limited attention spans. Although the game does not have a lot of different 
components compared to something like Cybernauts, it contains robust 
mechanics to capture players’ attention long enough to get them interested in the 
thematic cyber security content. 
 
3.1.2 Games that are not quite games 
 
A number of the games in Table 1 are marketed as games but contain much fewer 
ludic components and mechanics than other titles on the list. 
 
Matrix games 
 
The first five games in the list come from John Curry and Tim Price’s Dark Guest 
book.188 A common criticism that applies to all five games is that they are matrix 
games (also known as seminar games) – a subset of wargames focused on player 
discussion with limited game accoutrements and gameplay. In essence, the core 
gameplay of matrix games is that players verbally describe an action they would 
                                                          
186 U.S. Copyright Office (2016) 
187 Which Gondree and Peterson do in their 2013 paper, op. cit., p. 3 and on the [d0x3d!] 
website 
188 Curry and Price (2013) 
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take, other players may get an opportunity to argue how they would mitigate or 
counter that action, and the umpire decides – sometimes using dice – whether 
the action is successful. Such games are recognised for their simplicity and 
accessibility, but at the same time lack much of what Perla considers ‘a good 
wargame needs’: a data base, models, and (to some extent) rules.189 In most of 
the Dark Guest games, especially Enterprise Defender, All Your Secrets Are Belong 
to Us and Media Wars, the umpire plays a pivotal role and dice rolls serve no real 
purpose, as the numbers and outcome are assigned by the umpire anyway. 
Insofar as having any elements of chance or probability, this game fails to provide 
independent variables which can affect the outcome.  
 
The authors do recognise these limitations and stress that ‘the training value of 
[Enterprise Defender] comes from evaluating the familiarity of the managers with 
the organisation’s existing policies.’190 Despite this acknowledgement, the authors 
only offer the vague statement that their ‘experience’ evidences the game’s 
efficacy.191 It would have been beneficial for the authors to provide concrete 
examples of how the game has been used, or a list of suggested discussion points 
that their experience has shown generates useful outcomes. Without these it is 
difficult to evaluate the educational value of the game. 
 
Intriguingly, in their introduction to Dark Guest, Curry and Price state that the first 
edition of the book (which the researcher was unable to acquire) contained a 
card-based game, but for the second edition they decided the wargaming 
community needed more ‘generic ideas with wider application.’192 As a 
counterpoint, the analysis presented in this chapter, and the game design and 
results in Chapters V and VI, make it clear that more intricate games for narrower 
purposes have great value and should not be discounted. 
 
 
 
                                                          
189 Curry (2011), p. 158 
190 Curry and Price (2013)., p. 39 
191 Ibid. 
192 Curry and Price (2013), p. 5 
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The Global Cyber Game  
 
The central focus of The Global Cyber Game is a ‘Cyber Gameboard’ which aims to 
endow players with ‘the ability to determine an optimal strategic approach to 
cyber security concerns.’193 The Gameboard is divided into nine rectangles, 
representing intersections between power and information. Cells are grouped in 
three zones (along the power plane), denoting, in turn, ‘destructive power against 
information assets’, ‘information assets to produce economic exchange power’, 
and ‘social power of freely shared information assets.’194 The intention is that an 
actor’s real-world actions can be mapped onto this Gameboard, thereby exploring 
how that actor is traversing and exploiting different aspects of cyberspace.  
 
While the goal is a noble one, it is very hard to see how this can be classified as a 
playable game, let alone a wargame. Though all the right components are 
nominally there, no actual information for how the game might be played is 
supplied. Instead, the report outlines historical exchanges such as US versus Iran, 
US versus China, and US versus Kim Dotcom to analyse how the different players’ 
actions can be described in terms of the framework provided by the Gameboard. 
While certainly an interesting and potentially useful exercise, there is nothing 
here which a wargamer can actually play for specific educational purposes. In 
short, the report provides nothing actionable, which is the keyword this thesis is 
keeping in mind at all times. 
 
Spot the Risks and Secure Workspaces 
 
Meanwhile, Spot the Risks and Secure Workspaces are two computer-based 
games produced by legal expert Daniel Solove, intended to be used for training in 
aspects of privacy and data security. In both games, players are presented with a 
stylised image of a workplace (see Figure 2) and tasked with clicking on situations 
where personal information is at risk of being exposed. Players receive points for 
correctly identifying risks and penalties for incorrectly identifying risks, all of 
which adds up to a total score at the end.  
                                                          
193 Ibid., p. 13 
194 Ibid., pp. 37-40 
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Each game takes only a few minutes to play and the graphical presentation is 
simple and intuitive, so they are very accessible. Solove himself provides a 
voiceover that reads all the text in the games, but his voice is rather monotonous 
and does not enhance the engagement quality. Indeed, the games self-styling as 
‘highly-engaging and fun’ is overly ambitious because the gameplay is fairly boring 
and attempts at humour in the games fall flat.195 To classify these activities as 
games is tenuous owing to their linearity and lack of competition, and there are 
no repercussions for making an incorrect decision, which as we have seen in 
Section 2.2.5 is central to the effectiveness of wargames. A better term would be 
to call these products ‘interactive tools’, which more accurately reflects what they 
are. 
 
3.2. Adversarial nature 
 
The second aspect which many of the most engaging games have in common is 
their adversarial nature. As illustrated in Section 2.2.2, one of the primary benefits 
of wargaming is that it pits humans against humans, creating a dynamic 
                                                          
195 Spot the Risks website 
Figure 2: Screenshot from Spot the Risks, office version (image author's own) 
73 
 
environment where unpredictability is not just the result of chance through dice 
rolls, but also the uncertainty of human decision-making processes. In other 
games where players battle against the game system there is still some 
representation of human decision-making foibles, but only on one side. For a 
physical metaphor, compare hitting a tennis ball against a wall with playing 
against a human opponent: both present a challenge, but only one has a thinking 
adversary. 
 
3.2.1 Player versus player 
 
Among the 25 games analysed, there were some which implemented adversarial 
player mechanics to great effect. 
 
Operation Digital Chameleon 
 
Perhaps one of the most intriguing developments in cyber wargaming is Operation 
Digital Chameleon. Designed by Andres Rieb and Ulrike Lechner from Universität 
der Bundeswehr in Munich, the game is intriguing because the academic paper 
which accompanies it reads like a miniature version of this thesis.196 It begins with 
motivations that extoll the virtues of wargaming for education, provides an 
overview of current efforts (although the focus here is squarely on exercises 
rather than games), outlines their methodological approach and game design, and 
concludes by offering insights into player experiences. 
 
The game itself is played on a game board representing ‘the IT-infrastructure of a 
Critical Infrastructure – without any IT-security instruments.’197 (See Figure 3.198)  
The game uses an adversarial setting where players are divided into red and blue 
teams, respectively tasked with attacking and defending this network. The teams 
are set up in separate rooms, so they cannot see what the other team is doing but 
must react to each other’s actions as they become known. Gameplay consists of 
the teams describing their attacking and defensive measures in terms of ‘attack 
                                                          
196 Rieb and Lechner (2016) 
197 Rieb and Lechner (2016), p. 4 
198 Rieb has denied requests for a higher-resolution image of the game board, owing to 
him using it for consultancy purposes and not wanting others to steal his idea. 
74 
 
trees’, and the actions taken must be consistent with the role the team is playing 
– for instance if the red team are playing script kiddies they cannot develop and 
use zero-day attacks.199  
 
 
In order to enable the double-blind gameplay mechanics, the game is overseen by 
a white cell ‘Games Master’ who not only ensures the rules of the game are 
adhered to, but also determines the winner.200 In this sense, Operation Digital 
Chameleon Closely resembles some of the matrix games analysed earlier in this 
chapter. The designers do recognise the potential shortcomings of this approach, 
particularly the critical need for open discussion and evaluation of results, 
because ‘without transparency, it is highly likely, that participants will be 
frustrated and blame the Game Master to manipulate and to decide in an 
arbitrary manner. [sic]’201 
 
Rieb and Lechner’s paper is positive about the outcomes of the game, though this 
appraisal is conducted on the back of only one play session.202 Despite such a 
limited dataset, Operation Digital Chameleon is a valuable addition to the cyber 
                                                          
199 Rieb and Lechner, op. cit., p. 5 
200 Rieb and Lechner (2016), p. 4 
201 Ibid., p. 5 
202 Ibid., p. 8 
Figure 3: Operation Digital Chameleon game board (image from Rieb and Lechner (2016), 
p. 4) 
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wargaming corpus, especially if viewed as an early indication reaffirming the 
utility of wargaming for education. Moreover, these outcomes were achieved in 
an adversarial game setting, reaffirming this approach as one that can foster high 
levels of engagement and create opportunities for players to learn about cyber 
security. As a drawback, Operation Digital Chameleon illustrates some of the 
overhead associated with facilitating the blind gameplay which enables a rich 
adversarial setting. 
 
Game of Threats 
 
One business that has adopted wargaming is PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), who 
have created Game of Threats to be used as part of their consultancy services. The 
game is loosely based on the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain203 and ‘simulates the 
experience of executives when their company is targeted by cyber attack.’204 The 
game is for two teams of five to ten players, competing in an adversarial setting: 
one team plays attackers who must attempt to penetrate a company network and 
access valuable data or hinder the company from operating, whilst the other team 
play as company representatives who must defend their network, mitigate any 
intrusions, and manage public relations. Gameplay involves the teams investing 
limited resources in cards that enhance attacking or defensive capabilities and 
deploying these. The presentation of the game is technology-assisted, with each 
team viewing the game situation from their point of view on a screen while 
controlling their moves via an iPad. There is also a central screen visible to both 
teams which shows an overarching picture of the state of play. Points are scored 
for successful attacking and defensive moves, and at the end of the game 
moderators use these for ‘reviewing both teams’ strategy, actions and missed 
opportunities.’205 
 
Aside from the flashy technological presentation, the setup and gameplay of 
Game of Threats appears very similar to the game created for this thesis, as 
outlined in Chapter 4. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to verify this as the 
                                                          
203 Author discussion with PwC representative, London, 16 February 2017; Lockheed 
Martin website 
204 Game of Threats website 
205 Ibid. 
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company has not been willing to show a working demonstration or provide any 
hands-on time with the game. It was possible to garner some further information 
about the game in a meeting with a senior PwC representative, but most details 
were shared on a commercial-in-confidence basis (more on this in Section 5.2.2). 
However, one crucial insight, which is entirely shareable, is that according to the 
representative, Game of Threats ‘helps the board ask the right questions.’206 
Whether they were wittingly channelling Peter Perla’s citation from Section 2.3.3 
or had arrived at this conclusion independently is unknown. Either way, Perla’s 
sage wisdom appears to withstand the test of reality. 
 
3.2.2 Player versus system 
 
A less common approach in the analysed games was for players to compete 
against the game itself rather than other players. 
 
[d0x3d!] 
 
One limitation of [d0x3d!] (see Section 3.1.1) is its purely collaborative nature. 
Players do not compete against each other and the game’s adversary (the 
network administrator) is ‘encoded in the game’s mechanics.’207 This may serve 
the social function the game designers emphasise, as players have to 
communicate to achieve their goals.208 The designers also point to a ‘myth that 
human opponents are more dynamic, less predictable, and more skilled than the 
non-player adversaries encoded in challenges’ and that ‘player adversaries can be 
considered “poorly designed”: they can become distracted, become disengaged, 
be offline for significant portions of the competition, [and] be over-skilled (or 
under-skilled) compared to other players.’209 Whilst these are certainly defensible 
objections, we would also do well to recall many of the human-centric benefits 
outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2), and the Alfred H. Hausrath quote that 
‘gaming challenges the competitive spirit.’ A players-versus-system setup, such as 
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207 Gondree et al (2013), p. 65 
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209 Gondree et al (2016), p. 38 
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the one in [d0x3d!], seems to be at odds with these benefits, or at least not realise 
them to their full potential. 
 
SyHacked 
 
As an antithesis to the Solove games (see Section 3.1.2), SyHacked is an excellent 
example of an interactive online tool with strong gamic elements. Produced by 
Transmedia Storyteller for Al Jazeera news network, SyHacked is a game intended 
to educate players about cyber security aspects of the ongoing conflict in Syria. 
Players are placed in the shoes of a newly-hired investigative reporter tasked with 
producing a report on the Syria cyber conflict.210 Players make contact with 
sources to gather information but must be careful to not get hacked themselves. 
 
Gameplay revolves around players making decisions about which potential 
sources to pursue and how to approach them. Sources range from hackers and 
activists to analysis and journalists, both on the ground in Syria and elsewhere. 
Once a player decides to pursue a lead they must establish a medium for 
contacting that source, whether via email, instant messaging, text message, 
telephone, or face-to-face meeting. Each decision can have ramifications as some 
sources prefer certain modes of communication and will only give you the 
information you need if contacted in the correct way, for example with pre-
agreed codewords. The player is also exposed to hostile actors who try to derail 
the investigation through devious misinformation or outright hacking activities. 
 
The presentation of the game is very polished, with a central interface containing 
an amalgamated inbox of communications. When the player interviews a source, 
it is presented via a video or voice vignette with details about cyber operations in 
Syria or more general cyber security lessons. The educational elements of the 
game are contained in these vignettes as the player learns more about how cyber 
has played a role in the Syrian conflict. Players not already familiar with cyber 
security concepts are also made aware of things like passwords, encryption and 
phishing – the latter of which is particularly powerfully presented when a player 
clicks on a link in an email resulting in them being hacked and game over. The 
                                                          
210 SyHacked website 
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game even offers a way for players to link their own real-world Facebook accounts 
to the game, although this seems somewhat contrary to many of the lessons the 
game tries to teach.  
 
Overall, the presentation value and design of SyHacked makes it emblematic of 
how interactive educational games should be done. The game is not linear, and 
player-decisions have a real impact on how the game progresses, so there is a 
strong sense of challenge and high replay value. However, as a single-player 
game, SyHacked does not contain any multiplayer adversarial elements. The 
challenge therefore comes only from the game itself, which is a less dynamic 
opponent than other humans would be.  
 
3.3 Cards 
 
The third aspect worth highlighting is the prevalence of cards among these games. 
There is only a handful of games which do not have any card components, and 
several are entirely card-based. Cards are a useful mechanic to simulate the fog of 
war, both in terms of capabilities and intentions. For these reasons, Clausewitz 
asserted that ‘in the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles 
a game of cards.’211 Cards can be used to hide information from other players, yet 
their presence suggests the existence of information, just not the content – in 
effect creating known unknowns.212 (More on this in Section 4.6.) Cards are 
flexible and powerful game components because they can be implemented in a 
variety of ways, and, as Miranda asserts, ‘the physicality of the cards does much 
to enhance player experience.’213 A notable limitation, however, is that cards are 
usually a relatively small size, restricting the amount of information and data that 
can be legibly printed on them. 
 
 
                                                          
211 Clausewitz (1997), p. 27 
212 A term popularly attributed to former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
though it predates his 2002 use, particularly within scientific inquiry, see Logan (2009), p. 
712 
213 Miranda (2016), p. 675 
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Ctrl+Alt+Hack 
 
Similar to [d0x3d!] in motivation and design, Ctrl+Alt+Hack is a card game with 
educational purposes designed by a team led by Tamara Denning. The game is 
intended to ‘help increase awareness and understanding of high-level security 
concepts’, but the designers emphasise that they ‘focused on making it fun to play 
so that people would come back and play again.’214 Players take on the role of 
white hat hackers working for a security consulting firm tasked with penetration 
testing other organisations. The end goal is to become CEO of the company by 
gaining ‘Hacker Cred’ (credibility) which are earned by completing missions.215 
Gameplay consists of initial phases of drawing, playing and swapping cards 
followed by players attempting to complete missions by throwing dice, after 
which the round is completed by awarding or subtracting Hacker Cred depending 
on mission successes and failures. Rounds are played until the winning conditions 
have been met and one player can declare themselves CEO.216 
 
 
 
                                                          
214 Ctrl+Alt+Hack website 
215 Ctrl+Alt+Hack game rules, p. 2 
216 Ibid., pp. 4-6 
Figure 4: Ctrl+Alt+Hack game box and contents. Image from game website. 
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As with [d0x3d!], Ctrl+Alt+Hack uses an existing game for its gameplay mechanics, 
in this case Ninja Burger (designed by Steve Jackson).217 The attendant benefits of 
this, as outlined previously, are recognised by the designers, and instead allowed 
them to concentrate testing time on the thematic game content.218 The designers 
are keen to acknowledge their reliance on an existing product, with Steve 
Jackson’s name and logo liberally advertised both on the Ctrl+Alt+Hack website 
and in the game’s rule book. 
 
Although not a wargame, Ctrl+Alt+Hack does recreate some of the mechanisms 
which engender positive learning outcomes from such games. It fosters a 
competitive environment, and because it gives players the ability to conceal 
information from each other using cards, this environment resembles one that 
might be found in cyber security, which is replete with hidden data and 
intentions. It also gives a role to luck through the use of dice, which forces players 
to make risk assessments on each of their decisions. Clausewitzian fog and friction 
and are therefore amply represented in Ctrl+Alt+Hack (see Section 4.6 for further 
discussion). 
 
Cyber Strike 
 
Another company with a cyber wargaming product is Roke Manor Research, who 
have developed Cyber Strike – formerly known as CEMA, borrowing the title from 
the acronym for Cyber Electromagnetic Activities.219 Although not security 
classified, no information about Cyber Strike exists in the public domain, for 
example promotional material. The account of the game below is therefore 
entirely based a brief experience of the game during a personal demonstration at 
the Connections UK 2016 wargaming conference.220 
 
Cyber Strike is a game for four to twelve players divided into two teams. The game 
board consists of a satellite photo of a city (fictionalised for the game scenario, 
but the image is of Beirut) divided into zones. The scenario imagines the blue 
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team deploying into the city as an intervention/peacekeeping force in response to 
a dramatic decline in state stability. The objective of the game is for the attacking 
team to gain control of key zones of the city while the defending team seeks to 
frustrate these efforts. Players have at their disposal a deck of cards, each 
representing different cyber capabilities that would help with controlling zones, 
such as manipulating traffic lights to affect flow of transport or disrupting 
television and radio broadcasts to win the support of the populace.  
 
The game is intended foremost as an educational tool, with learning outcomes 
being achieved in the discussions players have around the capability cards. Players 
must make decisions, as a team, about which cards they should play and why, 
prompting debate about the potential effectiveness of the capabilities the cards 
represent. Furthermore, the game facilitators encourage discussion that relates 
the cards to the real world, allowing players to contribute with their personal 
knowledge and expertise, and learn from others where such is lacking.  
 
Insofar as it exposes players to a wide gamut of cyber terminology, Cyber Strike 
certainly seems like it has a lot of potential for creating learning moments along 
the lines sought in this thesis. With the right mix of players in a game session, the 
format of the game lends itself to constructive discussions. It is only a shame that 
more information about the game is not available for closer evaluation, as this 
limits its impact on the catalogue of cyber wargames. 
 
3.4 Simulating unpredictability 
 
Following on directly from the idea of using cards, the fourth aspect of note is the 
type of card which simulates unpredictable events. Unlike the world represented 
in games like chess, where the entire range of actions are known in a closed 
system, the real world contains elements outside human control and sometimes 
things do not perform as they should. The weather, for example, can be forecast 
but not prescribed. Two of the games analysed were particularly noteworthy for 
their use of cards simulating events outside the players’ control.  
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Anti-Hack! 
 
Anti-Hack! is a board game in which players attack and defend their computer 
networks. The game is for two to four players who take turns drawing four cards 
from a main deck, of which they may play two. There are four types of cards: 
attack cards representing hacking methods, defence cards representing anti-
hacking tools, situation cards representing real-life events, and chance cards 
which inject gameplay differentiators. The objective of the game is to be the last 
surviving player, represented by a security level gauge which is depleted each 
time players are attacked and unable to defend. 
 
Anti-Hack! is a mysterious wildcard in this list of games because no information 
about it is available beyond a short video demonstration.221 There is no 
explanation of the game’s origin, purpose or design methodology, nor do we 
know who should be credited with its development. Judging from the video the 
most likely use for the game is as an educational tool to introduce players to 
network defence concepts, but without access to the game material it is not 
possible to evaluate the game’s pedagogical efficacy. Nonetheless, the 
appearance of event cards is noteworthy and it would be beneficial for more 
game material to be made public to see what kinds of events the game designers 
have included. 
 
Privacy 
 
One of the oldest games analysed in this chapter is Privacy, an educational card 
game coming out of the Visualisation and Other Methods of Expression (VOME) 
collaborative research project between Royal Holloway University of London, 
Salford and Cranfield Universities, along with Consult Hyperion and Sunderland 
City Council, which ran from 2009 to 2012.222 Developed during this time, Privacy 
is a relative infant in terms of the history of wargaming, but in terms of 
educational cyber gaming it is one of the more mature products available.  
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The game is for three to five players who each assume the role of a character – 
there are 11 available representing a wide range of internet users including 
Hacker, Bank Manager, and Online Dater. Players are tasked with managing 
information about themselves, divided into six categories: Social, Digital, 
Financial, Biographical, Security, and Health. In each turn, players must decide 
whether to keep information hidden in their hand, reveal it for everyone to see, 
or trade it with another player, before replenishing their hand from the deck. 
Gameplay moves from player to player until all cards in the deck have been 
drawn. There is also a set of event cards representing unforeseen occurrences 
that inject randomness and force players to react. At the end of the game scoring 
is determined by comparing the goals for each character with the current state of 
play.223 
 
Encouragingly, the design of the game was driven by desired learning outcomes – 
an approach which is considered ideal in educational wargaming.224 The VOME 
team tested Privacy with a total of around 130 participants across various 
organisations, evaluating it as a game, as an educational and social intervention, 
and as a research tool.225 As a game Privacy was well-received in terms of its 
production values (graphics and tactile qualities of the cards), but feedback 
indicated that gameplay could be improved in a number of areas.226 In terms of 
educational value, Privacy was successful in leveraging the social situation of play 
to stimulate discussion between players, but at the same time both feedback and 
observations revealed the game to be overly complex, with players focusing more 
on playing the game rather than the thematic content of the cards.227 Finally, the 
team appraise the game as a useful precursor to other qualitative research 
methods, but do not see it as a replacement for more established approaches 
such as focus groups.228 
 
As an early attempt at an educational game in the cyber security area, Privacy is a 
very good trailblazer. The transparency of the project aims, game design, and 
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224 Barnard-Wills and Ashenden (2015), p. 154 
225 Ibid., p. 153 
226 Ibid., pp. 154-155 
227 Barnard-Wills and Ashenden (2015), pp. 155-156 
228 Ibid., pp. 157-158 
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deployment evaluation serve as an indispensable guide for future game 
development. Although not a wargame, there are nonetheless important lessons 
to learn from the VOME team’s efforts, not least the inclusion of event cards, 
which are reflected in the design and deployment of the game for this thesis. 
 
3.5 Marketplace 
 
The final noteworthy aspect from the analysed games is a marketplace, 
specifically as implemented in Decisions & Disruptions, although the concept also 
makes an appearance in Maelstrom.  
 
Decisions & Disruptions 
 
Decisions & Disruptions (shortened to D-D) is a game about the security of 
industrial control systems created by a team at Lancaster University in the UK.229 
The purpose of the game is two-fold: it is an educational tool as well as a means 
by which to study player’s decision-making processes.230 Lessons learned are not 
necessarily contained directly within the game itself, but instead come out in the 
discussions players have in and around the game.231 
 
D-D is for three to five players who assume the role of a newly-hired information 
security team for a company. The game lasts four turns, during each of which the 
players assess the company’s current security situation and decide how to spend 
their security budget, after which an unknown security incident may or may not 
occur (these follow a script and occur depending on which security assets were 
purchased).232 The company has a number of assets at two locations: an 
electricity-generating water turbine plant and an office, separated by 
geographical distance but connected via a network. Assets include computers, 
databases, servers, routers, and a SCADA industrial controller.233 The players 
invest a budget of 100,000 credits (per turn) in a selection of defences spanning 
                                                          
229 Decisions & Disruptions website 
230 Frey et al (2017), p. 1 
231 Author conversation with D-D developers, ACE-CSR Conference, Solihull, 11 July 2016 
232 Decisions & Disruptions game rules, pp. 11-12 
233 Decisions & Disruptions game rules., p. 29 
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both technical measures – firewalls, anti-virus, network monitoring, upgrades, 
encryption, CCTV – and non-technical measures – security training, asset audit, 
and threat assessment.234 The budget does not allow the players to purchase 
every available defence, so a decision must be made by the group about where to 
invest their money based on the vulnerabilities they identify in the company’s 
systems and the threats they perceive facing the company. 
 
The developers of D-D demonstrate a clear understanding of gaming principles, 
particularly surrounding the game experience (see Section 2.2.5). The D-D game 
manual, addressing the game facilitator, stresses that ‘the immersion of players is 
an important success criterion. You, the Game Master, do not want you players to 
think they are playing a game as if they were solving a riddle.’235 To enable this, 
the manual provides scene-setting scripts the facilitator can follow236, gives 
guidance on how to run and conclude the game237, as well as a comprehensive set 
of frequently asked questions.238 The provisions here give unseasoned game 
facilitators a high chance of running a successful game. As a criticism, a useful 
addition to the manual would be a set of suggested discussion points, helping the 
facilitator guide discussion towards learning outcomes. 
 
The researcher’s first-hand experience shows that the game is excellently put 
together, both in idea and execution.239 The game generates discussion around a 
number of cyber security topics and does so at a level accessible to players with 
no prior knowledge. The primary drawback of D-D is that, similarly to [d0x3d], the 
game provides a player versus environment setting rather than player versus 
player. Some of the benefits of adversarial play in wargames are therefore not 
realised, although this has subsequently been recognised by the designers and a 
‘red team vs. blue team’ version has been suggested as a future extension for the 
game.240 
 
                                                          
234 Ibid., p. 14 
235 Decisions & Disruptions game rules, p. 12 
236 Ibid., pp, 16-17 and 18-19 
237 Ibid., p. 20-22 
238 Ibid, pp. 22-27 
239 Based on author’s experience with the game at ACE-CSR Conference, Solihull, 11 July 
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In D-D, the market for purchasing new security products is an excellent way to 
force players to make decisions based on limited resources, and if facilitated 
correctly – as this author has experienced it – also encourages players to 
articulate the reasoning behind their decisions. The process is enhanced by the 
fact that D-D is a team game, meaning players must externalise their thinking and 
debate with each other to arrive at a consensus decision. Recalling from 
Section 2.2.2 that exploring and understanding human decision-making processes 
is one of the key benefits of wargaming, D-D demonstrates that a marketplace can 
be an effective way of realising this. 
 
Maelstrom 
 
Maelstrom is an ‘Attack Lifecycle Game Concept’ developed by Shane Steiger, first 
showcased at the DEFCON 24 conference in August 2016. Similar to Game of 
Threats, Maelstrom is explicitly based on the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain, but also 
‘borrows concepts from several MITRE Frameworks, attack patterns matched 
from previous campaigns and from real “cyber security life”.’241 This influence is 
reflected in the game board (see Figure 5), which has players navigating through 
the various steps of an offensive cyber operation. Maelstrom is intended to be 
used for ‘education, demonstration and evangelism’ to a variety of audiences.242 
 
The game is for two to thirteen players, with one player assuming a defensive role 
and all others attack. Attackers choose or draw a role from 12 available, for 
example State Actor, Script Kiddie, or Insider Threat which are represented by a 
token. They then select or draw an objective such as Exfiltration, Denial of Service, 
or Blackmail from a deck of cards. Both these selections or draws are kept secret 
from the other players. A number of cards are then drawn from Attacker and 
Defender decks by the respective players, and it is these cards which are used to 
drive the game forward. Each card outlines an attacking or defensive measure and 
its effect in the game in terms of how many steps the player takes forward or is 
knocked back in the Kill Chain. Play is alternated between attackers and the 
defender, so that the defender has a chance to respond to each attacking move. 
                                                          
241 Maelstrom game rules (2016), p. 2 
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The game ends either when all the attackers have been discovered and locked out 
of the system, or an attacker successfully reaches the end of the game board and 
completes their objective. 
 
 
To cater for different audiences, Maelstrom offers three levels of complexity. For 
high school level the designers recommend a ‘quick and fun’ version in which all 
roles and cards are initially drawn at random, and emphasise the importance of 
the ‘story of play’ in which players ‘must supply a one or two sentence description 
of the way in which the card is being played.’243 For college students the 
recommendation is ‘tactical choices’ where players select their cards based on the 
objective they want to achieve. Finally, termed ‘Ninja Level’, the advanced version 
of the game introduces ‘strategic choices coupled with realistic challenges’ and 
tasks players with managing a budget and buying only cards they can afford.244 
 
                                                          
243 Maelstrom game rules (2016), p. 7 
244 Ibid. 
Figure 5: Maelstrom game board (from Maelstrom game rules (2016), p. 2) 
88 
 
In a demonstration video, the designers show how the ‘story of play’ really adds 
educational value to the game.245 However, this also assumes some subject 
matter expertise on behalf of the players, as complete cyber security novices 
would not be able to articulate the details of specific attacking and defensive 
measures. Value can therefore be seen in the game by teaming up experts with 
non-experts (perhaps high-schoolers with college students and college students 
with seasoned professionals) to enable dissemination of knowledge through 
discussion. Interestingly, in the video the designers also express a preference for 
the tactical version of the game because the ‘strategic [version] is too much like 
real life so it starts to feel like your job.’246 Whilst this indicates that the 
marketplace function in Maelstrom achieves a degree of realism, the sentiment is 
an apt reminder that the element of fun is central to achieving engagement with 
games. 
 
Chapter 3 Conclusion 
 
The collection of 25 games analysed in this chapter represents the entire corpus 
of cyber wargames that fit the above criteria, as known at the time of writing. It 
may be that other games exist outside the author’s sphere of knowledge which 
have escaped thorough research efforts, and in such cases these games would 
make valuable additions to further research. 
 
In analysing virtually every available cyber security-themed wargame, hobby 
game, and educational game, this chapter serves as a much-needed reference 
point for others working in this space. The researcher’s experience at the 
Connections US 2018 conference suggests that an increasing number of people, 
both wargamers and educators, are keen to explore cyber security but are 
unaware of many existing cyber games. Depending on the intended use, some of 
the 25 games covered in this chapter (plus the original game developed for the 
thesis) may be products that people can use in their current state, or else 
constitute starting points for further development or generate new ideas for 
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games. By highlighting the five most critical takeaways from the analysis it is 
hoped designers take these into account, ensuring that any new additions to the 
cyber wargaming corpus are robust and valuable.  
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Chapter 4: Designing a cyber 
security wargame 
 
This chapter analyses the design strategy which underpinned the development of 
the original wargame for the thesis. As has been iterated previously, the most 
effective wargames are those which are designed with a specific purpose in mind, 
whether that be to impart a particular learning outcome or evaluate the result of 
a hypothetical scenario. For the thesis, the purpose of the game was to address 
one of the central research objectives: 
• Analyse the capacity for the game to create learning moments and enable 
players to share knowledge and ask the right questions. 
 
With such an open-ended objective in mind (the parameters of which are 
discussed in Section 5.1), the game needed to create an environment enabling 
multifarious learning experiences. Even if it might not be known beforehand 
exactly what kinds of learning moments might be created or questions players 
might ask, the game should contain myriad concepts and terminology from cyber 
security to stimulate inquisitiveness and conversation, giving players a chance to 
ask something. Across several game sessions with different audiences it would 
then be possible to analyse discussions players had to ascertain what the key 
learning moments were and whether players were indeed able to ask the right 
questions (see Chapter 6). 
 
Following this experimental approach, this chapter does not provide an 
exhaustive overview of every game component or design minutiae. Instead, the 
chapter structures analysis according to the purpose served by particular game 
components and mechanisms. In this sense the chapter adheres to the standard 
set by related literature, where game design analysis is largely limited to those 
parts which materially impact players’ learning experiences.247  
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The chapter begins with an exposition of some design constraints which affected 
the development of the game, principally the balance between realism and 
complexity. Each of Sections 4.2 to 4.6 then opens with a rationale for why a 
concept was important to include in the game followed by an exposition of the 
relevant game components and mechanics. Section 4.2 outlines how the game 
conveyed the concept of various Entities248 in cyberspace and links this to the UK 
National Cyber Security Strategy, which was the impetus for the main thrust of 
the game. Section 4.3 builds on this by showing how the game design included 
concepts surrounding strategic goal-setting in cyber security, again using the 
National Cyber Security Strategy as a case study. Section 4.4 shows how the game 
treated the large and complex topic of cyber attack and defence dynamics 
through various gameplay mechanisms, while Section 4.5 outlines how the game 
recognised the multidimensionality of cyber security through inclusion of 
geopolitical realities. Finally, Section 4.6 covers concepts around visibility and the 
difficulty of determining capabilities in cyberspace, before the chapter concludes 
with a summary of original contributions made. 
 
Before delving into this material, it is imperative to note that the game design was 
not static but instead evolved over time. Over the course of the research, the 
game went through several iterations of development, sometimes resulting in 
drastic overhauls and sometimes in minor tweaks. Overall, it can be said that the 
game went through three distinct development stages: testing, refinement, and 
settled. In the testing stage, different game mechanics and components were 
experimented with to determine their suitability both for eliciting learning 
moments and for their playability – whether they created unnecessary friction in 
the game experience (for example by adding excessive complexity) or enhanced 
player engagement with the game. In the refinement stage the core game 
mechanics and components had been decided, but significant tweaks were 
required to ensure the game was balanced and there were no game-breaking 
features that might put an abrupt and unanticipated stop to the progress of the 
game. In the settled stage the game had reached a point where all mechanics and 
                                                          
248 A brief note on terminology: throughout this chapter game components are treated as 
proper nouns, for example “Entities” or “Assets”. This is simply to differentiate them from 
their real-life counterparts, especially when used in the same sentence. 
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components served a useful purpose and were refined such that the game 
experience offered significant possibilities to elicit learning moments and enable 
players to ask the right questions. Of the 33 game sessions that informed this 
thesis, 10 were used game versions in the testing and refinement stages, while 23 
used the final settled version of the game. 
 
As a result of this progressive development process, the final version of the game 
differs from the version first conceptualised in many critical aspects and several of 
these are highlighted in the analysis. Refining a game along the development 
process is standard practice in wargaming, ranging from rule tweaks during 
playtesting to complete thematic overhauls.249 In the sense that this thesis is 
experimental and explorational endeavour it was important to be able to not just 
tweak rules, but to adapt the game to respond to player requests or reactions. 
The final version of the game therefore represents the most optimal version in 
terms of maximising potential learning moments, which is a primary concern of 
the research, although as limited by the constraints analysed in Section 4.1. 
 
4.1 Realism versus complexity in game design 
 
One of the most fundamental challenges facing game designers is the balance 
between realism and complexity. Efforts to attain ever-increasing detail in game 
models lead to a higher degree of realism (or, less disjunct between the game and 
reality), but at the expense of an increase in the number of variables, counters, 
and rules required to play the game. This problem has also been characterised by 
at least one academic commentator as one of accuracy versus simplicity or 
realism versus playability.250 Whatever the vernacular used, the main tenets 
remain the same: simple games are easy to play but not usually realistic, while 
realistic games tend to be more difficult to play. While greater realism may result 
in a richer experience, increasing the difficulty also ups the bar in terms of 
                                                          
249 For example, Guy Debord’s attempt to create a game of social commentary on 1970s 
culture which ended up being more of a simulation of battlefield logistics; see Galloway 
(2009) 
250 Sabin (2012), p. 19 
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participation, requiring a greater investment of time and energy, or prior 
knowledge and understanding. 
 
Where on this scale the designer chooses to place their game depends on the 
purpose of the game and the target audience. Games for hobbyist wargamers, for 
example, tend to veer towards complexity because the players are interested in 
historical detail and the dynamics of the scenario.251 For a more generalist 
audience, however, a game that sacrifices realism in favour of playability is more 
likely to gain traction. As an example, consider the difference between chess, a 
relatively simple and highly abstract game played by millions around the world, to 
World in Flames, an extraordinarily complex Second World War game of low 
abstraction but with a player base of perhaps a few thousand.252 In this regard, 
Sabin’s conclusions seem apposite: ‘Above all, it is crucial to remember that a 
simple wargame that is played will be more instructive than a detailed wargame 
that is not.’253 Furthermore, in terms of utility for education and training, great 
level of game complexity does not necessarily translate into real-life lessons. 
‘When you put a raw recruit behind gun A for the first time,’ says David O. Ross, 
‘those six digits of accuracy go out the window.’254 Given that this thesis is 
concerned with pedagogy for a non-specialist audience, it therefore seems 
pertinent to err on the side of simplicity and playability. 
 
4.1.1 Length of rules 
 
The desire to err on the side of simplicity and playability manifested itself in the 
game rules, the full set of which for the final version of the game can be found in 
Appendix B. The rules were printed on a double-sided A4 page and included in 
individual Player Dossier envelopes. Each player received an identical copy of the 
rules. The double A4 page was an important element of the development of the 
rules, and the game as a whole. As part of striving for playability, a simple rule set 
was required which players could grasp in a matter of minutes before getting 
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stuck into the game itself. More complicated wargames provide greater fidelity in 
their simulation, but, as attested by Sabin, can take several hours just to set up.255 
For the game for this thesis it was deemed more important that players could 
quickly engage with the game’s content, so effort was made to not erect 
unnecessary barriers that may inhibit playing. As such, the one double-sided A4 
page became a hard limit for the rule set, because this could be consumed 
relatively quickly (less than ten minutes). 
 
The hard limit did mean that once the two pages had been filled with rules, any 
new additions would have to be accommodated by removing others. This meant 
that many good suggestions made by players for new gameplay mechanics were 
never implemented for the final version of the game. However, the final rule set 
reflects a balance of adopting new mechanics and leaving others out for new 
players to re-suggest. As is discussed in Chapter 6, thinking about alterations to 
game rules and components was one of the most effective methods for players to 
extract pedagogical outcomes. Many of the suggestions were therefore left out of 
future game versions on purpose, because it was felt more educational value was 
derived from having players suggest rules than play with them. 
 
4.2 Key constituents of cyberspace 
 
A crucial facet of cyberspace is that it is populated by a variety of actors ranging 
from governments and nation-states to organised crime groups and individuals. 
This is of course only a reflection of the physical world, but importantly, in 
cyberspace the relationships between these actors can significantly differ. The 
anonymity offered by technologies such as The Onion Router (TOR), for example, 
gives people and groups power to resist and reshape governance.256 Indeed, this 
transference of power away from traditional governance structures underpinned 
John Perry Barlow’s ‘Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace’ in 1996.257 The 
extent to which Barlow’s vision of independence has materialised can be debated 
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and such a debate represents a discussion opportunity the game could be 
designed to prompt. It was therefore deemed important to include a variety of 
actors in the game for players to engage with. 
 
The document which inspired the game was the UK National Cyber Security 
Strategy, first published in 2011 with an updated version released in 2016. The 
Strategy serves well as inspiration for a wargame because it creates just such an 
adversarial setting which wargames require. The Strategy makes it clear that the 
UK is under threat from a number of actors, including other nation states who 
seek to gain ‘political, diplomatic, technological, commercial and strategic 
advantage.’258 Although it stops shy of naming specific state actors, the Strategy 
nonetheless contains sufficient antagonistic language which labels cyberspace as a 
contested and competitive domain. A game based on the Strategy can therefore 
include not only ‘friendly’ UK actors, but also ‘enemy’ foreign actors. 
 
The first edition of the Strategy contained an early recognition that building and 
promoting a safe and secure cyberspace requires synergy between the key 
constituents of UK society. This recognition resulted in a central trinity of actors 
promoted by the Strategy: individuals, businesses, and Government.259 This trinity 
was the focal point of cyber security-related policies, but each of the constituents 
of the trinity were also assigned a share of the responsibility for a secure and 
prosperous UK cyberspace – it was not for the Government alone to act.  
 
In the second (and current) edition of the Strategy, released in November 2016, 
the trinity of individuals, businesses, and Government remains, but it has been 
deemphasised and mutated from the previous iteration. Rather than appearing 
upfront in the introduction, the 2016 Strategy does not introduce the trinity until 
page 26 – a third of the way through the document – suggesting a decreased 
function for the trinity.260 The Government, frustrated that ‘a market based 
approach to the promotion of cyber hygiene has not produced the required pace 
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and scale of change’, has also been given a more prominent role in securing 
cyberspace, now leading from the front and shouldering more responsibility.261 
 
From a game design perspective, the trinity of individuals, businesses, and 
Government, both as originally expressed in the 2011 Strategy and the altered 
version in the 2016 Strategy, begin to show what actors could be represented in a 
strategic cyber wargame. It could be also argued that these actors form a 
trinitarian relationship akin to the ‘wonderful trinity’ of government, people and 
military envisioned by Clausewitz to give balance to strategy.262 Modelling the 
trinity of individuals, businesses, and Government in the game therefore creates 
scope to explore the tensions and interactions between the actors, taking 
inspiration from contemporary geopolitical contexts. The shift in the prominence 
of the trinity between the 2011 and 2016 versions of the Strategy suggests further 
changes may occur in the future and invites players to think about how the game 
design can be altered to reflect changing realities. 
 
4.2.1 Entities 
 
The game was designed with ten Entities representing the key actors as expressed 
in the National Cyber Security Strategy. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the first version 
of the game board as originally conceptualised and the final version of the game 
board as implemented. The core trinities can be seen in the blue and red triangles, 
while two additional actors have been added representing a military/intelligence 
function and Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). These were introduced 
because, in the author’s assessment, a conceptualisation of cyberspace which 
leaves these two out does not present a comprehensive picture. Indeed, both 
military/intelligence and CNI do appear at various points in the UK National Cyber 
Security Strategy, but they are not mentioned as part of the central trinity, hence 
why they are outside the blue and red triangles. 
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The game is laid out so that one side of the board represents friendly Entities, 
while the other represents a hostile foreign actor. In version 1.0 of the game the 
Entities were identically mirrored and anonymous, so both sides had the exact 
same Entities. In the final version the Entities have been given real-life identities 
U
K
 En
ergy 
Figure 6: Version 1.0 of the game board 
Figure 7: Final version of the game board 
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(UK and Russia), a decision which was taken with player engagement in mind. 
Early deployments of the anonymised game showed that players related the 
teams and Entities to real-world actors, so to further encourage this as a potential 
learning moment the actors were transposed directly into the game. Russia was 
selected as the game’s antagonist because of the researcher’s observations of 
Russian cyberspace activity, and the UK Government’s assessment that Russia has 
been responsible for hostile cyber attacks targeting the UK.263 While the Russian 
approach to national cyber security does not necessarily follow similar trinitarian 
tenets as the UK, these constituents are nevertheless present in their society, so 
representing the red side in this way can be justified and provides a potential 
discussion point for players.264  
 
It is also worth reflecting on some of the representational politics that appear 
when assigning real-life identities to the in-game Entities. Using UK and Russia 
overtly in this way replays some of the rivalry and imagery associated with 
military and political contests between great powers. In this sense the most 
immediate comparison might be with the Cold War, where the Soviet Union, the 
great red state to the east – also incidentally on the right (east) of the game board 
as presented in Figure 7 – was directly opposed to the US and the West (see also 
Section 2.3.4). A more historically astute comparison might be to see the 
representations in the game as echoing the so-called ‘Great Game’ of the 19th 
century, where the UK and Russia contested a prolonged intelligence-led 
geopolitical battle for influence and control in central Asia.265 The aptness of this 
comparison stems from the way the Great Game was shrouded in secrecy and 
underhandedness mirrors much of the activity that takes place in cyberspace 
today. 
 
Another facet of the representations, especially that of Russia, is that it falls into a 
trap outlined by Andrew Foxall whereby a Russian ‘(geo)political identity’ is 
assumed to exist, without interrogating the processes and manifestations of such 
an identity.266 It is possible that the representation of Russia in the game is naïve 
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in portraying Russia a homomorphic entity with clearly agreed national goals – 
although as outlined in Section 4.3.1 and Appendix A, attempts have been made 
to capture some of the divergent objectives of different actors on the Russian side 
of the game board. Indeed, the representation of Russia in the game is likely a 
product of the researcher’s positionality as a Westerner with several years of UK 
education (see Section 5.2.1). Vincent Pouliot has argued that NATO (of which the 
UK is a part) ‘thinks from their superior position to Russia [italics in original]’ and 
in this sense the researcher has imposed their vision of Russia, replete with 
possibly erroneous or misinformed assumptions, onto the game.267 
 
Crucially, the representational politics involved in using UK and Russia do not 
undermine their presence in the game. Drawing on analysis of statements by 
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, Edward Newman and Benjamin Zala have 
written that ‘the international order and the evolving balance of power are at the 
heart of the rising power vision.’268 This means that, whatever the shortcomings 
of the representation of Russia (and the UK) in the game, the great power 
contests which provided backdrops to both the Cold War and Great Game are still 
present today, at least in the Russian vision of the world. It therefore makes sense 
to use Russian and UK real-life identities for the Entities on the game board, 
because the design of the board with two directly opposing sides is consistent 
with the visions and actions of these actors in the real world. 
 
The following sections provide some details about what each Entity represents in 
the game and some of the learning moments the representation can create. 
 
UK Government and Russia Government 
 
The two Government Entities represent the functions of the UK and Russian state 
apparatuses and correspond to the Government part of the trinity found in the 
National Cyber Security Strategy. In gameplay terms they play a pivotal role as the 
point at which new Resource (see Section 4.3.2) is gained and distributed to other 
Entities, inviting players to discuss the merits of such a centralised economic 
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model. Although there are no specific cyber security-related learning moments 
associated with the Government Entities, players are challenged to think about 
the role of the government as a driver in securing society, for example whether it 
should allow market forces to dictate proceedings (as in the 2011 Strategy) or 
take a more hands-on approach (as in the 2016 Strategy). 
 
Electorate 
 
The Electorate represents the individuals part of the National Cyber Security 
Strategy trinity. Here, individuals have been extrapolated to the entire civilian 
populace of the country, effectively equating it with the people part of 
Clausewitz’s trinity.269 Between version 1.0 and the final version, the people were 
relabelled as the Electorate, reflecting the UK’s status as a democracy where the 
will of the people has a genuine effect on politics. The UK Government cannot 
enact policy without taking some regard of popular opinion, unlike some 
autocratic states which are genuinely top-down ruled.  
 
A downside to using the Electorate label rather than people or individuals is that it 
automatically removes a swathe of the population from the game. Those under 18 
years of age are not part of the electorate as they are ineligible to vote. Although 
this only represents some 20% of the UK population, it is also a demographic who 
have been born into the digital era.270 The Millennial generation are largely 
unaccustomed to a life without smartphones and the Internet. As perhaps the 
sector of society most reliant on information technology, these people constitute 
a large target for cyber attacks and it is therefore critical they are attuned to 
security concerns and best practices. If a security culture can be instilled at this 
early stage, it can be maintained as they enter the labour force (and electorate) 
and become decision- and policymakers in their own right (or influencers to 
decision- and policymakers). Players of the game might not recognise the 
importance of this demographic, since they are explicitly left out, so the 
opportunity to educate current policymakers about the importance of getting 
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youngsters’ training and education right from the start is perhaps missed unless 
prompted by the game session facilitator. 
 
Online Trolls 
 
Online Trolls represent the people part of the trinity for the red team. This is a 
bigger departure from the original meaning of individuals/populace than the 
Electorate is, because whereas the Electorate represents a majority of the UK 
population, people trolling on the web are a small minority of the Russian 
population. However, the decision to characterise this Entity as Online Trolls was 
not based on their representativeness, but rather their mythology and potential 
effects. Originally a fairly benign activity, trolling is the act of goading someone 
into a response, mostly as an act of attention-seeking.271 This is often done in 
online chatrooms or messaging boards and usually constitutes flippant remarks or 
deliberately incorrect or provocative statements that invite or force a discussant 
to respond. The term ‘don’t feed the troll’ is a warning sounded by observers or 
participants to prevent others rising to the challenge – if the troll does not receive 
any attention it tends to fade away.272 
 
Going back to the Soviet era, the Russians have a long history in controlling 
information to influence and deceive. Control and censorship of the media to limit 
the knowledge of the Soviet people is an example of defensive information 
operations. As an offensive example – what is often referred to as ‘active 
measures’273 – in the 1940s and 50s, the KGB (Soviet intelligence) had infiltrated 
the Polish resistance movement to the extent there were more intelligence 
operatives spreading misinformation than there were genuine members of the 
resistance.274 Similarly, the collection of kompromat material (compromising 
material such as video tapes of extramarital affairs) on diplomats, dignitaries, and 
business people to later use as blackmail is a well-known tactic.275 
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About the time the idea for the game was conceived in late 2015, academic 
understanding about Russian information operations in the cyber domain was 
gathering momentum. This all came to a head during the 2016 US Presidential 
elections, which the US intelligence community (representing 17 agencies) has by 
consensus concluded that Russia interfered in to get its preferred candidate – 
Donald Trump – elected.276 Tactics used here included hacking into email servers 
of the Democratic National Committee and John Podesta (a close adviser to 
Trump’s opposing candidate Hillary Clinton), and subsequently leaking stolen 
emails through WikiLeaks with the intent of defaming the Clinton campaign.277 
There was also an army of anonymous Twitter accounts, mostly automated bots, 
which would propagate news – both real and fake – to Clinton’s detriment and 
Trump’s gain.278 Although Trump’s victory in the election cannot be attributed 
solely to these Russian active measures (which the Kremlin vehemently deny), 
they have been judged to have had an effect. 
 
In the wake of the events in the US, other countries with upcoming elections such 
as Italy279 and Germany280 became concerned about the integrity of their 
democratic processes and sought measures to mitigate any potential meddling by 
Russia. As an exceptionally active practitioner of information control, 
disinformation, deception, and influence, it was therefore important that Russia’s 
role in these activities was represented in the game to give players an opportunity 
to engage with these concepts. Players should be able to recognise that threats in 
cyberspace do not just come from attacks on infrastructure that have destructive 
physical effects such as Stuxnet (more on this in Section 4.4.3), but also more 
subtle operations that have less obvious consequences. 
 
UK Plc and Energetic Bear 
 
UK Plc correlates with the business part of the National Cyber Security Strategy 
trinity. In the game, the Entity represents UK industry and business interests.  
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Energetic Bear represents the business part of the trinity for the red team. In 
version 1.0 of the game, the Entity had been conceptualised as a Chinese actor. In 
the years preceding the idea for the game, Chinese industrial espionage had been 
one of the main cyber security concerns for the West, with multiple attacks 
attributed to Chinese state or state-sanctioned actors. The infamous Mandiant 
APT 1 report, for example, singled out Chinese PLA Unit 61398 as a main culprit.281 
The results of such espionage have manifested in a number of ways. In a military 
case, the Chinese fifth generation jet fighter J20 Chengdu looks eerily similar to 
the US F-35 Lightning II, likely a result of F-35 blueprints being stolen from 
Lockheed Martin.282 In a business case, AMSC, a US wind turbine software 
manufacturer, was the victim of espionage by Sinovel, a Chinese wind turbine 
manufacturer, who stole crucial code for operating turbines. Sinovel had been a 
customer of the AMSC, but rather than continue this relationship, Sinovel got the 
code they required through cyber espionage, causing AMSC to lose out on $800 
million of business283 and its stock value drop by 98%.284 The case demonstrates 
how industrial espionage can directly serve the business interests of a country, 
meaning such actors can justifiably represent the business part of the trinity. 
 
As the game developed and the red team was synonymised with Russia, it became 
necessary to find a Russian actor to fill the industrial espionage role. Energetic 
Bear, an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actor (variably known as Crouching Yeti 
or Dragonfly), is a hacking group affiliated with Russia and espionage attacks 
against industrial targets in the UK have been attributed to them.285 (Note that 
Energetic Bear is not to be confused with APT28, Fancy Bear, another Russian 
hacking group who have been deemed the culprits of the attacks on the Clinton 
Presidential campaign.)  
 
Similar to the inclusion of the Online Trolls, the presence of Energetic Bear in the 
game gives players an opportunity to explore some of the non-destructive threats 
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that emanate from cyberspace. These lessons are enhanced when combined with 
other game components such as the Ransomware Black Market Asset (discussed 
in Section 4.4.2), which introduce additional cyber security concepts through 
impactful gameplay mechanics. 
 
GCHQ and SCS 
 
Both UK and Russia have dedicated intelligence agencies for cyberspace. In the 
UK, the responsibility lies with Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ), which is primarily a signals intelligence agency, but also has a role in 
information assurance and critical infrastructure protection. Other UK intelligence 
agencies – MI5 and MI6 – as well as various military units – 77 Brigade and Joint 
Cyber Reserve – also operate in cyberspace, but GCHQ is a more useful actor for 
this game as it has more prominent national defence remits and is therefore more 
closely linked to the other Entities on the game board. These defensive functions 
are, since October 2016, encapsulated in the National Cyber Security Centre, 
though because the Centre is a part of GCHQ it does not merit separate 
representation in the game.286 
 
In Russia, the Special Communications Service (SCS) has a similar role to GCHQ, 
though organisationally it is different because SCS is a division of FSB, the Russian 
internal security service (equivalent to MI5). With SCS having largely defensive 
tasks, GRU, the foreign intelligence agency (equivalent to MI6), holds more of the 
offensive cyber responsibilities. Despite this, SCS are more fitting for the game as 
they are a specialised agency more closely akin to GCHQ, thereby preserving the 
mirrored setup of the game.  
 
Encapsulating multiple agencies with diverging missions into one Entity could 
potentially mislead players who have no prior understanding of the UK or Russian 
intelligence communities and militaries. The representation in the game puts the 
onus for all cyber attack and defence on GCHQ and SCS, which may not be useful 
for players who need a more nuanced understanding of how these agencies 
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function. This problem is a manifestation of the need for balance between realism 
and complexity. It would be possible to design the game to include whole 
intelligence communities, but this would sacrifice playability, which is the priority 
design guideline. 
 
UK Energy and Rosenergoatom 
 
Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) encompasses a variety of sectors including 
energy, transport, telecommunications, and finance. Version 1.0 of the game 
treated these as an amorphous Entity, so the process of narrowing it down to a 
specific sector and actor for the final version provided an opportunity for more 
precision. The decision to settle on the energy sector was largely the result of a 
joint UK-US exercise focusing on cyber threats to nuclear power plants, which was 
in the news concurrently to the game design process.287 Nuclear can perhaps be 
considered an especially critical part of national infrastructure, partly due to its 
role in electricity supply, but also because any faults in a power plant can have 
catastrophic consequences, as demonstrated at Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima 
in 2011. Through vivid imagery associated with these disasters, nuclear might 
therefore serve a useful purpose in capturing players’ imaginations. 
 
Although not explicitly referenced in the game, the UK the primary nuclear 
operator is EDF Energy, which is due to construct new reactors complementing 
those already in operation at Hinkley Point. Intriguingly, EDF is a French company 
building UK nuclear plants with Chinese money. This complicates the relationship 
between EDF and the UK Government. By extension, the French and Chinese 
governments are also involved, giving the initiative a diplomatic as well as a 
business dimension. However, as neither EDF nor the French or Chinese are 
represented in the game, so the diplomatic dimension will remain unexplored in 
gameplay, though is simple to inject into post-game discussions. 
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In Russia, the nuclear industry is centralised with a state-owned operator and 
regulator – Rosenergoatom. Given this centralisation, the relationship between 
Rosenergoatom and the Russian Government is simpler than in the UK.  
 
It is important to recognise that concentrating on nuclear energy production at 
the expense of other CNI sectors also limits how players think about this area. 
Attacks on national financial systems may not provide the physical impact of a 
nuclear meltdown but could nevertheless have significant impact. As an example, 
a nine-hour outage of a Bank of England clearing system in October 2014 delayed 
almost £290 billion worth of payments, causing disruption to property purchases 
due to be completed that day.288 A deliberate and sustained attack on such 
systems could cripple the economy. Similarly, Britain runs an import/export deficit 
on every food supply apart from whisky.289 Retail grocers operate a ‘Just-in-Time’ 
stock level with only a few days’ worth of supply, so an attack which disrupts 
imports or transport systems that carry this food to all parts of the country can 
cause widespread havoc.290 Because the game does not explicitly consider CNI 
sectors such as these, players’ learning moments are likely to be limited to nuclear 
energy and electricity supply.  
 
This is a shortcoming of the learning potential of the game, but one which is 
difficult to address because it is another manifestation of the need to balance 
realism and complexity. Although all sectors of CNI are important and players 
should be educated about them, the UK Government defines 13 such sectors.291 
Including each one would increase the complexity of the game and detract from 
playability, which has already been justified as the priority factor in the game’s 
design. 
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4.2.2 Relationships between constituents 
 
In the same way that each part of Clausewitz’s trinity relies upon the other two to 
support it, so do each of the Entities in the game relate to each other. It is 
important for players to understand that cyber security in a networked society 
cannot be the sole responsibility of one actor. As an example, even if the military 
has high-grade protection on its own assets and communications, hostile actors 
can attack more vulnerable targets in the industrial supply chain, such as the case 
of Lockheed Martin and the F-35 outlined previously. Similarly, criminals may be 
deterred from attacking the infrastructure of banks, who invest considerable 
resources into cyber defences, but can instead target unknowledgeable customers 
who unwittingly give criminals access to their bank accounts via telephone scams 
or email phishing links. 
 
Relationships between Entities on the same team are represented on the game 
board by thin black lines joining the Entities, some of which are arrows 
representing one-way relationships. In gameplay terms the lines dictate how 
Resource, which is the in-game currency, can be transferred between Entities and 
which Entities take damage in case of an attack (see Section 4.4.4 for further 
discussion). There are 16 possible linkages in total, but only 12 are actually joined 
up. The sections below analyse a selection of the relationships and the learning 
moments associated with them. 
 
UK Plc – GCHQ  
 
The industrial-military complex is well-documented and in version 1.0 of the game 
this relationship was intended to reflect this close intertwining of business and the 
military.292 In this complex, the military conveys its needs to industry who oblige 
with products for the military to purchase. It is a loop of ever-increasing 
expenditure where projects run into billions of Dollars/Pounds. In the final version 
of the game, where the military/security Entity had been identified explicitly as an 
intelligence agency, the relationship was refined to a more nuanced 
                                                          
292 Hinshaw and Stearns (2014), pp. 317-318 
108 
 
understanding of how these Entities interact. Although there is certainly an 
intelligence-industrial complex, the relationship in the game is only partly 
concerned with the supply of products. It is true that certain hardware and 
software is required for cyber security and cyber operations, but most of these 
are not autonomous and require users to operate them; and whereas there are 
many skilled tank drivers and jet pilots, there is a dearth of skilled cyber experts. 
Across all of industry globally there will be a shortage of some 1.5 million people 
in 2020.293 Of the ones that exist, most choose to work for private companies 
where they can command significant salaries which the public sector – including 
military and intelligence – are unable to match. In response, the UK created the 
Joint Cyber Reserve to tap into this pool of expertise, staffing it with part-time 
volunteers from industry.294  
 
The potential learning moment here is for players to understand that the link 
between UK Plc and GCHQ is less about sale of products and more about the 
transfer of expertise. Indeed, the fact that the relationship is a one-way arrow on 
the game board forces this issue: business can lend their people to the agency, 
but the agency cannot pay businesses for their products or people. Although this 
is a gross simplification of a complicated issue, the representation is intended to 
stimulate debate rather than act as a realistic simulation. 
 
UK Government – Electorate  
 
The UK Government’s relationship with the populace is symbiotic. The 
Government derives its legitimacy from the people through parliamentary 
democracy and the people are a source of Government income through taxation. 
Similarly, the people rely on the Government to provide the functions of the state 
in national security and legislation, and for financial support through social 
security and development programmes (such as tax relief or property help-to-buy 
schemes). If the people become discontent or disillusioned, perhaps as a result of 
adversarial disinformation operations (such as the campaigns discussed in 
Section 4.2.1), this sentiment may be passed on to the Government through 
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protest or diminishing electoral support. Likewise, a decline in the Government’s 
ability to perform its functions will cause a negative effect on the population. As 
such, the relationship here is two-way, with either Entity being able to transfer 
Resource to the other, and likewise suffer when the other does.  
 
The intention of this relationship, combined with the Attack Vector enabling 
Online Trolls to target the Electorate (see Section 4.4.3), is to demonstrate how 
the populace can become a burden on a democratically elected government. In 
many ways, the people form the soft underbelly of an otherwise resilient society 
and can be a source of frustration for a state attempting to create a secure and 
prosperous society. Government and business networks may be hardened against 
attack with firewalls and cryptographic protocols, but the sentiment of the people 
cannot be defended in the same way. The tensions between the Government and 
Electorate enables players to explore the difficulties inherent in running a modern 
liberal democratic country and their implications for cyber security. 
 
Russia Government – Online Trolls 
 
There was a need for this relationship to be reconsidered between version 1.0 and 
the final version of the game, because the Online Trolls Entity does not represent 
the general populace. Instead of a two-way link, it was decided to make this a 
one-way arrow where the Government could transfer Resource to the Trolls but 
could not receive any in return. Combined with the lack of relationship between 
the Trolls and Rosenergoatom, this effectively turns the Trolls into a Resource sink 
where any Resources transferred in must be spent as it cannot be transferred out.  
 
This relationship is intended to signify that the Trolls are under some modicum of 
control of the Russian Government but are still a force unto themselves. The 
Government provides cash for the Trolls to conduct their nefarious activities, but 
cannot rely on a return on the investment, nor a return of the investment. Instead 
of launching trolling operations, the Trolls may spend the Resource to reinforce 
their own position, or just hoard it. In real life, mercenary hackers recruited for 
information operations are not necessarily beholden to any national allegiance 
and may well prove a waste of money. Consider a stereotypical example where a 
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teenaged computer enthusiast receives a few thousand Roubles from a shady 
source to generate a fake news campaign; but instead of fulfilling this task, they 
publish one or two stories then squander the remaining money. 
 
It is notable that this relationship is also favourable to the Russian Government 
because they can distance themselves from the trolling activities. If attacks or 
information operations cannot be attributed directly to the Russian state, there 
are far fewer repercussions on the international stage. Representing some of 
these nuances in the game (see Section 4.4.5 for further discussion of attribution) 
offers players opportunities to explore these topics through both gameplay and 
further discussion. 
 
GCQH – UK Energy and SCS – Rosenergoatom 
 
The lack of a direct relationship between these Entities is a result of the military 
Entity in version 1.0 of the game being envisioned as a more offensive force (see 
Section 4.4.3 for discussion of Attack Vectors). The military was primarily tasked 
with attacking the enemy’s CNI and did not have any links to its own side’s CNI. In 
the final version of the game, with the Entity now being an intelligence agency, 
there may have been scope to revise this relationship. In 2016, the UK public 
cyber security apparatus was restructured around the National Cyber Security 
Centre (NCSC), whose remit included that previously held by the Centre for 
Protection of National Infrastructure (at least its cyber functions). Since the NCSC 
is a part of GCHQ, there is a real direct role for GCHQ in the defence of CNI, and 
the same can certainly be said of SCS and Rosenergoatom. It would therefore 
have made sense to create a relationship on the game board between these 
Entities. 
 
There are two reasons why a design decision was made to not link GCHQ to UK 
Energy and SCS to Rosenergoatom. The first was that from a gameplay 
perspective this link would have made the respective sides too well-connected, 
making it easier to marshal Resource between the different Entities and limiting 
the amount of decisions the players had to make. The second reason, which 
became apparent after a few game sessions, was that the absence of a 
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relationship was conducive to creating learning moments. As evidenced in Section 
6.2.2, several players noted the lack of relationship, commenting that this was an 
inaccurate representation of reality. Fewer such comments were made about any 
other relationships on the game board (whether it was regarding the absence or 
presence of a link), so omitting the link made sense from the perspective of the 
main thesis question: if the absence of a link caused players to react and have a 
discussion it was doing its job as a pedagogical device. Omitting the relationship in 
the final version of the game was therefore a deliberate decision to prompt 
players to comment on the lack of relationship and thereby enhance learning 
moments created by the game.  
 
Overall assessment of relationships 
 
The way the relationships are set out in the final version of the game makes 
gameplay strategies significantly different from version 1.0. Whereas in the earlier 
version both teams had identical pathways to move Resource around, in the final 
version the UK has more links and therefore more opportunity to marshal 
Resource to where it is needed. On the other hand, increased interdependency 
also leads to a higher chance of contagion when things go wrong. The Russian 
setup limits this risk through compartmentalisation at the cost of not being as 
flexible in moving Resource. In some sense, this reflects a UK society with better 
interconnectivity and cohesiveness, but also the weakness of democracy 
compared to a more centralised system of governance. Although these are subtle 
points to pick up, several players did recognise the crux of the setup and were 
able to discuss it during game sessions (see Section 6.2.2), vindicating the final 
design of the game board as a tool for educating players about the key 
constituents of cyberspace and the interactions, dependencies, and tensions 
between them. 
 
4.3 Strategic goal-setting in cyber security 
 
In the past decade, many states have developed and documented some form of 
national strategic approach to cyber security. As of January 2018, the NATO 
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Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence listed 81 countries plus two 
intracontinental unions (European Union and African Union) that had published 
national cyber security strategies.295 The ubiquity of these documents suggests 
that states have recognised the importance of cyber security and of tackling its 
challenges in a well-planned manner. Guidance from the European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security suggests that the first step in developing a 
national cyber security strategy is to set out ‘vision, scope, objectives and 
priorities.’296 In the 2016 UK National Cyber Security Strategy this is summarised 
as the vision that ‘the UK is secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and 
confident in the digital world,’ with objectives to ‘defend, deter and develop’.297  
 
Given that a target audience for the game are policy- and decision-makers whose 
role it is to write, or inform, strategy (either in a national or business context), it 
was deemed important that the process for developing a cyber security strategy 
was represented in the game design to some extent. This was realised by 
including the idea of strategic goals: Objectives which players had to achieve to 
win the game. All games require winning and losing conditions, otherwise they 
are not games.298 In early draft versions of this game, the aim for the teams was 
simply to annihilate the opposition, but this represented an overtly bellicose 
scenario where the two teams had reached a stage of all-out cyber warfare and 
left little room for players to think about more nuanced strategic goals. For this 
reason, additional, more peaceful, Objectives were added to the game, delivered 
to players by means of individual dossiers for each Entity.  
 
In the first versions of the game, these Objectives were non-quantifiable, 
intended primarily to elicit debate from the players in order to create learning 
moments. The Electorate Entity, for example, had an Objective which said: 
 
“Hold Government accountable – whenever the Government makes a decision or 
performs an action (such as transferring resources or attacking) you must demand 
clear reasoning and justification for this.” 
                                                          
295 CCDCOE website 
296 ENISA (2016), p. 14 
297 National Cyber Security Strategy (2016), p. 9 
298 Although there is serious divergence in academia about this. See Salen and Zimmerman 
(2004), p. 79 for a concise summary. 
113 
 
 
While the UK Government’s reciprocal Objective was: 
 
“Please the people – the UK is a democratic country and without popular support 
your mandate to govern will dissipate. You must therefore ensure the Electorate are 
happy with you, which entails supporting them in achieving their goals.” 
 
Crucial feedback from playtesting showed that players did not understand how 
these Objectives would be measured. The original thought had been that success 
would be decided by consensus – in the Electorate case above it would be up to 
the players to determine whether they felt the Government’s actions had been 
satisfactorily justified. Although the pedagogical purposes of this approach were 
recognised, the playtesters questioned its feasibility as a gameplay mechanic, in 
many ways capturing the debate around the efficacy of matrix games as analysed 
in Section 3.1.2. In reaction to this feedback, all subsequent versions of the game 
only had quantified Objectives that could be easily measured, and a Victory Points 
mechanic (earn Points for achieving Objectives, most Points at the end of the 
game wins) was added to make the whole system transparent. The Victory Points 
mechanic was only implemented reluctantly because wargaming literature warns 
against it; players can become fixated with chasing arbitrary points and lose sight 
of the wider lessons of the game.299 Nonetheless, because the mechanic is easy to 
understand it makes the game more playable, which was the overriding design 
concern. 
 
4.3.1 Player Objectives 
 
The following sections highlight some of the Objectives as presented in the final 
version of the game and links these to lessons players might learn. All player 
Objectives can be found on the dossiers in Appendix A. 
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GCHQ Objectives 
 
GCHQ has one objective: 
1. Recruitment drive – swell your staff numbers by increasing Vitality every 
quarter (end of March, June, September and December). 
+1 Victory Point for single quarters 
+3 Victory Points for two consecutive quarters 
+5 Victory Points for three consecutive quarters 
+7 Victory Points for the entire year 
(Not cumulative) 
 
The lack of skilled personnel in cyber security has already been discussed in 
Section 4.2.2, especially with regards to the public sector. This Objective tasks the 
player with redressing this skills gap by growing personnel numbers. Although 
seemingly straightforward, the Objective is quite difficult to achieve because of 
other pressures on the GCHQ Entity in the game, notably the need to access the 
Black Market which is a drain on Resource. The UK team can of course divert 
Resource from UK Plc to GCHQ, but this will compromise UK Plc’s ability to 
achieve their Objective. There is therefore tension here the UK team must 
manage, and players can experience some of the difficulties that the UK 
policymakers are currently grappling with, giving players insight into real-world 
cyber security policy problems. 
 
In earlier versions of the game, GCHQ’s main objective had been to directly 
compete with SCS in a cyber arms race, but this was changed with the removal of 
the UK Government – Russia Government Attack Vector (see Section 4.4.3). With 
the UK’s in-game stance becoming more defensive, in line with its real-world 
stance, it was deemed more appropriate to align Objectives with this defensive 
outlook so that learning moments for players would more closely match the real-
world scenario. 
 
Energetic Bear Objectives 
 
Energetic Bear has one Objective: 
115 
 
1. Those who can’t, steal – grow your business by whatever means possible. 
+1 Victory Point for having more Vitality at the end of April than the start 
of the game 
+3 Victory Points for having more Vitality at the end of August than April 
+5 Victory Points for having more Vitality at the end of December than 
August 
(Cumulative) 
 
This Objective represents the business interests of industrial espionage (also 
discussed in Section 4.2.1). Espionage is conducted to gain an advantage over a 
competitor or reveal intellectual property or other trade secrets which can be sold 
for profit. The way the Objective is formulated for the final version of the game 
makes any damage Energetic Bear causes to UK Plc a secondary concern, though 
in earlier versions of the game this was the primary aim. The change in priorities 
puts less emphasis on the offensive aspects of cyber security, instead encouraging 
players to think about more nuanced strategic goals and relationships. Is it more 
advantageous to damage a competitor than it is to promote innovation and 
growth within your own company? Does cyber industrial espionage represent a 
good return on investment versus the risks associated with attribution? Is 
industrial espionage conducted with the backing of the state, whether tacit or 
overt? These are important questions which players can discuss and the answers 
to the questions also help stimulate thought about how to assume an appropriate 
defensive posture against industrial espionage. 
 
SCS Objectives 
 
SCS has one Objective: 
1. Win the arms race – have a better cyber arsenal than the UK. 
+2 Victory Points every month you end with more Attack Assets than the 
UK’s Defence Assets 
 
This Objective represents a Russian ambition to gain an upper hand in technical 
capabilities over the UK by hoarding vulnerabilities and exploits from the Black 
Market (see Section 4.4.2). Although the title of the Objective says it is an arms 
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race, the race is one-sided because in the final version of the game the UK does 
not have a corresponding Objective to participate in the race. The UK can still 
become involved by competing with Russia on the Black Market, but they are not 
rewarded for doing so, other than potentially denying Russia Black Market Assets 
and resultant Victory Points. Intriguingly, the Objective rewards hoarding of any 
acquired Assets, though there will inevitably be tension with Energetic Bear and 
Online Trolls who want to use the Assets as part of their offensive efforts. The 
Russian team must therefore continually evaluate whose Objectives they want to 
pursue throughout the game and how they might most optimally use Black 
Market Assets. Players’ engagement with these issues closely resembles trade-
offs facing real-world policymakers. Working out when to ‘burn’ undisclosed zero-
days (software exploits with no previously known mitigation), for example, is a 
very inexact science, though efforts exist to create more precision in this space.300 
In terms of creating learning moments, understanding the value of certain cyber 
capabilities and deciding when to deploy them is therefore a worthwhile topic for 
players to be able to explore. 
 
4.3.2 Managing limited resources 
 
The policymakers who formulate national cyber security strategies need to 
consider the context of their own countries, not only in terms of threats facing 
them but also resources available to mitigate problems. Even for states with large 
economies there are usually not enough resources (both people and money) 
available to solve every problem – hence why the ENISA guidance on national 
cyber security strategies emphasises that prioritising desired outcomes is a key 
first step.301 For game players to be able to engage with this tension, it was 
important that the balance between resource availability and task priority was 
represented in the game. 
 
The representation takes the form of two sets of counters which the players must 
manage for each Entity: Vitality and Resource. Vitality represents the well-being 
of the Entity, which is purposefully nebulous to allow players to think about what 
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well-being means for each Entity. For people it might mean health, happiness, 
safety, security, and/or financial stability; for businesses it might be a productive 
workforce and thriving trade; and for a government it can be social stability, 
national security, and legislative capacity. In pure gameplay terms, however, 
Vitality is the hit points of the Entity and it should never reach zero. 
 
Resource represents the wealth of the Entity and can be thought of as a monetary 
resource which the Entity can spend. However, in line with the idea of skills 
shortage and transfer as discussed previously, Resource can also represent non-
tangible assets. In order to convey the pressures associated with prioritising 
strategic goals, the number of Resources available to players is never sufficient to 
achieve all their Objectives. Players must therefore decide which Objectives they 
will pursue, perhaps re-evaluating these decisions as the game progresses and 
other Objectives become more attainable. The pedagogical idea is then to discuss 
these decision processes and allow players to reflect on why they chose to pursue 
certain Objectives instead of others. If players can relate their in-game decisions 
to real-world dilemmas facing policymakers, lessons can be learned about the 
difficulties of formulating national cyber security strategies with limited resources. 
 
From a game design perspective, it is worth noting two physical aspects of the 
counters. Firstly, the colours chosen – blue for Vitality and yellow for Resource – 
took into account colour blindness. According to the UK National Health Service, 
colour blindness affects the red-green spectrum more than any other colour, so 
red and green were avoided for the counters. 302 Secondly, the tactility of the 
counters was important. For the earliest versions of the game, small square chits 
had been constructed by simply printing and cutting regular paper, but these 
proved flimsy and difficult to handle. Instead, small wooden cubes were procured, 
which are a mainstay of board gaming. These are easy to handle and stand out 
visually on the game board. Feedback from players in multiple game sessions 
indicated that the cubes had a satisfying feel – there is something more 
meaningful to picking up a wooden cube that a small piece of paper. These points 
are worth keeping in mind for future game designers.  
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4.4 Cyber attack and defence dynamics 
 
Not all wargames involve combat, but most do, and this game is no exception. 
Inclusion of combat in the game served multiple pedagogical purposes. From the 
setup of the game board and the Objectives, players could learn lessons about key 
actors in cyber security and some of the tensions between them, but cyberspace 
is an antagonistic arena with a variety of threats, so it was important that players 
were exposed to cyber attack and defence dynamics in order to engage with key 
concepts in this field and how combat in cyberspace might be different from 
combat in physical space. 
 
4.4.1 Dynamics of time progression 
 
Time progression is not straightforward when modelling combat in cyberspace. 
Cyber is often said to be a fast-moving medium, yet this is only true of actual 
operations.303 The deployment of a cyber capability can be near-instantaneous, 
but the actual brunt of the work is often done in the lead-up to the attack. A 
distributed denial of service attack, for example, can be executed in a matter of 
minutes, but building the botnet of computers used to mount the attack could 
take several months. The question is how this could be represented in a wargame. 
If the total time span of the game is from the beginnings of botnet building to the 
launch of the actual attack, the time span is several months. It might then be 
reasonable that one turn in the game represents one month of “real” time. But 
what occurs on the final turn of the game? Suddenly, this turn only represents a 
few minutes of “real” time, when all the others had represented a month.  
 
Similar time distortion dynamics are evident in the aftermath of cyber attacks. It 
may only take a few minutes for a hacker to steal some vital documents, but the 
repercussions are not necessarily immediate. An apt example of this is the Sony 
hack of 2014, where hackers managed to obtain copies of millions of emails held 
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on Sony’s servers, which were subsequently leaked to the public. This caused not 
only great inconvenience and embarrassment for Sony staff and executives, but 
disparaging remarks made about certain film actors also harmed their business 
relationships.304 Furthermore, when North Korea was accused of orchestrating the 
hack, the situation escalated into a diplomatic event resulting in US President 
Barack Obama invoking additional economic sanctions on North Korea.305 All of 
this of course played out in the weeks and months following the actual cyber 
attack, meaning a wargame based on this episode would likely have turns 
representing different amounts of real time. 
 
Wargaming literature recognises that manipulating time in this way can be 
disorientating for the players, which can lead to disillusionment and 
disengagement.306 With the primary aim of designing a playable game that players 
would first and foremost engage with, it was therefore decided that each turn in 
the game would represent the same amount of real time: one month. This meant 
that the timescales of some actions within the game, such as launching cyber 
attacks, would not fit into the timescales represented by each turn. However, 
from a pedagogical standpoint, it seemed more effective to deliberately create a 
misrepresentation which players could identify and discuss, than to attempt to 
create an accurate simulation.  
 
Gameplay phases 
 
In many wargames, turns are subdivided into phases, for example movement and 
combat. A giant of the wargaming hobby, Jack Scruby, recommends that that 
novice players begin with an ‘alternative move’ game where one player takes a 
full turn consisting of all phases, followed by the opponent taking a full turn of all 
their phases. As players become more familiar with wargaming mechanics they 
can proceed to more complex rule sets with intertwined turns or simultaneous 
phases.307 The game design for this thesis assumed no prior wargaming 
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experience on behalf of the players, so, following the advice of Scruby, a simple 
alternative move approach was selected. 
 
In reality, of course, war does not involve one side idly awaiting their turn while 
the opponent manoeuvres and fires. In that respect, the game with simultaneous 
moves is perhaps the best reflection of real warfare. However, this would still not 
be a true characterisation, as strategy and tactics often revolve around reacting to 
an opponent’s actions, or proactively anticipating them. As such, war is not a 
balanced activity where each side get a fair share of ‘action time’ – compare, for 
example, an army geared towards Blitzkrieg-style tactics which can pick and 
choose the time and location of their attacks, against a slow and immobile 
defender which could only try to absorb the assaults as and when they come.  
 
This type of warfare is probably the most apt metaphor for the current state of 
affairs in the cyber domain. It is commonly accepted that cyber attackers have the 
upper hand over defenders.308 Defenders, especially anti-malware vendors, are 
constantly reacting to new threats and attacks and this will remain the case as 
they have no remit (legal or otherwise) to counterattack and try to regain the 
initiative. Arguments have been made to allow private companies to ‘hack back’ in 
response to a cyber attack309, but for the time being this privilege is reserved by 
nation states.310 Depending on the entities represented in a wargame, this can be 
relatively easily modelled by simply removing the defender’s ability to conduct 
offensive combat (see discussion of Attack Vectors in Section 4.4.3). The point, 
however, is that despite its simplicity, an alternative move game is not necessarily 
an inaccurate method of representing the dynamics of defenders continually 
reacting to attackers in cyberspace. To reinforce this point, the game rules 
stipulated that Russia always conducted actions first each turn, putting the UK in 
the position of a reactive defender (see Appendix B). 
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4.4.2 Dynamics of cyber capability development 
 
The third objective of the UK National Cyber Security Strategy states that the UK 
‘will acquire and strengthen the tools and capabilities that the UK needs to 
protect itself from the cyber threat.’311 The Strategy proceeds to outline the 
methods by which these capabilities will be acquired, which largely involve 
stimulating skills growth, industry innovation, and academic research. All of these 
are worthwhile discussion points for players and the game design incorporates 
many of these dynamics through player Objectives and Resource management. 
An aspect of the Strategy where capability development is less transparent, 
however, is in offensive cyber capabilities. Although the Strategy notes that the 
UK will seek to strengthen and develop offensive cyber tools, exactly how this will 
be achieved is not described.312 This is largely owing to the often-secretive nature 
of cyber security (as discussed in Section 5.2.2) but could also be a result of 
offensive capabilities being acquired through less salubrious means. 
 
A Black Market for cyber capabilities 
 
In the game, the primary method of acquiring cyber capabilities is through the 
Black Market, where players can spend Resource to gain Assets that modify in-
game abilities (see Figure 8). The Black Market was partly inspired through first-
hand experience with Decisions & Disruptions (see Section 3.5), which 
implemented a purchasing system for in-game capabilities. This system was very 
effective in terms of forcing players to make decisions about how to spend their 
limited in-game currency and, importantly, discuss the rationale behind these 
decisions. Implementing a similar system in the game for this thesis therefore 
seemed to be a pertinent method to emulate some of the learning outcomes of 
Decisions & Disruptions.  
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In real life, sites exist on the dark web where vulnerabilities, exploits, and other 
cyber tools are traded for up to six-figure sums.313 The association with the dark 
web is why the Market in the game is Black. However, this is really a misnomer, 
because many of the Assets available to buy on the game Market are legitimate 
tools or programmes. Some players have identified this, but as far as terminology 
goes, Black Market has a certain allure to it which is both a source of amusement 
and serious discussion, for example the ethics around the UK Government paying 
money to the Black Market. In this sense, the Black Market is able to spur a 
greater range of discussion than the purchasing system in Decisions & Disruptions, 
thereby creating more learning moments. 
 
Black Market Assets 
 
There are nine different Assets available to buy on the Black Market: three 
attacking and six defensive. The sheet containing all Asset cards is shown in Figure 
9, from which each individual card is cut out to form a small deck. Cards are fed 
into the Black Market periodically, making them available for players to purchase. 
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Although the Assets have in-game consequences that affect gameplay, they also 
have pedagogical purposes, a selection of which are discussed below. 
 
 
Software Update 
Perhaps the single, most basic practice contributing to good cyber security is 
software updates. Updates remove vulnerabilities in programs, closing routes in 
for an attacker. For most consumer programs, for example Microsoft Windows, 
these updates are frequent and free (insofar as they are included in the original 
purchase price) and happen automatically in the background unless the user opts 
to install them manually. In more specialised and bespoke systems, such as 
control programs for industrial sites – including CNI – the availability and cost of 
updates can vary, and updates can be difficult to deploy to inaccessible 
systems.314 In these cases, onus falls on the end user to ensure provisions are 
made for the future upkeep of programs before a purchase is made.  
 
The Software Update Asset simulates the temporary protection provided by 
updates by granting UK Plc, UK Energy, or Rosenergoatom immunity from direct 
attacks for a short duration. The intended learning moment is for players to 
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engage with the idea that updates deny vulnerabilities to would-be adversaries, 
but the limited time frame also reminds players that updating is a continuous 
process. The asking price of the Asset is very cheap, partly because many of the 
most critical updates are inexpensive (businesses also use Windows), and partly to 
encourage players to purchase the Asset. The principle here is to positively 
reinforce the importance of updates by lowering the barrier to players engaging 
with the concept. 
 
Network Policy 
The Network Policy Asset aims to expose players to some of the dynamics of 
defence through segregation. Segregating networks and systems from each other 
is a potentially effective way of limiting both attack surface and contagion from an 
incident. A computer which is not connected to the Internet, for example, cannot 
receive spear phishing emails. In more sensitive settings – such as CNI – a system 
may be completely ‘air-gapped’ from its surroundings, meaning it has no physical 
or wireless connections to other systems.315 Extreme versions of this might put 
additional barriers in place to prevent intrusion, such as Faraday Cages which 
block out all electromagnetic activity. In these cases, an attacker would require 
physical access to the system, which brings an attack beyond the realm of a pure 
cyberspace operation and out of reach of all but the most advanced actors 
(usually state intelligence agencies). 
 
The downside to isolating computers and systems is that they do not gain the 
benefits brought by interconnectivity. A computer without emails would not be 
much use in an office setting where communication with colleagues and 
customers is paramount. Similarly, an air-gapped system cannot be controlled or 
maintained remotely, making it more expensive to run because of the need to 
have operators or engineers on-site. The benefits of connectivity are usually 
weighed as more valuable than the security risks, so organisations opt for 
networking over segregation. 
 
The Network Policy Asset represents the trade-offs associated with segregation by 
making the Entity it is deployed on immune from residual damage (damage 
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received as a result of a linked Entity receiving damage), but also limits the 
amount of Resource which can be transferred to or from it. In this representation, 
malware is limited from spreading from neighbouring systems, but the utility and 
operability of the system is restricted. Although the defensive benefits of the 
Asset are simple to recognise, players are faced with more difficult decisions 
about where to place the Asset. By encouraging player discussions about 
gameplay benefits and drawbacks, learning moments about the defensive 
dynamics of network segregation can be created. 
 
Stuxnet 2.0 
One of the most emblematic offensive operations in the short history of 
cyberspace is Stuxnet. Stuxnet was a computer virus allegedly developed by US 
and Israel to disrupt operations at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran.316 At the time 
of its discovery in 2010, Stuxnet was one of the most advanced pieces of malware 
seen in public. It infected an air-gapped system, used three zero-day 
vulnerabilities to compromise defences, and employed two stolen software 
certificates to appear authentic. Stuxnet took control of the Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system for the centrifuges which enriched uranium 
at Natanz, causing them to spin outside their operating bounds and thereby 
incapacitating them, all while evading detection and spoofing safety features to 
make it appear as the system was operating normally.317 Although the actual 
effect of Stuxnet on the Iranian nuclear programme can be questioned, this 
author has argued that the operation captured the imagination of military 
planners, security specialists and academics, to whom it had been demonstrated 
that purely digital weapons could have physical effects.318 
 
SCADA systems are used in industrial settings such as manufacturing or energy 
production plants. In the game, both UK Energy and Rosenergoatom are in the 
energy production business and SCADA systems will be a part of nuclear plants 
such as those at Hinkley Point in the UK. The Stuxnet 2.0 Asset follows its real-life 
namesake by targeting such systems: it causes an attack by SCS on UK Energy or 
GCHQ on Rosenergoatom to deal double damage. Although powerful, players 
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need to make carefully-deliberated decisions about its use. Firstly, the Asset 
carries a large price tag, reflecting the development costs of high-end cyber 
weaponry; the original Stuxnet has been estimated at up to $100 million. 319 
Secondly, the Asset is single-use only, reflecting that once zero-days are ‘burned’ 
(made known), attack routes will be closed by system updates. Players therefore 
need to discuss whether it is worth investing in, and using, Stuxnet 2.0 or whether 
their Objectives can be achieved in other ways. These discussions give players an 
insight into dilemmas facing real-world policymakers. 
 
Ransomware 
Ransomware is malware that infects a target computer and encrypts files so that 
they cannot be accessed by a user. The malware then informs the user that they 
can purchase the key to decrypt their files, and provides instructions on how to do 
this, usually by using the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. The payments sought are 
normally relatively small, between $300 and $700 for consumers.320 The 
Ransomware Asset simulates a ransomware attack by forcing the attacked Entity 
to either pay a small amount of Resource to the attacker or be incapacitated for a 
short time. The low ransom cost mirrors the small charges levied by cyber 
criminals, while the time duration of the incapacitation reflects that an affected 
person or organisation who does not pay should eventually restore use from a 
backup system. The gameplay mechanisms associated with the Ransomware 
Asset force players to make decisions about whether to pay ransoms or suffer the 
inconvenience associated with incapacitation, mirroring decisions facing real-
world victims of ransomware attacks. 
 
Ransomware had been a scourge of cyber security for many years before the 
WannaCry attack in May 2017, but this incident really brought the issue to the 
public’s attention. In the UK, this was not least because of the debilitating effects 
of WannaCry on the National Health Service, where multiple hospitals were 
severely disrupted, leading to a public debate about who was at fault.321 Was it 
hospitals for using outdated systems (Windows XP)? Users for clicking on infected 
links? Microsoft for not providing updates? IT administrators for not applying 
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available updates? Or Government for withdrawing funding? Wherever ultimate 
responsibility lay, WannaCry encapsulated many important cyber security 
concepts. The Ransomware Asset can serve as a catalyst for players to explore 
these concepts and how they tie in to other parts of the game. 
 
4.4.3 Attack Vectors 
 
Cyberspace is a domain of constant hostile activity, stemming from a need for 
prospective attackers to probe the networks and systems of their targets to find 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited at the time of attack. Ben Buchanan has 
described how this can be a dangerous and escalatory process, a modern version 
of the Thucydides Trap.322 In this situation, no actor in cyberspace (whether 
nation-states, organisations, or individuals) can exist in isolation from adversaries. 
It was important for players to understand some of the dynamics around this 
constant hostility because it is such a fundamental aspect of cyber security. The 
game introduces this to players through Attack Vectors on the game board: two 
permanent and three available to purchase on the Black Market. 
 
Permanent Attack Vectors 
 
The permanent Attack Vectors are the orange arrows in Figure 7, leading from 
Energetic Bear to UK Plc and Online Trolls to Electorate. These represent, 
respectively, industrial espionage and disinformation campaigns, as described in 
Section 4.2.1 and are one-way Vectors; UK Plc and Electorate have no attacking 
remit in the game. These UK Entities’ inability to Attack represents UK policy that 
the Government has a monopoly on offensive cyber operations. Players are able 
to debate the efficacy of this policy and whether organisations should be 
empowered to ‘hack back’ against hostile actors to recover stolen material, or 
even pre-emptively attack to deter or disrupt potential Attacks (as mentioned in 
Section 4.4.1). 
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The permanency of the Vectors is intended to illustrate to players that Attacks 
along these lines are a constant threat, even if the Attacks themselves are not 
constant. Because the Vector is always there, players are reminded that the 
dynamics between cyber attack and defence is an ongoing competition where 
defenders are usually on the back foot (as discussed in Section 4.4.1). Players 
therefore learn that defences against such attacks need to be constantly 
maintained as any lapse in defence is liable to be exploited by attackers.  
 
Purchasable Attack Vectors 
 
The Attack Vectors available to purchase on the Black Market were a 
development which came about from experiences with earlier versions of the 
game. As can be seen in Figure 6, the first version of the game included three 
additional permanent Attack Vectors: SCS targeting UK Energy, GCHQ targeting 
Rosenergoatom, and UK Government targeting Russia Government. The first two 
of these were intended to represent sophisticated attacks on critical 
infrastructure, as exemplified by Stuxnet or the 2015 BlackEnergy attack on the 
Ukrainian electricity grid.323 However, feedback about the game design from an 
academic in the military establishment indicated that this representation would 
likely skew the game’s potential learning moments as too overtly offensive. 
According to the academic, blatant attacks on CNI would only occur in exceptional 
circumstances (such as war), yet the game model made them appear part of the 
norm, on par with industrial espionage and disinformation. Players might 
therefore get the wrong impression about the prevalence and severity of different 
types of attacks. In reaction to this feedback, the game design was altered by 
removing these two Attack Vectors (SCS on UK Energy and GCHQ on 
Rosenergoatom) from the game board, instead making them options available to 
players who purchase the Attack Vector Black Market Asset, as seen in Figure 9. In 
this way, the game places less emphasis on CNI attacks and instead focuses on the 
operations which are more prevalent in day-to-day cyber security (espionage and 
disinformation). To create learning moments, players can think about why the CNI 
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Attack Vectors are not permanent features on the game board and discuss how 
the game model could be changed in terms of Attack Vectors. 
 
It is also noteworthy that moving these Attack Vectors to a Black Market Asset 
created a better representation of capability development. It has already been 
mentioned that attacks on CNI are often highly sophisticated, and large research 
and planning efforts underpin these operations. With Stuxnet, for example, it has 
been surmised that certificates embedded in the software were physically stolen 
from two companies in Taiwan324, and that a replica of the Natanz facility had 
been built where the malware could be tested.325 By making players invest 
Resource into the Asset to create an Attack Vector targeting CNI, some of the 
supporting efforts of such operations are better represented than having the 
Vector available by default, thereby affording players a more realistic experience 
of cyber capability development. 
 
The final Attack Vector, UK Government targeting Russia Government, had initially 
been designed as a non-cyber Vector. It represented both the UK’s ability to wield 
greater democratic clout thanks to its standing in the international community, 
and its greater economic capacity and ability to levy sanctions on Russia in 
response to aggressions, for example in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea.326 However, a surreptitious meeting with a member of the UK intelligence 
community yielded design feedback which suggested this Attack Vector may 
create inaccurate learning moments. The interlocutor highlighted that in 
international processes regarding cyber security, such as the UN Government 
Group of Experts, Russia actually wields a high degree of power because it has the 
support of many smaller nations. 327 Indeed, disagreement over the applicability of 
UN Article 51 (right to self-defence) in cyberspace, suggests that Cold War 
allegiances are still influential on the diplomatic arena when it comes to cyber 
issues.328 As a result of this feedback, the Attack Vector was removed from the 
game board and instead made available as part of the Attack Vector Black Market 
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Asset. To further reflect the dynamics of international cyber security policymaking 
processes, the Bargaining Chip Black Market Asset was also added (see Figure 9), 
which allows Russia to leverage its support base in the international community. 
With these changes, the final version of the game more accurately represents the 
real world, enabling players to engage with concepts surrounding power balances 
in international cyber security and how these affect dynamics around Attack 
Vectors. 
 
4.4.4 Dynamics of attack risk and reward 
 
As has been alluded to in previous sections, many actions in cyberspace entail 
trade-offs between benefits and drawbacks. With cyber attacks, as with other 
military operations covered in wargames, trade-offs can manifest themselves as 
the balance between risk and reward. The risk can be characterised as the amount 
of resource committed to an attack combined with the chance of discovery and 
attribution, while reward equates to the damage or other effects caused. A low-
level Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, for example, can be launched 
with very little risk because of the anonymity offered by botnets, but the reward 
is not very high because the attack can be easily mitigated. On the other hand, 
state-sponsored operations against CNI, such as Stuxnet, have a high potential 
reward in disrupting infrastructure, but also carry a higher risk of political fallout if 
the attack is discovered and attributed to the attacker.  
 
In order to convey some of these dynamics to players, the game required an 
Attack mechanism with a scale of risk and reward. Following the standard used by 
most wargames, a mechanism was designed which allowed players to spend 
Resource to Attack, then roll a die to determine the outcome of the Attack. The 
use of dice depicts the uncertainties of war, where outcomes are never 
deterministic.329 In the first version of the game, this was implemented as a simple 
formula: 
 
𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡) – (𝐷𝑖𝑒 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙) 
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A combat results table, another mainstay of wargaming, with all the possible 
outcomes from this calculation is shown in Figure 10. There were three problems 
with this initial approach. Firstly, the mechanism used a four-sided die, but 
feedback from an early game session with a professional military wargamer 
suggested that most people’s unfamiliarity with non-standard dice would likely 
cause some confusion. Secondly, the formula meant that players had to roll a low 
number for a successful Attack. Feedback from the same professional wargamer 
suggested this was highly counterintuitive. In most games that employ dice, 
whether wargames or casual board games, high numbers equate to good results, 
so players naturally expect this standard. Forcing players to reverse their thinking 
process introduces a small but significant moment of friction to their engagement 
with the game. Players might roll a high number and expect a good result, only to 
realise the opposite was the case. Any positive emotions conjured would 
therefore be taken away by a game technicality, potentially causing player 
disillusion with the game.    
 
 
 
Figure 10: Version 1.0 combat results table 
Figure 11: Final version combat results table 
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The third, and most critical, problem with the first version of the Attack 
mechanism was that it presented risk and reward on a linear scale where there 
was an equal chance of success and failure. Feedback and observations from early 
game sessions suggested this balance achieved counterproductive pedagogical 
outcomes, because it did not reflect a realistic risk calculation – there was little 
point launching an Attack with anything but the maximum number of Resource. 
This model did not reflect the real world, where the vast majority attacks are 
cheap but unsophisticated and unlikely to cause a great deal of damage. To 
remedy this situation, the Attack formula was abandoned in favour of a new 
combat results table, as seen in Figure 11, which reflects a dynamic where low-
risk Attacks can be launched cheaply, but without any great potency to cause 
damage. Higher-damage Attacks require a greater Resource investment and come 
with a higher risk of failure. With this model, players have more difficult decisions 
to make about how they want to mount offensive operations and what their risk 
appetite is. In this way, the final version of the game simulates the trade-offs that 
are present in the real world to a reasonable degree of accuracy, exposing players 
to these concepts in a more realistic way and enabling richer discussion around 
the issues. 
 
4.4.5 Dynamics of attribution  
 
A critical dynamic of cyber attacks is the issue of attribution. In addition to speed 
of deployment (as discussed previously), cyber capabilities have also been lauded 
for their stealth provided by anonymity.330 Unlike physical weapons which leave 
traces indicating their origin, such as missile trajectories, cyber weapons’ traces 
can be obfuscated or deceptively altered, making it seem as if they were deployed 
from somewhere other than their real point of origin. The attribution process for 
cyber attacks therefore requires more than technical indicators; Thomas Rid and 
Ben Buchanan, for example, propose a ‘Q model’ for attribution that involves 
‘minimising uncertainty’ on tactical, operational, and strategic levels.331 The key 
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words here are ‘minimising uncertainty’, which highlight how attribution often 
does not deal in absolutes, but in degrees of certainty. After the Sony Pictures 
hack mentioned in Section 4.4.1, the US State Department levied new sanctions 
on North Korea, who had been deemed the perpetrators of the attack, yet this 
was based on what the Federal Bureau of Investigation called ‘not just high 
confidence, but very high confidence.’332 Similarly, the Mandiant report regarding 
Chinese cyber espionage referenced in Section 4.2.1 reached only a ‘most 
probable conclusion.’333 The point here is that attribution of cyber attacks is not a 
definitive science and it is important for players to be able to engage with some of 
the dynamics around this process. 
 
The game design conveys attribution in two ways: one deliberately misconstrued 
and one more realistic. The misconstrued way is the two permanent Attack 
Vectors on the game board: Energetic Bear targeting UK Plc and Online Trolls 
targeting Electorate (also see Section 4.4.3). These Vectors are not misconstrued 
in their existence – industrial espionage and disinformation campaigns targeting 
the UK do happen, as discussed in Section 4.2.1 – but misconstrued in their clear 
attribution. Referring to Figure 7, the orange arrows on the game board leave 
players in no doubt where the Attacks on UK Plc and Electorate are coming from; 
in other words, they have perfect attribution, which is not representative of real-
world attacks. In this way, the mismatch between the game model and reality can 
provide players with discussion opportunities leading to a learning moments 
about attribution. 
 
The more realistic way the game conveys attribution is in failed Attacks. Referring 
to Figure 11, the negative numbers in red result when players commit a medium 
or large amount of Resource to an Attack, representing a greater degree of 
sophistication, but roll a low number on the die, representing the Attack failing. A 
failed Attack results in damage to the attacker, representing blowback effects of 
the Attack, and additional effects representing the Attack being attributed (a 
Resource penalty, and/or the attacking Entity being incapacitated for a short 
duration, and/or a Black Market Asset being given to the attacked team). In the 
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game, attribution is only possible for attacks at more sophisticated levels because 
these attacks leave more traces, both technical and otherwise, to limit the 
uncertainty associated with attribution. As part of their risk-reward calculations 
when deciding to Attack, players therefore also have to take into account whether 
they are willing to chance having the Attack attributed to them, with the 
attendant repercussions. In this way, players can engage with some of the 
dynamics around attribution, generating discussion points and potential learning 
moments.  
 
4.5 Geopolitical realities of cyber security 
 
Events happen in the world which are not controllable, perhaps not even 
predictable, but which nevertheless have some effect and need to be reacted to. 
Cyber security is not immune from such events, nor are affectual events limited to 
cyberspace; geopolitical occurrences in the physical world can have significant 
consequences in the digital world. It was important for players to be able to 
engage with these unpredictable events in order to understand how cyber 
security can be impacted by events which may not seem to have a direct 
connection, but nevertheless create situations in which cyber security policy or 
technology is affected. 
 
To represent some of what can be termed geopolitical realities, a deck of Event 
Cards was designed for the game, which are drawn randomly to simulate the 
unpredictability of events. The deck consists of 16 Cards, half of which create an 
Event, shown in Figure 12, and half of which allow play to proceed as normal, 
shown in Figure 13. Players have to react to the Cards by adapting their gameplay 
strategies, similar to how a policymaker in the real world might have to react to 
an unfolding situation. In gameplay terms, the Event Cards also add a layer of 
entropy, in addition to the use of dice, making the game less deterministic. The 
sections below discuss some of the Event Cards and the learning moments 
associated with them. 
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4.5.1 Clumsy Civil Servant Event Card 
 
The frailty of the human link in the security chain is often highlighted in 
information security literature and no subset of society seems to embody this 
more than civil servants.334 With alarming frequency stories emerge about 
suitcases, laptops, or storage devices with millions of citizen’s sensitive data being 
                                                          
334 For example, see Mitnick and Simon (2002), p. 3; Arce (2003), p. 74; Lineberry (2007), 
p. 44; Pfleeger et al (2014), p. 491 
UK Energy 
Figure 12: Event cards 
Figure 13: Non-event 
card 
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left on planes, trains, or in public places.335 Perhaps chastising civil servants is 
unfair as this undoubtedly happens to employees in every variety of organisation, 
but civil servants’ errors are especially grave because of the data they handle and 
their public positions, which no doubt brings additional media attention to 
incidents.  
 
The Clumsy Civil Servant Event Card simulates such an incident, aiming to educate 
players that these events result in negative repercussions for both the Electorate 
and the UK Government. For the Electorate, the exposed personal data can be 
used by criminals to commit identity theft and fraud, undermining the integrity of 
people’s personas. For the Government, a costly clean-up operation must 
inevitably follow, including re-securing the data and compensating any persons 
who are the victims of crime as a direct consequence of the lost laptop. Although 
not catastrophic, this card puts the UK team at a disadvantage, forcing them to 
adapt any plans they had made in light of new gameplay conditions. Players 
thereby receive the benefits of an ersatz experience (as discussed in Section 2.2.5) 
of dealing with the consequences of human error in information security. 
 
4.5.2 Banking Error Event Card 
 
The financial sector is a part of CNI and in the UK its contribution to the economy 
is outsized given the prominence of the City of London as a global marketplace. 
Any major disruptions to the workings of the sector are likely to cause significant, 
if not catastrophic, effects on the economy (as discussed in Section 4.2.1). 
Although no malicious cause has been attributed to the Bank of England 2014 
incident, it can be envisaged that a directed and determined attack on multiple 
systems simultaneously might achieve effects orders of magnitude higher. 
 
The Banking Error Event Card creates a similar incident by simulating a Bank of 
England transfer protocol error and restricting the UK side from transferring 
Resource between Entities. This does not bring the country to a complete 
standstill – the UK can still use Resource where it currently is – but it does 
                                                          
335 For a list of examples, see BBC News (2009) 
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severely limit the UK’s options, as well as potentially delaying or derailing any 
planned moves. The Card can prompt players to think about the criticality of some 
of the systems which underpin a modern economy, perhaps leading to discussions 
about how reliance on centralised mechanisms can be reduced. Although not 
mentioned explicitly in the game, distributed ledger technologies may be a 
potential solution in this space – and has been actively explored by multiple 
financial institutions336 – so the Card has potential to inspire discussion about 
disruptive innovation in cyber security. 
 
4.5.3 People’s Revolt Event Card 
 
Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, political opposition and public dissent in 
Russia has been repressed. In the 2018 elections, for example, Alexei Navalny, the 
only viable opposition candidate, was barred from running.337 Public protests are 
staged from time to time but are often met by police violence and arrests. 
Assassinations also appear to be a viable instrument of power, with multiple 
opposition party members, political activists and critical journalists meeting 
untimely and mysterious deaths.338 In this environment it is difficult for any 
narrative which questions the official line to gain foothold, and serious challenges 
to Putin’s grasp on power do not appear forthcoming. 
 
The People’s Revolt Event Card simulates a situation in which this repression 
reaches boiling point, with people taking to the streets in protest. In keeping with 
the thematic cyber content of the game, the trigger for the protests is Internet 
censorship and a person bearing a Guy Fawkes mask – associated with hacktivist 
group Anonymous – is on the Card. The in-game effect of the Card is that Russia 
does not gain any new Resource that turn, representing the people’s 
unwillingness to pay taxes under the current regime. Although there are no long-
term repercussions in the game, representing the historical fleetingness of similar 
protests, the Card invites discussion about regulation of free expression and the 
role of the Internet in galvanising groups of people. Of additional importance, this 
                                                          
336 For a summary, see World Bank Group (2017) 
337 Roth (2018) 
338 Jackson (2015) 
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is the only place in the game Anonymous explicitly appear, meaning the Card can 
serve as a catalyst for discussing the role of non-state actors in cyberspace, and 
where such actors may play a role in other parts of the game. 
 
4.5.4 Quantum Breakthrough Event Card 
 
The other seven Event Cards paint a rather gloomy picture of cyberspace where 
every incident only has negative consequences. Breaking with this trend, the 
Quantum Breakthrough Card represents a technological advance which benefits 
all sectors of society and industry. The Card states that Google rolls out quantum 
computing to all its devices and services, granting all Entities a one-off Resource 
and Vitality payment, representing some of the potential benefits quantum 
computing can bring. 
 
Quantum computing takes advantage of the superpositionality of atoms to enable 
unparalleled processing power. Shor’s algorithm, for example, can (theoretically) 
be used to factor large numbers, which would undermine many of the 
assumptions that enable modern cryptographic technologies.339 However, 
foreseeing this diminishing of security, post-quantum cryptography is already 
developing algorithms that will be resilient to quantum computing, meaning 
secure communications can still be achieved.340 Quantum technologies will also 
enable increases in speed and efficiency of communication, as demonstrated by a 
Chinese satellite experiment in 2017.341 Fast, cheap, and secure communication 
has underpinned globalisation and the movement of goods and money, increasing 
the quality of life for billions of people, which could be taken to another level in 
the post-quantum world. The Quantum Breakthrough Event Card prompts players 
to debate which of these touted benefits will materialise, or whether the Card is 
in fact unrepresentative in its effects and that quantum computing will irrevocably 
undermine modern cryptography. Given that Google are explicitly mentioned on 
the Card, there is also scope for discussing ownership of technologies and the 
motivations of technological giants. Similar to the Banking Error Card, the 
                                                          
339 Shor (1997) 
340 For an overview of the field, see Berenstein et al (2009)  
341 Ananthaswamy (2017) 
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Quantum Breakthrough Card thereby challenges players to think about the direct 
effects of technological change and extrapolate this to wider societal impacts.  
 
4.6 Visibility in cyberspace 
 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 outlined game components and mechanics which convey 
Clausewitzian friction – unforeseen difficulties. However, little has been said 
about the fog of war – imperfect information – which is the other part of 
Clausewitz’s famous ‘fog and friction’ concepts. 342 The fog of war can be taken 
literally in terms of visibility on the battlefield. Historically, the cacophony and 
tumult of battle could shroud commanders’ views of the battlefield to such 
extremes that armies mistakenly charged upon themselves, or complete 
obliviousness that a battle had taken place at all.343 In modern war, literal line-of-
sight visibility is perhaps less important than the battlespace awareness created 
by geospatial plotting devices (such as radar) and intelligence about unit 
dispositions. Nonetheless, the fog of war can be present here too, with 
incomplete or inaccurate information shrouding visibility. 
 
In the cyber domain, the lack of visibility is amplified further than the smoke-filled 
Napoleonic battlefields on which Clausewitz was schooled. Not only can we not 
physically perceive the electrical impulses on which computing and 
telecommunications are based, the structure of the Internet also prohibits a 
comprehensive overview of the operational landscape, despite attempts made in 
this direction.344 It is important for players to be able to engage with this concept, 
as decision-makers and policymakers rarely have a complete visibility of a 
problem or situation before they have to address it.  
 
There are established techniques within wargaming for simulating the fog of war. 
In his wargaming manual, for example, Scruby recommends that a curtain is set 
                                                          
342 Although it should be recognised that Clausewitz himself never used this phrasing, 
Kiesling (2001), p. 85 
343 Englund (1991), pp. 14-15 
344 Kiravuo (2015) 
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up in the middle of the table so that ‘troops may be set up in secret,’345 mimicking 
the uncertainty a commander experiences prior to battle, while John Setear 
suggests six design tools: referees real and simulated, counters that conceal, 
counters potentially in play, the rulebook, modifying the map, and the laws of 
war.346 In early prototype versions of the game some of these were experimented 
with, for example using counters to cover portions of the game board. Ultimately, 
however, the game board has been left entirely visible to all players and hidden 
information is instead conveyed through the player dossiers (which each team 
keeps secret from the other team) and pre-allocated Black Market Assets (which 
are dealt face-down before the start of the game).  
 
The decision to hide information about players, especially their capabilities, rather 
than the game board stemmed from the difficulty of determining capabilities in 
cyberspace. Although cyber attacks of varying scales occur with regular frequency, 
they usually reveal more about targets’ weaknesses than attackers’ capabilities. 
From the effects of a cyber attack we can infer a minimum level of adversarial 
capability in that they are able to exploit certain vulnerabilities, but we are not 
given information about any further capabilities which may be able to achieve 
effects above and beyond what has been achieved. These difficulties are 
exacerbated by the nature of cyberspace as non-physical. The weapons deployed 
in cyberspace have no engine, chassis, hull, or barrel, nor do they fire bullets or 
shells. Gaining meaningful intelligence about adversaries’ cyber capabilities 
therefore becomes enormously difficult. 
 
In this sense, the design decision to limit visibility of capabilities rather than the 
operating landscape follows the standard set by many games about carrier task 
forces, where fog of war is used to represent intelligence capabilities rather than 
physical line of sight. 347 It also follows Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘In the whole 
range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.’348 By 
giving players cards (Black Market Assets) which are hidden from opposing players 
they have at their disposal unknown capabilities which represent a form of 
                                                          
345 Scruby, p. 13 
346 Setear (1989) pp. 6-18 
347 Sabin (2012), p. 109 
348 Clausewitz (1997a), p. 27 
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information superiority – the players know something the others do not know. 
There is no game mechanic which allows the opposing players to find out what 
these capabilities are until they are played in the game, closely simulating the 
difficulty of determining capabilities in cyberspace. 
 
In having to deal with the fog of war, players gain an experience of making 
decisions based on incomplete information, as a policymaker would in the real 
world. There are also discussion opportunities around how the visibility 
mechanics have been implemented in the game, for example the whole game 
board being visible or players’ inability to gather intelligence. Such discussions 
allow players to explore the issue of visibility in cyberspace and learn lessons 
about the difficulties associated with constructing a complete and accurate 
picture of the operating environment. 
 
Chapter 4 Conclusion 
 
Wargaming literature is rife with analysis and advice regarding the game design 
process. This chapter has taken much of this advice under consideration, for 
example Scruby’s assertion that simple time flows are best for inexperienced 
players (Section 4.4.1), or Frank’s warning that victory points mechanics can 
distract players from the purpose of the game (Section 4.3). Perhaps most 
crucially, a core tenet of the design philosophy was Sabin’s dictum that a simple 
wargame that is played is more instructive than a detailed game which is not 
played (Section 4.1). In almost all design matters, simplicity and playability was 
favoured over complexity and accuracy. This was to serve the game’s purpose as 
an educational tool, rather than an analytic or simulation tool. 
 
Where this chapter has made original contributions to the field is in applying 
wargame design concepts to the topic of cyber security. Chapter 3 demonstrated 
some of the deficiencies in current cyber wargaming efforts and the game design 
outlined herein is an attempt to plug a gap in the extant corpus. There are three 
contributions of crucial significance. First, this game is explicitly based on the UK 
National Cyber Security Strategy; the design of game board, the Entities present in 
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the game, and players’ Objectives are to a large extent derived from the 
designer’s interpretation of the Strategy. The games analysed in Chapter 3 almost 
exclusively deal with tactical issues, either of a technical nature or confined to one 
organisation, whereas the original game designed for this thesis concerns a much 
wider gamut of strategic topics. Although ambitious in scope, including more 
topics and concepts increases the learning opportunities contained within the 
game, serving the primary aim of using the game for educational purposes. 
 
Second, the game contains a more nuanced representation of cyber attack and 
defence dynamics. Several of the better games analysed in Chapter 3 pitted 
players against the game system rather than other players, thereby foregoing 
many of the benefits of wargaming (see Section 3.2.2). Even in the matrix-style 
games, where players could argue with each other, the results of conflict were 
decided almost arbitrarily by the umpire. This game allows players to face off 
against human opponents, but with solid game mechanics and independent 
variables determining the outcome of attacks. These mechanics and variables are 
based on the designer’s interpretation of real-world cyber security dynamics, 
which have been extensively documented throughout the chapter. Importantly of 
course, players would be able to question design decisions based on their own 
knowledge or expertise, thereby stimulating pedagogic discussion. 
 
Lastly, this game has showcased how successful game mechanics can be 
innovatively borrowed from existing games. The effectiveness of event cards in 
simulating unpredictability, particularly as implemented in Privacy, led to a similar 
system being designed for this game. Similarly, the marketplace contained in 
Decisions & Disruptions was deemed exceptionally effective in both forcing 
players to make decisions about how to use limited resources and articulate their 
reasoning behind these decisions. The Black Market implemented in this game is 
intended to achieve the same effects, but broadening the lessons from tactical to 
strategic, and including a competitive arms race element. Examples like these 
illustrate the value of understanding an existing wargaming landscape for a given 
topic and being able to transpose useful concepts rather than reinvent the 
proverbial wheel. 
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By analysing design concepts with close regard to a wide variety of cyber security 
issues, this chapter has demonstrated that a wargame can encapsulate both 
technical and geopolitical aspects of cyber security whilst maintaining playability, 
with the ultimate aim of educating players. The efficacy of the game in achieving 
this outcome is analysed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology for 
studying games and players 
 
This chapter outlines the methodological approaches of the thesis. In practical 
terms it could be said that the research takes the form of “create wargame, 
deploy wargame, observe results.” However, underpinning each stage of this 
process are theoretical foundations that guide and shape how the research is 
conducted. In the sense that the thesis represents experimental work, a core 
focus of the methodology is grounded theory, which affords a certain flexibility to 
research that emphasises emergence of findings through creative analysis and 
interpretation of data.  
 
Grounded theory does not have a strong precedent for use within academic 
gaming research. John Salisbury and Tom Cole point to a ‘lack of rigorous and 
transparent use of [grounded theory] in Game Studies.’349 Until recently, in the 
subset of wargaming research, this lack has been even more apparent. Anders 
Frank, for example, used what he calls an ‘interactionist perspective’ as the 
theoretical framework for his 2014 doctoral thesis, giving him a fairly narrow lens 
through which to analyse the ‘gamer mode’ phenomenon his work is concerned 
with.350 Colin Newcombe’s experience using wargames for teaching history hinted 
at the benefits of grounded theory, but did not elaborate further; ‘the more 
elastic one’s approach, the more is to be gained in terms of class discussion or 
individual research,’ he says.351 Jonathan Barbara, meanwhile, touched on aspects 
of ethnographic practice (also discussed in this chapter) but shied away from 
grounded theory with his use of pre-prepared questionnaires to evaluate player 
experiences.352 As of the time of writing, the only considered and critical use of 
grounded theory in academic research is Johan Elg’s 2017 doctoral thesis 
concerning wargaming in military education. Similar to the approach of this thesis, 
                                                          
349 Salisbury and Cole (2016), p. 2 
350 Frank (2014), p. 49 
351 Newcombe (1970), p. 302 
352 Barbara (2015), pp. 633-634 
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Elg only partially implements grounded theory; he embraces the notion that it 
enables theory development yet emphasises that this is of interest only so long as 
it is relevant to the practice of wargaming.353 The use of grounded theory in this 
thesis therefore joins Elg in representing a novel approach to wargaming research. 
 
The chapter begins by outlining the basics of grounded theory, before more 
closely analysing how it is applied in this thesis, specifically the use of grounded 
theory in an inspirational mode, rather than a strict guide for research. Following 
this, Section 5.2 proceeds to look at the applicability of ethnographic practice to 
the thesis, interlacing core tenets of ethnography with methodology themes from 
wargaming literature. A short biography of the researcher is provided as a way of 
addressing strategic positionality, and the difficulties of security and classification 
as applied to this research are enumerated. Section 5.3 analyses issues around 
facilitation and adjudication, which are key to wargaming practice, resulting in the 
first part of an exposé of tactical positionality covering the tensions between the 
roles of game designer and game facilitator/adjudicator. Section 5.4 returns to 
questions around research design, covering different methods for capturing data 
and evaluating results. The section justifies the primary data-collection methods 
used in the thesis – fieldnotes and photographs – while outlining why another 
candidate – video recording – was not employed. This discussion leads onto the 
second part of tactical positionality, looking at the tension between the roles of 
facilitator/adjudicator and researcher. The chapter concludes with commentary 
on the contributions of the thesis to wargaming research methodology.  
 
A crucial consideration to keep in mind throughout this chapter is that 
experiences of conducting the research are elaborated in detail in Chapter 7. This 
includes comparisons of how the experiences reinforce or challenge assumptions 
and predictions stemming from the methods. As such, the current chapter 
presents the methodology in theory, while evaluation in practice can be found in 
the later chapter. 
 
                                                          
353 Elg (2017), p. 17 
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5.1 Grounded theory and its links to wargaming 
 
Most academic research follows the traditional positivist scientific approach. This 
approach begins with the formulation of research questions, which in turn guide 
how the research will be conducted. The evidence gathered is then used to 
confirm, dispel or reformulate the pre-selected hypothesis. In essence, grounded 
theory seeks to flip this around, so that data is gathered first, and a hypothesis or 
theory only emerges once this data is analysed. Although first formulated by Brian 
Glasner and Anselm Strauss’ 1967 work The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies for Qualitative Research in the field of sociology, in the past fifty years 
grounded theory has established itself as a highly regarded qualitative research 
method, especially in health and education studies but also human geography and 
politics and international relations.354  
 
Given that this thesis is to a large extent concerned with pedagogy, it is therefore 
important to consider how grounded theory is instructive. In the area of 
education, Sally Hutchinson has provided a comprehensive overview of how to 
approach research using grounded theory. She notes constraints on the 
researcher such as ‘bracketing’ (or positionality, discussed further in 
Sections 5.2.1, 5.3.1 and 5.4.2 below) and the reliability and validity of data, and 
makes recommendations on how to record data.355 She also points to Glasner’s 
1978 book Theoretical Sensitivity as the best guide on the subject, yet, perhaps 
ominously, deems it ‘tedious, difficult, and carelessly edited,’ imploring that ‘it is 
best to read the book as you are doing your research; to read Glaser's work in 
isolation from empirical data is un-productive.’356 If we take this statement to be a 
reflection of the academic consensus, grounded theory appears ironically self-
fulfilling. In the same way that grounded theory itself involves the collection of 
data before a postulating a theory, in order to employ grounded theory in the first 
place, the research that feeds into it must already be done.  
 
                                                          
354 Thomas and James (2006), p. 768 
355 Hutchinson (1986), pp. 57-60 
356 Ibid., p. 57 
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Despite an apparent close fit to the research being conducted (create-deploy-
observe), this thesis does not simply embrace grounded theory uncritically, but 
uses it strategically to inform research design and methods. As a reminder, the 
central objectives research presented here are: 
 
• Create a wargame for cyber security education. 
• Analyse the capacity for the game to create learning moments and enable 
players to share knowledge and ask the right questions. 
• Reflect on the researcher’s experience as a wargaming practitioner. 
 
This is accompanied by a selection of sub-questions, including: What are 
wargames useful/not useful for? What difficulties emerge when designing a 
wargame for cyber security? How might a wargame that deals with cyber security 
look? Are wargames good learning tools for cyber security? With the final 
question as a notable exception, the common characteristic of these questions is 
their open-endedness. It is not yet known what the potential answers to the 
questions are and as a result it is not known what type of evidence or data should 
be gathered. Indeed, the questions are intended as loose guidelines rather than 
rigid interrogatives and should be flexible enough to be amended or reconsidered 
in light of whatever data emerges as the thesis progresses. In this sense, the 
present research is comparable to that of Carlo Fabricatore et al, whose study of 
game playability (albeit computer games) started with the open-ended question 
‘what do players want in video games?’ and went on to apply grounded theory to 
derive conclusions.357 Applying grounded theory as an informative, rather than 
prescriptive, method in games research also has precedent in Nathan Hook’s 2012 
social psychology study of live action role-players.358 
 
Roy Suddaby argues that grounded theory is too often taken to mean ‘anything 
goes’ when it comes to data collection and analysis.359 The research for this thesis 
is infused with an awareness of some of the uses and limitations of grounded 
theory. For example, Kathleen Wells’ criticisms about the difficulties of 
                                                          
357 Fabricatore, Nussbaum and Rosas (2002) 
358 Cited in Hook (2015), p. 317 
359 Suddaby (2006), p. 640 
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implementing a ‘constant comparative method’ and evaluating grounded theory 
for practical potential are well-noted.360 This method calls for new data to be 
analysed with regards to previous data as and when it is collected. As the scope of 
research grows and the amount of data increases, this can become an onerous, 
potentially unmanageable, task. Taking this into account, Hook lauds Emily Brown 
and Paul Cairns’ 2004 study of game immersion, which drew grounded theory-
based conclusions based on just seven data interviews.361 However, the point here 
is that this thesis must not limit the amount of data collected simply to ensure 
grounded theory remains a viable method, and those aspects of grounded theory 
should not shackle the research. The research may outgrow the applicability of 
constant comparison, but grounded theory can still remain informative in 
interpreting data at later stages. 
 
As a final insight, noteworthy of early reviews of grounded theory is the emphasis 
on the creativity required by the researcher. Both John Scott362 and Helmut 
Wagner363 were enthusiastic about Glaser and Anselm’s focus on exploration of 
data by a human researcher with an understanding of the study area. Perhaps 
precognisant of this thesis, Wagner states that grounded theory ‘emphasizes 
curiosity, imagination, and openness as prime virtues of sociologists rather than 
infatuation with statistical techniques: the prime area of sociological action 
remains the field, not the IBM or computer centre. [sic]’364 Recalling the analysis 
provided in Section 2.2, there is clear overlap between grounded theory and some 
of the advantages of wargaming. Just as wargames can capture human elements 
of conflict better than operational research techniques, so can grounded theory 
harness the human aspects of the subject being investigated – in the case of this 
thesis wargaming and cyber security. Furthermore, the onus on the researcher to 
creatively apply their cognitive faculties is reminiscent of the creativity required of 
a wargame designer when creating games. In these aspects, at least, wargaming 
and grounded theory seem to be close fits. 
                                                          
360 Wells (1995), pp. 35-36 
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363 Wagner (1968), p. 555 
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5.2 Ethnographic practice 
 
This thesis is not a classic ethnography. The research does not comprise extended 
embedding within an organisation or community to make longitudinal 
observations. Nonetheless, the practical elements of the thesis do draw on many 
accepted ethnographic practices as the research conducted involved multiple 
engagements with varied stakeholders in the UK and overseas. Martyn 
Hammersley and Paul Atkinson’s seminal work on ethnography identifies five 
facets which make up most ethnographic work: 
1. People are studied in everyday contexts rather than contrived setups 
2. Participant observation forms the main part of the data gathered 
3. Data collection is unstructured 
4. Focus is on a few, small-scale cases for in-depth research 
5. Analysis involves interpretation of human actions, extrapolated to wider 
contexts.365 
Of these five, only facets 2 and 3 apply wholly to this thesis; the data collection 
portions of the research are largely built on the researcher’s observations during 
gaming sessions, and these observations were not designed to spot certain 
behaviours or actions, nor designed to be recorded in any set format. Facet 1 does 
not apply at all; gaming sessions represent an artificial setting where players are 
often encouraged to abandon their everyday roles and mentalities. Facets 4 and 5 
apply partially: there were not a great number of gaming sessions enacted as part 
of the research, but the intent was not to do an in-depth study of each one; while 
data analysis may involve wider extrapolation, but only if the data permits, which 
cannot be known before the analysis is actually done. 
 
The implication of this mixed applicability is that the research conducted for this 
thesis is not directly comparable to classic ethnographic studies. Seminal 
ethnographic work like that of Edmund Leach366 or Margaret Mead367 very closely 
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follows the five principles outlined above and the present study should not be 
measured against these, either in terms of how the research was conducted or in 
terms of impact. At the same time, however, it would be remiss to attempt to 
completely distance this thesis from ethnography. Given that the research does 
feature some central tenets of ethnographic study, trying to work in isolation 
from such well-established theoretical and practical concepts might be seen as 
reinventing the wheel (at best) or academic negligence (at worst). This section 
therefore recognises existing theoretical and practical considerations of 
ethnography, but rather than apply these considerations wholesale, limits analysis 
to those parts applicable to this thesis. 
 
5.2.1 Strategic positionality 
 
In ethnography, the role of the researcher is pivotal to shaping both the conduct 
and outcome of the research. The researcher’s understanding, skills, and 
behaviour will affect the level of access granted, what observations are made, 
how data is recorded and analysed, and how participants react to the research. 
With regards to initial and overarching influences, we can refer to what 
Hammersley and Atkinson call ‘background knowledge, social characteristics and 
circumstances’ as strategic positionality.368  Strategic positionality is intended to 
encompass the broader particularities of the researcher which influence the 
research. This concerns aspects of the researcher’s personal background which 
may need to be taken into account when determining how the research should be 
conducted, or when analysing data. These aspects include sociocultural-economic 
background (class, race, ethnicity, gender, nationality, language), educational 
attainment, and employment experience. It is important to make these 
disclosures because other researchers attempting similar work may find different 
results, and such variation can be caused by the researcher’s own characteristics. 
Strategic positionality is contrasted with tactical positionality (detailed in 
Sections 5.3.1 and 5.4.2) which refers to specific instances during the research, 
particularly how the researcher behaves during a game session. Factors that may 
influence behaviour include the tensions between the roles of the researcher and 
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game designer/adjudicator, and between distanced observation and close 
engagement. 
 
Researcher’s background 
 
As part of identifying strategic positionality issues, it is useful to provide a short 
overview of the researcher’s background. This section highlights some facets of 
the researcher’s personal, academic and professional experiences before 
commencing the thesis, which are pertinent with regards to positionality. 
 
Gender 
The most immediately obvious personal characteristic is that the researcher is 
male. This is their birth gender and they have never identified in any other way. 
The advantage of being male when researching a predominantly security- and 
military-affiliated topics should not be underestimated. These environments have 
traditionally been male-dominated and, in the case of the military, built on strong 
cultures of comradeship and bravado associated with testosterone-fuelled acts. 
Writing of US foreign policy mechanisms after the Second World War, Robert 
Dean refers to ‘socially constructed brotherhoods’ from which the likes of John F. 
Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson gained prominence, not least on the back of their 
much-vaunted respective military service.369 Although Western societal attitudes 
have largely steered away from patriarchal dominance in recent decades, military 
demographics have yet to catch up with an increasingly gender-balanced world. 
As of April 2017, for example, the UK’s Regular Armed Forces were composed of 
10.2% females, and the official target was 15% by 2020.370 As such, a male 
researcher is likely to more readily be accepted in this environment, because they 
fit into existing masculinised structures. In her, ethnographic work exploring the 
world of defence intellectuals, Carol Cohn characterised her experience as 
‘bizarre’371 and that her initial naivety meant she was ‘not prepared for what [she] 
found.’372 Cohn’s work is admittedly dated, having been written over 30 years ago, 
but even the passing of this amount of time will not have completely undone 
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centuries of masculinised military structures. It could be posited that a male 
researcher, being less susceptible to a Cohn-like culture shock, would more 
quickly assimilate into the environment (which took Cohn some time), making the 
environment less of an obstacle to the research. 
 
As wargaming has military roots, it has inherited a male bias among its 
practitioners. This is recognised by Pat Harrigan and Matthew Kirschenbaum, who 
make a point of highlighting the contributions of female authors (11 out of 66 
total) to their edited 2016 volume Zones of Control.373 Anecdotally, judging by the 
attendance at professional wargaming conference Connections UK in 2015, 2016 
and 2017, females accounted for less than 15% of participants. In 1992, Dunnigan 
estimated that females made up as little as 1% of the wargaming community.374 
Unfortunately, the peculiarities of a male-dominated community can sometimes 
materialise as negative consequences for female participants. Twitter user Katrina 
Clifford, for example, has shared her experience of a wargaming event where 
‘people talked only to my husband & looked right past me when on my own 
[sic].’375 Being female in this environment can evidently be a handicap, but one 
that has not had to be contended with as part of this research.  
 
Cyber security, the other primary environment this thesis is concerned with, is 
equally male-dominated. A 2017 survey by Reed et al found that just 11% of the 
global cyber security workforce were women, and in Europe (where this thesis is 
written) it was even lower at 7%.376 Foley et al reported that one of the inhibitors 
to female participation in this profession was a perceived ‘boys’ club’, with 
workplace culture being cited as a major cause for career dissatisfaction.377 
However, these problems are widely recognised by the cyber security community 
and concrete steps are being taken to address the imbalance. Eleanor Dallaway, 
for example, has constructed an action plan targeting every level from school 
children to existing industry professionals.378 Anecdotally, this author is also 
aware of a growing number of male cyber security professionals who refuse to 
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participate in conference panels without female representation. These efforts 
notwithstanding, at the current impasse, being a male researcher in this 
environment can clearly be an advantage in terms of removing some of the 
friction associated with gender disparities. 
 
Nationality and language 
Another advantage of the researcher’s background they have been able to exploit 
for research purposes is their dual nationality and bilingualism. The researcher 
was born in Sweden and spent their early childhood there, before immigrating to 
Australia where they spent most of their teenage years. Courtesy of this, they 
hold both Swedish and Australian citizenship, and are proficient to native 
standard in both Swedish and English. This has proved a boon to the research, as 
it was possible to leverage both linguistic ties and contact networks (old and new) 
to arrange gaming sessions in both these countries (see Section 7.1.1), providing 
important international perspectives and data points. An additional consideration 
with regards to nationality is the researcher’s lack of British citizenship, which 
could be imagined as a hindrance given the association of the thesis with the UK 
military establishment. In practice, however, only security and classification, not 
necessarily tied to nationality, proved an issue in this regard – see Section 7.2 for 
further discussion. 
 
Education 
The researcher’s prior education has proved fundamental in shaping the course of 
the research. The researcher received an undergraduate degree in War Studies 
with Digital Humanities from King’s College London, later followed by a master’s 
in Intelligence and International Security from the same university. Both degrees 
were based in the university’s Department of War Studies, which ‘seeks to 
understand the complex realm of war, conflict and international politics.’379 In 
addition to providing the researcher with a solid foundational understanding of 
various aspects of war and conflict, there were two crucial outcomes which have 
affected the research for this thesis. The first was an initial exposure to 
wargaming used for pedagogical purposes. The researcher had previously 
encountered both board games and miniature figure games in recreational 
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settings, but a professor at King’s – Philip Sabin – used wargames in an 
undergraduate module as tools for teaching strategic and tactical components of 
the Second World War. This gave the researcher a basic understanding of how 
wargames could be used in an educational setting, although at the time this 
purely served personal interest – this thesis was still several years away from 
conception. Notably, Sabin also convenes an optional module on the War Studies 
master’s programme dedicated to wargaming, covering multiple aspects of 
wargame use and design (including many of those discussed in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4), and students must for their final projects design and construct a 
wargame based on a historical military campaign or battle of their choosing. 
Unfortunately, at the time the researcher did not elect to take this module simply 
because others appealed more. In hindsight, the researcher missed out on 
knowledge and experience which would have served them well for this thesis – 
although they have been able to catch up on much of the module’s content as it is 
contained within Sabin’s Simulating War.380  
 
The second outcome from the researcher’s education are the benefits which 
come with the King’s brand. The Department of War Studies carries a very good 
reputation, both within the UK and internationally, from which the researcher has 
been able to derive a certain degree of personal credibility by virtue of being a 
War Studies graduate. Partly as a result of this reputation, many King’s graduates 
go on to work in prominent positions the military, civil service, security 
organisations, and other companies, many of which are prime targets for the 
research in this thesis.381 Although the researcher has not formally exploited the 
university’s alumni network to build a contact network, being able to appeal to 
their King’s background has enabled them to build rapport with key individuals 
they have met who also happened to be War Studies graduates. This combination 
of King’s reputation and connections has created access routes to organisations 
which may not otherwise have been open – see Section 7.1.1 for further 
discussion. Importantly, these exact same effects have also been possible in the 
cyber security world thanks to Royal Holloway’s Information Security Group, 
which has a comparable reputation and connections. It is entirely possible that 
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conducting this thesis research without the gravitas associated with both King’s 
and Royal Holloway would not have achieved the same outcomes. 
 
Employment 
The final facet of the researcher’s background pertinent to shaping this research is 
their employment history, the most important part of which is the 18 months (6 
full-time then 12 part-time during their master’s) they spent working for an 
events company organising conferences, exhibitions, and industry fairs. More 
specifically, the researcher worked for the part of the company organising such 
events for the defence and security industry, ranging from conferences with 150 
participants to international exhibitions with 34,000 visitors. The researcher’s role 
was on the VIP team and involved liaising with senior military, government, and 
diplomatic officials both in the UK and overseas regarding their attendance at the 
events. Having had no prior first-hand exposure to the military or defence-
industrial complex, the researcher’s time in this role was invaluable in terms of 
immersing them in the cultures of these worlds and learning how to communicate 
with the people working there. The peculiarities of communication in this 
environment should not be underestimated; Cohn, for example, notes how she 
was ‘startled’ by the language used, particularly the liberal use of acronyms.382 
Given that a lot of the fieldwork conducted for this thesis involves defence-related 
organisations, being able to interface with this environment seamlessly is an 
invaluable skill, partly to ease the flow of communication when setting up the 
fieldwork and partly to avoid any friction during the fieldwork itself.  
 
5.2.2 Strategy for targeting research participants 
 
In Section 1.1 it was stated that the theoretical target audience for the game were 
senior policy- and decision-makers, though that in practice participants came from 
a wide range of backgrounds. Moreover, with reference to Appendix C, it may be 
noted that there is a high proportion of military and central government 
organisations in the list of participating organisations. Out of 14 distinct 
organisations, 5 are affiliated with the military and 3 with government, while 
many of the mixed sessions also had representatives from these organisations. 
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The prevalence of military and government among the participants can be traced 
to two factors. Firstly, the researcher made a concerted effort to make inroads 
with government organisations because this had been identified as the primary 
source of senior policymakers. Indeed, the conceptual “moon shot” for the thesis 
was Number 10 Downing Street – to have the Prime Minister play the game. 
Without any direct contacts at those ultra-high echelons of government, attempts 
were made to build relationships at lower levels, with a view to working upwards 
as the game gained traction. This resulted in multiple central government 
organisations taking part in game sessions, even if the ultimate aim of reaching 
Ministers was never realised. 
 
Secondly, as outlined in Section 2.1, owing to the history of wargaming there is a 
close synergy with the military. Notwithstanding the presence of “war” in the 
terminology, the military pioneered wargaming and are therefore attuned to its 
use. Although Perla has noted that wargaming goes through peaks and troughs of 
popularity, at the time of writing the thesis wargaming is near one of these 
peaks.383 The aforementioned memorandum from Robert O. Work (see Section 
2.2.1) exemplifies this in the US, while in the UK renewed interest in wargaming is 
evidenced by the 2017 release of the Ministry of Defence Wargaming 
Handbook.384 Combined with the researcher’s strategic positionality, which as 
outlined in Section 5.2.1 contains significant military and defence elements, the 
game therefore quite naturally attracted attention from military organisations, 
resulting in their participation in game sessions.  
 
What should be clear from the preceding paragraphs is that while some efforts to 
garner research participants were directed, much of the traction of the game 
grew organically. This resulted in the participation of organisations which the 
researcher had scarcely been aware of, let alone targeted. The details of this 
process, including the role of strategic positionality and ‘snowballing’, are 
extensively analysed in Section 7.1.1.  
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5.2.3 Security and classification of information 
 
Issues surrounding access are well-covered in ethnographic literature. 
Hammersley and Atkinson note that while access is often a practical matter 
concerning physical presence385 and relationships with gatekeepers386, there are 
also theoretical understandings about how negotiating access feeds into the 
research387 and ethical considerations.388 What Hammersley and Atkinson’s 
account lacks, however, is a thorough treatment of the effect of secrecy and 
classification on ethnographic practice, despite citing examples where this would 
have been relevant.389 
 
This thesis is written at an entirely unclassified level. All sources consulted are 
public and open, and no security sensitive material is actively sought in gaming 
sessions or meetings. Cyber security, however, is notoriously over-classified and 
problems of secrecy may prove a hindrance to access to material.390 This problem 
is by no means a nascent one. Nearly 60 years ago, Robert Specht noted that with 
regards to wargames: 
 
‘Unfortunately, the operations and results of such games [national policy-
making level] are hedged about with tight security restrictions - the reports 
bear, in fact, the security classification BBRSC, which stands for "Burn Before 
Reading and Shoot the Courier."391 
 
Although tongue-in-cheek, the underlying point remains valid. It is perhaps little 
wonder that post-wargame reports are enshrouded in such secrecy; after all, they 
would provide an adversary with useful insight into how the organisation playing 
the game operates, how they might react in certain situations, and, above all, 
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what they know (or think they know) about the adversary. With this in mind, Nina 
Wilhelmson and Thomas Svensson suggest that issues of security, accreditation 
and secrecy should be settled before even the planning of a wargame 
commences.392 With cyber security being high on many lists of national priorities, 
classification is especially pertinent in cyber wargames. Reporting to US Congress 
on the first ever cyber security exercise conducted by the US National Security 
Agency, ELIGIBLE RECEIVER, Steven Hildreth complained that ‘reliable, unclassified 
results are hard to come by.’393 Despite the justified reasoning behind such 
secrecy, classification is nevertheless a methodological problem for this thesis, as 
it is restricted in what previous work it can draw on, which participants can be 
accessed, and what these participants can contribute – see Sections 7.2.1 and 
7.2.2 for discussion of how these restrictions were realised. 
 
Despite being conducted at an unclassified level, during the course of the research 
sensitive material was nonetheless encountered.  The restrictions on what could 
be divulged about PwC’s Game of Threats (Section 3.2.1) illustrate the resulting 
tensions of unwittingly gathering commercially sensitive material. Similarly, in 
creating a safe space (Section 2.2.7), players may feel comfortable sharing things 
they would not otherwise have done, or at least would not want attributed to 
them. Although anonymity may be relatively easy to preserve, there is some 
disciplinary resistance to further secrecy-enhancing practices. Gerald Berreman, 
for example, states that ‘the repudiation of secret or clandestine activity in the 
name of anthropology has been the most long-standing and the most 
consistently, unequivocally enunciated of ethical principles embraced by 
American anthropologists.’394 This thesis may not be an anthropological 
endeavour, but Berreman’s words provide a note of caution about tensions that 
may arise during the course of conducting and publishing ethnographic research. 
One the one hand there is a need to preserve security and privacy, and on the 
other an impetus to publish research stemming from privileged access not 
available to other researchers. 
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5.3 Facilitation and adjudication 
 
Although some wargames are self-contained, most professional games are 
convened by a second-party (the game designer) or third-party (other 
convenor/facilitator). Sometimes the convener simply introduces the game and 
explains the rules then lets the players play, but often the convener acts in a 
pivotal facilitating role where they enforce the rules and adjudicate on outcomes. 
There can therefore be great pressures on the convener to perform their role 
impartially, consistently, efficiently and confidently.  
 
In his practice-based doctoral thesis, Anders Frank states that the role of the 
instructor (facilitator) is two-fold: to ‘support players’ role-play and professional 
orientation’ and to ‘explain events in the game by providing real-world 
references.’395 While the first part seems straightforward, there is widespread 
disagreement with the second. A whole host of authors attest that the facilitator 
should very explicitly not explain events in the game, but should allow and 
encourage players to do this themselves. ‘A facilitator isn’t there to give opinions,‘ 
writes Terence Mahoney, ‘but to draw out the opinions and ideas of the group 
members’396 to create what Warren Wiggins refers to as a ‘feedback-loop.’397 This 
conviction is reinforced by both Steven Downes-Martin who says that ‘it is the 
players’ job to illuminate the problem with insights and understanding, not the 
adjudicator’398 and Shawn Burns who concludes that ‘focused discussion led by a 
war game faculty member [facilitator], as opposed to a rambling free-flow player-
led discussion, can drive the discussion toward reflection related to game 
objectives.’399 The point here is that that facilitator/adjudicator role is to guide 
players, but not necessarily to impose their own interpretation of and on the 
game. 
 
The task of prompting players to create their own learning moments is not an 
easy one, requiring strong pedagogic and interpersonal skills on behalf of the 
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facilitator. Some of this may be aided (or hindered) by positional factors, such as 
the gender of the facilitator when working in gender-imbalanced settings, but a 
lot also hinges on the facilitator’s observation and communication abilities. Frank 
provides the useful insight that a turn-based game was better for ‘getting a grip 
on the situation’ because the pace of the game was slower.400 Aside from the 
personal characteristics of the convenor, the game setup and locale should also 
foster an engaging and participatory environment. In particular, Wilhelmson and 
Svensson prescribe a ‘positive atmosphere’ where ‘participants should not feel 
vulnerable or that their weaknesses have been exposed to their colleagues and 
superiors.’401 Similarly, Burns highlights ‘concern for being critiqued by peers or 
seniors for speaking contrary to the collective view of the group’ as a barrier to 
reflection.402 Selection of players therefore becomes paramount, as do the rooms 
in which the game is played, and who is able to observe the game in-play and read 
any post-game reports. Should participation in the game therefore be limited to 
players of equal seniority, encouraging a freer exchange of views at the expense 
of seniors not being there to share directly in the learning moments and juniors to 
provide specialty input? There is no definitive theoretical answer to this question; 
the approach taken will vary depending on the circumstances of each game. 
 
On a practical level, the game designer and/or facilitator may not have any control 
of these factors, instead being constrained by what the participating organisation 
is able to arrange. A game for six to eight players, for example, might be best 
played on a medium-sized table in a private boardroom, but the host organisation 
is only able to arrange a large lecture hall requiring an improvised playing surface 
of smaller desks joined together, or a noisy recreational room where the choice of 
surface is limited to a snooker table, knee-height coffee table, or the bar. All of 
this should be kept in mind throughout the game cycle, including designing, 
playing, and evaluating the game. A multi-purpose game intended to be reused in 
many settings needs to be less sensitive to situational changes, whereas a 
bespoke one-off game can be tailored to factor in the spaces available and players 
who will participate. Similar considerations also apply to the game facilitator. A 
formal setting might require a more authoritative voice and presence, while an 
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informal setting invites a more relaxed demeanour. In cases where the facilitator 
follows the game to different settings, as in this research, a great degree of 
adaptability is clearly required. The researcher’s experiences in this regard are 
discussed in Section 7.1.2. 
 
5.3.1 Tactical Positionality I 
 
In contrast to the strategic positionality outlined previously, tactical positionality 
is here used to refer to short-term localised influences and constraints. Issues 
around tactical positionality emerge from the quadruple-hatted role assumed by 
the researcher. For this thesis, the author simultaneously acted as game designer, 
game facilitator, game adjudicator, and PhD researcher. The tensions between 
these are broadly divided along two fault lines: between designer and 
facilitator/adjudicator, which is addressed in this section, and between 
facilitator/adjudicator and researcher, which is treated in Section 5.4.2. 
 
The tensions between the designer and facilitator/adjudicator roles fall into two 
categories. First might be called the trap of the overzealous salesman. For this 
research, designing a game was not sufficient, the game must also be deployed. In 
order to get buy-in from prospective players, the virtues of the game would need 
to be communicated to them: why the organisation should commit staff and time 
to playing the game and what the potential learning outcomes are for players. The 
potential pitfall here is that the game’s benefits are over-sold, either unwittingly 
by an overenthusiastic designer, or wittingly in the quest for (more) participants. 
If the game fails to deliver on the promised benefits, participants will be 
disappointed, which not only yields negative (though valid) data from that game 
session but can also hinder the game from gaining traction for future game 
deployments. Such a failure to deliver can either be actual – players did not 
achieve the touted learning outcomes – or perceived – players achieved learning 
outcomes, but the organisation did not see the value of the game in eliciting 
these. Actual failure points to erroneous game design or delivery which may 
require changes in game construction or deployment, whereas perceived failure 
should be mitigated by expectation management. However, Dunnigan points out 
that ‘the difference between a false prophet and a real one is usually only 
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detectable after it’s too late,’ meaning any corrective efforts may be futile as the 
damage (for example to the game’s or the designer’s reputation) may already 
have been done.403 The optimal solution, therefore, is to be cognisant of the trap 
of the overzealous salesman at the outset of the research, and factor this in when 
communicating the benefits of game to potential participating organisations, to 
prevent the researcher from becoming a false prophet.  
 
The second category is taking feedback personally. As the owner of the product, it 
would be understandable for the designer to develop a personal and professional 
attachment to the game. After spending up to 2000 hours designing a game, the 
game can become an extension of the designer themselves in terms of their 
personal and professional identity.404 If players offer feedback about the game to 
the facilitator it is then entirely plausible that the designer (being the same 
person) takes this feedback personally, especially criticisms. This could be 
envisaged as a potential pitfall as it may create a sour environment in the game 
session with a despondent designer causing the facilitator to be unenthusiastic or 
the adjudicator to be impartial against the critical party. In this sense, we would 
benefit from heeding the advice of Harriet Hawkins who, as part of her work on 
creative research methods, highlights ‘the importance of appreciating the 
processes of creative practices…rather than only as a means of production leading 
to an output.’405 A wargame designer may feel an attachment to their creation, 
but if this feeling overrides the perceived value of feedback (part of the creative 
process), a large part of the purpose of the game is lost. While a level of pride in 
the game should be maintained, it can be posited that it is equally important to be 
able to disassociate from the product during the course of critical feedback. 
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5.4 Methods for capturing game results and player 
experiences 
 
In order to measure whether learning objectives are met, devices for tracking 
players’ thoughts and actions within the game and for recording game outcomes 
need to be constructed. Although a plethora of data collection techniques are 
available, and a selection are discussed in this section, there are few established 
standards for which techniques should be used in wargaming, because what is 
recorded and how this is done depends on the design of the game and the 
learning objectives, which are unique to each game. Rather than outright 
emulation of any previous research in this field, this thesis therefore builds a 
bespoke data collection mechanism, but to avoid the ‘anything goes’ grounded 
theory trap, analysis of existing literature can illuminate some basic approaches 
and pitfalls with this process. 
 
There are two primary targets for data collection. The first is interaction between 
players, which falls into three broad categories: interaction through game play 
(such as capturing another player’s pieces), direct interaction (such as negotiation 
or trade within the rules of the game), and social interaction (outside the rules of 
the game).406 The second is interaction between the players and the 
facilitator/adjudicator, either as part of gameplay or in discussion sessions outside 
the rules of the game. All of these interactions are likely to contribute towards 
players achieving learning objectives and should therefore be recorded as the 
game progresses.  
 
In other research using games, notably by Johnathan Klein and Dale Cooper, 
attempts have been made to capture players’ internal thought processes through 
‘cognitive mapping’ which ‘provides a means of representing the way in which a 
decision-maker models his decision-making environment, in terms of the concepts 
he himself uses.’407 Though certainly interesting and potentially useful, two 
factors hinder this technique from being applicable to this research. Firstly, having 
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players continually reflect on their own decisions is likely to interrupt the flow of 
the game, thus interfering with its immersive qualities. Given that this thesis is 
more interested finding out the potential value of games than analysing players’ 
decision processes, it seems imprudent to jeopardise the former in an attempt to 
capture the latter. Secondly, these maps can only be developed from a rich 
recording of game progress, player interactions, and player thoughts, so they are 
dependent on thorough data collection in the first place. With the research in this 
thesis being highly experimental, it is not known a priori whether the data 
collected could satisfy the requirements for cognitive mapping. As such, this 
technique will not be pursued as part of this research. 
 
5.4.1 Data gathering methods 
 
Existing wargaming literature points towards data gathering techniques that may 
be employed in this space. In a handbook for wargame designers, the US Naval 
War College outlines four: summaries of player discussions, survey 
questionnaires, player-submitted game products (such as move sheets), and 
transcripts of final plenary discussions.408 Defence company Boeing, in delivering a 
wargame for the UK Ministry of Defence, used seven types of data collection 
techniques: pre-experiment questionnaires, analysts' observations, Instant 
Messenger logs, situational-awareness survey sheet, end-of-session 
questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, and end-of-experiment 
questionnaires.409 Of these, Instant Messenger logs can be immediately discarded 
for this thesis since these are only applicable to computerised games. 
Additionally, evidence from wargaming, specifically cyber defence exercises, 
suggests that questionnaires are unreliable because it can be difficult to motivate 
players to fill them out.410  
 
In keeping with the foundations of a joint grounded theory-ethnographic practice 
approach to research, three of the techniques provided above appear most suited 
to this research: summaries of player discussions, player-submitted game 
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products, and analysts’ observations. Discussion summaries and analyst 
observations are recorded via the thesis’ primary data gathering method: 
fieldnotes; while photographs are used as supplementary evidence. There are also 
player-submitted game products in the form of Record Keeping Sheets which 
provide quantitative data about game progress. Each of these methods have 
advantages and drawbacks, which are evaluated below, followed by two rejected 
data gathering methods involving video and voice recording. 
 
Fieldnotes 
 
The most obvious and prevalent method of capturing researchers’ observations is 
through diligent and extensive notetaking. This thesis relies on the researcher 
taking advantage of their privileged role as game facilitator to gather insights into 
players’ attitudes, behaviours, and communications. Although seemingly 
simplistic, notetaking is not necessarily a straightforward practice. Returning to 
Hammersley and Atkinson, notetaking is selective, fraught with trade-offs 
between breadth and depth, dependent on what the researcher perceives as 
important, suffers from issues with timing and covert/overtness, and the 
character of notes can change as the research progresses.411 Many of these 
aspects are captured in issues around tactical positionality (see Section 5.4.2), but 
it is important to be cognisant of the potential pitfalls in relying on notetaking as 
the primary data gathering method. The experience of the researcher in using 
fieldnotes, as compared to the theoretical background provided here, are 
evaluated in Section 7.1.2. 
  
Record Keeping Sheets 
 
Record Keeping Sheets are a game component created for the game used in this 
thesis which allows players to track the state of the game as it progresses. Each 
Sheet (one per team) contains tables which the players fill out every game turn, 
effectively recording the placement of counters and cards across the game board. 
Completion of the Sheets is a mandatory part of gameplay and is therefore a 
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guaranteed source of data. The data is entirely numeric and is in the same format 
for each game session. As a result, the data accumulated over the course of 
multiple gaming sessions constitutes a quantitative dataset which can be mined 
for statistics. During the course of game development, such statistics help game 
designers balance a game. In an analytical game, statistics are also the core 
mechanism for deriving lessons from the game and for measuring player or team 
performance. While the game produced for this thesis is educational rather than 
analytical, it would be a shame to let the data go to waste. As such, some 
statistical results are produced in Sections 6.1.2 to 6.1.4, though they are only 
intended to as anecdotal highlights rather than substantive insights.  
 
Rejected data gathering methods 
 
One visual data gathering method adopted by some researchers in this space is to 
capture video. This was used by Frank in his doctoral thesis412 and by Frey et al in 
their studies using Decisions & Disruptions, but neither reflected on their 
experience of using this data gathering method.413 From a critical perspective, a 
more insightful source is Daniel Bos, who utilised video recordings of game 
players to analyse their interactions with games in his geopolitics study of the Call 
of Duty video game franchise. Bos’ experience with this method reveals the 
consequences of imposing an artificial research environment on participants: in 
doing so he undermined the ‘everydayness’ of play he intended to capture.414 
Attempting to overcome this problem, Bos altered his method from a laboratory-
like setup to filming participants in their own homes. Crucially, however, all 
participants who agreed to this were close friends of Bos and their awareness of 
his research objectives impacted how they behaved in front of the camera.415 To 
borrow a phrase from Sarah Pink, such ‘camera consciousness’ does not adhere to 
the principles of ethnography, which hold that participants should be recorded in 
everyday settings.416 Although it has already been established that the game 
sessions used in this thesis do not constitute everyday settings, it is nonetheless 
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important to avoid introducing extra-ludic elements which can distract players 
from approaching a game in a natural manner. For this reason, the presence of a 
video camera was assessed to be overly imposing and likely to alter players’ 
behaviour in the game, and therefore rejected as a data gathering method. 
 
Another method utilised by Bos was to record his own thoughts about a game, 
during gameplay, by using a Dictaphone.417 This approach is suitable in an 
autoethnographic setting, where the researcher is also the subject of research 
and/or interacting with the object of research. However, as further elucidated by 
the tensions of tactical positionality in Section 5.4.2, capturing introspective voice 
recordings during a game session would not have been appropriate for this thesis. 
Pausing a game session, even briefly, to record observations or comments would 
likely be intrusive on the players and made them self-conscious about their 
actions and interactions in and around the game. An alternative would be for the 
researcher to remove themselves from the immediate game area to make the 
recording out of earshot of the players, but this would also mean removing 
themselves from the role of facilitator/adjudicator. Neither approach was deemed 
constructive for the research and voice recording was therefore rejected as a data 
collection method. 
 
Ethics and consent 
 
An important consideration when working with human research subjects is the 
issue of ethics and consent. Royal Holloway has ethical review processes which all 
research must pass through to protect research subjects, researchers, and the 
institution itself. These review processes ensure research will not cause harm to 
participants, whether physical or psychological, and that research adheres to 
moral and legal guidelines, for example when monetary or other rewards are 
offered to participants for taking part in the research. When research has the 
potential to cause harm or tread moral boundaries, participants should be 
informed of any anticipated consequences and consent to participating in the 
research. The processes are also intended to ensure research complies with data 
protection principles; participants should know what data is collected about them, 
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how this data will be stored and used, and be allowed to opt out of the research if 
they wish. 
 
Limitations on consent 
Despite procedures to ensure informed consent, it is not a straightforward 
consideration, as Hammersley and Atkinson put it: ‘consent is often neither 
possible not desirable in ethnographic (or, for that matter, other) research.’418 
Examples abound of covert research where participants were unwitting and 
therefore could not consent to taking part419, or of acceptable deceptive practice 
by researchers.420 Hammersley and Atkinson also provide a series of reasons why 
informed consent may not be practical, and in the context of this thesis, even 
though the research was overt, three of these reasons are particularly pertinent. 
 
Firstly, ‘continually seeking consent may be disruptive to the research.’421 During 
the course of a game session, the flow of events and player discussions could be 
interrupted if the researcher frequently paused proceedings to ascertain whether 
a participant agreed to individual actions or comments being included in the 
research data. Sami Abuhamdeh and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi state that a 
commonly reported feature of ‘flow experiences’ is ‘high attentional 
involvement’, so any disruption to flow may impact participants’ attention to the 
game (see Section 6.3.3 for discussion of engagement).422 Furthermore, from a 
logistical point of view, such pauses would also use up time in a game session, 
which was often capped. As discussed in Section 4.1.1, the game design was 
intended to minimise time participants did not spend interacting with the 
thematic content of the game, and continually seeking consent would counteract 
these efforts. 
 
Secondly, ‘the researcher may not know what the research will entail or what the 
consequences will be.’423 For this thesis, the evolving nature of the research 
meant data gathering requirements changed as the research progressed. At the 
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conception stage, the focus of the research was very much the wargame itself – a 
legacy from the genesis of the thesis (see Section 1.3) – and any human 
participation was anticipated to merely feed into the improvement of the game. 
As the research advanced, the focus shifted from the game to the participants, 
with the game design remaining constant (as described in Chapter 4) and data 
instead being gathered about player interactions with and around the game. In 
line with the grounded theory approach of the research, however, it was not 
known precisely what this data would capture or reveal, so a complete 
assessment of the impact of the research was not practical a priori. 
 
Finally, ‘divulging information about research purposes may alter participant 
behaviour, invalidating the research.’424 It is possible that participants would act 
differently in a game session if they were aware of the kinds of observations and 
notes the researcher was making. For example, if the researcher had said that 
they would count how many times people take out their phones (a possible sign 
of disengagement), participants may consciously or subconsciously suppress any 
desire to take out their phones, because they know this would be recorded. 
Alternatively, participants may exaggerate actions they perceive as positive, such 
as humorous remarks. In both cases, the natural disposition of the participant 
would be compromised. This is similar to Pink’s phrase ‘camera consciousness’ for 
research subjects who alter their behaviour because they are on camera (as 
discussed regarding rejected data gathering methods). Returning to Abuhamdeh 
and Csikszentmihalyi, another feature of ‘flow experiences’ is ‘a reduction of self-
consciousness’, so making participants conscious of their actions, by way of 
informing them about research purposes, could disrupt the flow of the game or 
discussion.425 
 
Efforts to obtain informed consent 
Throughout the fieldwork conducted for this thesis, all game sessions included a 
verbal briefing by the researcher about the nature of the activity that was about 
to take place. Players were informed that the game session formed part of 
ongoing academic research into cyber wargaming and that the 
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researcher/facilitator would be making observations and taking notes about 
player behaviour and interaction in the game environment. At this point players 
were able to opt not to participate in the game session, but none did, thereby 
granting the researcher a manner of consent to continue with the game session as 
described.  
 
Approaches to gathering consent in related research varies. One method is to 
hand information sheets to participants explaining how their data might be used, 
which they can sign to formally declare informed consent. In similar PhD projects 
where player observation was central to the research, use of such information 
sheets has been inconsistent: Bos, for example, did use them426, while Frank did 
not, opting instead to remediate ethical concerns in game debriefings.427 The 
verbal consent obtained for this research seems to fall somewhere in between 
these approaches, and to ensure privacy of participants, the thesis has been 
anonymised so that no individual participant nor organisation can be identified 
from data gathered and presented in this document (publicly available data 
notwithstanding). This has been done to protect players who were acting and 
speaking in a safe (as per Section 2.2.7) and highly-engaging environment (see 
Section 6.3.3), where they may have forgotten that they were participating in 
research. 
 
5.4.2 Tactical Positionality II 
 
The emphasis of this research on participant observations comes with tactical 
positionality caveats which need to be taken into account. In the Boeing game 
documentation, it was noted that ‘observing and gathering relevant information 
without interfering in a task, influencing subjects or biasing [player] decisions is 
tricky to balance.’428 These warnings are reinforced by Wilhelmson and Svensson, 
who say that 
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The evaluator should carefully reflect on the most ideal place to be during 
the exercise so that participant observations can be done in the best possible 
way. However, it is important to note that it is not good to be too close to 
the participants since this can disturb them or since this runs the risk that the 
evaluator is “drawn into” the exercise.429 
 
From this evidence we can infer that there is a careful balance the convener must 
tread between being a good facilitator to achieve learning objectives and a good 
evaluator (researcher) to ensure proper data collection. A good facilitator is 
physically involved in the thick of the action, immersing themselves in the game 
so that the players feel the facilitator is simply a part of the activity.430 A good 
evaluator, on the other hand, is removed and invisible, seeing and hearing 
proceedings but not interrupting the game itself. When the convener is a single 
person, as in the case with this thesis, this dual-role can be envisaged to be 
particularly tricky to manage. 
 
In addition to the evaluator disturbing the conduct of the game, the researcher 
may let this role influence their role as facilitator/adjudicator. It may be that the 
researcher is looking to duplicate an earlier observation, leading them to abuse 
their role as adjudicator to force a particular outcome to the game. This is not 
only unacceptable academic practice, but also nullifies the point of the game. ‘In 
order to retain the value of wargaming,’ says Sanu Kainikara, ‘it is of utmost 
importance to ensure…the progress of the game is neutrally observed to ensure 
impartiality at all times.’431 Although true impartiality may not always be 
achievable, managing the position at the nexus of adjudicator and researcher is a 
key aspect of this research. 
 
5.5 Data analysis methods 
 
In ethnography there are myriad techniques for analysing data collected from 
fieldwork. Depending on the types of data, the analysis might involve textual 
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interpretation, auditory transcription, or visual inspection. When research has a 
clearly defined question or objective, this helps guide the analysis by providing a 
lens through which to view the data. For this thesis however, although a central 
research objective exists, the objective is open-ended and the appeal to grounded 
theory in the methodology is intended to enable findings to emerge from the 
data, rather than data be channelled into narrow lanes of investigation. 
 
With this in mind, data analysis of this thesis comprised the following method. 
First, as outlined in Section 5.4.1, primary data from game sessions was gathered 
in the form of hand-written fieldnotes and player-submitted record keeping 
sheets. These notes and sheets were then digitised by transcribing them into two 
spreadsheets. The first spreadsheet contained the notes taken by the researcher, 
appended with metadata including: 
• Session identifier 
• Types of players taking part in the session (see Section 6.1 for further 
details) 
• Type of note (researcher observation, participant quote, participant 
feedback) 
• Timing of the observation or quote (pre-game, during game, or post-
game) 
As the notes were typed into the spreadsheet, the researcher also coded them by 
assigning categories and labels regarding what learning moment was enabled 
(using the game design in Chapter 4 as a guide to defining codes) and/or what link 
to wargaming theory that note provided (such as engagement, decision-making, 
or facilitation). The result of this process was a chronologically-ordered record of 
every fieldnote, but owing to the additional metadata and coding, it was possible 
to simply sort the spreadsheet so that all related notes from different game 
sessions were grouped together, making it easy to compare and draw links 
between them. 
 
In the second spreadsheet, the numerical values from the record keeping sheets 
from each session were entered to create a database of game progress and 
results. By running various queries against the data, some tentative findings could 
be extrapolated (see Sections 6.1.2 to 6.1.4). Furthermore, this spreadsheet 
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contained data about participant types and numbers, meaning this data could be 
spliced and interrogated for further insights (see Section 6.1.1). It should be 
stressed that for both spreadsheets, the data structures were not imposed by the 
research questions, but were instead intended to be as open as possible to allow 
findings to emerge as the datasets grew and were analysed. 
 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
As a practical research endeavour, this thesis is informed by two theoretical 
foundations: grounded theory and ethnography. These have long histories of 
academic use and attendant literature both critiquing their utility and guiding 
researchers in how to employ the techniques contained therein. In analysing this 
literature, it has been concluded that neither grounded theory nor ethnography 
can be applied in their entirety to this thesis, but are instead used in inspirational 
modes, informing the research without binding it to methodological constraints. 
This is not indifferent from Elg’s research approach, for whom grounded theory 
was useful in inspiring the creation of new theory, but only insofar as theory 
informed practice. In this thesis, the inspirational mode is adopted with full 
consciousness of Suddaby’s warning that grounded theory is often erroneously 
viewed as ‘anything goes’, and justifications have been offered for every 
modification made of grounded theory. This is also true of ethnography and the 
thesis only wholly embraces two out of five facets outlined by Hammersley and 
Atkinson, yet with good reasoning behind these choices. 
 
Methodologically, the most original contributions of the thesis are in formulating 
what was termed strategic and tactical positionality. Positionality has received 
ample coverage in both ethnographic and wargaming literature but has not 
previously been associated with the terms ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical.’ Thinking about 
positionality in this way frames the problem more militaristically, thereby bringing 
the problem closer to the roots of wargaming. The value here is in aligning 
disparate strands of literature along the same lines and relating everything back 
to wargaming, which is the core of the thesis. 
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Chapter 6: Pedagogy and practice 
in cyber wargaming  
 
This chapter outlines and analyses the outcomes of 33 game sessions conducted 
with a variety of participants. Rather than treat each session individually (a full list 
can be found in Appendix C), the chapter is structured according to themes which 
emerged during data analysis. Many of these were designed into the game as 
outlined in Chapter 4, but several themes pointed to learning moments which had 
not been deliberately designed for The themes address the central thesis 
objectives by elucidating what participants discussed during game sessions, but 
also evaluates the efficacy of the game as a teaching tool by analysing how players 
engaged with the game. 
 
The chapter is broadly divided into three parts. The first part provides a 
quantitative overview analysing metadata about players and data about game 
results, linking these to theoretical and methodological aspects highlighted 
previously (Chapters 2 and 5 respectively). The purpose here is to demonstrate 
alternative uses to wargaming, such as the analytical approach favoured by 
McNamara (Section 2.1), though this was not the primary intention of the thesis 
and the findings are illustrative rather than prescriptive.  
 
The second part of the chapter analyses qualitative data collected in terms of 
researcher observations and player discussions. These form an original 
contribution of the thesis to wargaming, building on the tentative findings of the 
likes of Rieb and Lechner432 and Barnard-Wills and Ashenden433, whose games 
were analysed in Chapter 3 (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.4 respectively). In order to 
address the central thesis objectives, the analysis is organised thematically by the 
learning moments created in game sessions, where possible aligning these with 
the purposes served by different game components (as discussed in Chapter 4).  
                                                          
432 Rieb and Lechner (2016) 
433 Barnard-Wills and Ashenden (2015) 
175 
 
 
In the final part of the chapter, qualitative data is analysed with regards to some 
of the theoretical wargaming concepts discussed in Chapter 2, particularly 
surrounding player engagement. Some ideas, such as Perla and McGrady’s ‘story-
living experience’ (cited in Section 2.2.5), are corroborated and validated, while 
others, such as Jim Wallman’s assertion that writing game rules is easy, are 
questioned. The chapter then concludes with a summary of key points. 
 
6.1 Gaming by numbers: quantitative uses of metadata 
and game data 
 
From each game session diverse sets of quantitative data were collected. Firstly, 
metadata regarding players (types, numbers, genders, roles/ranks) were recorded 
where available. This data can be aggregated and compared to data regarding 
game progress and outcomes to find out which types of players performed better 
in the game. The data can also reveal dynamics around which types of people 
participate in wargaming, allowing us to ask questions about the inclusivity of 
wargames and how this might be improved, particularly in a cyber security 
setting. 
 
One of the categories into which this metadata has been sorted is called ‘type’, 
signifying the organisational identities of the game session participants. Three 
primary types were identified: military, civilian, and mixed (game sessions with 
both military and civilian players). Further, the civilian category has been divided 
into four subcategories: industry (private companies), academia, civil service, and 
mixed. All 33 game sessions were classified according to these categories.  
 
Secondly, data about game progress and outcomes (winning teams, Victory Points 
achieved) was created as part of gameplay, with players completing record 
keeping sheets during the course of the game, capturing the state of the game 
during each turn (the amount of Resource and Vitality possessed by each Entity, 
as well as the number of Black Market assets owned by the teams). These sheets 
were explained to players as being for the calculation of Victory Points and to 
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prevent cheating, which was true, but the sheets also recorded a numerical 
representation of game progress.  
 
By digitising this data, it has been possible to run computations on the numbers, 
as an analytical wargame would, to find patterns and correlations which reveal 
information about player behaviour.  
 
6.1.1 The gender imbalance in wargaming 
 
Section 5.2.1 discussed gender imbalances in the military, in wargaming, and in 
cyber security, concluding that all three fields were male-dominated.  Some of 
that analysis was based on quantitative data – for example UK armed forces 
figures – but other parts were anecdotal – such as the number of female 
attendees at the Connections UK wargaming conference, the only conference of 
its kind in the UK. By collecting data about participants in this research, it is 
possible to corroborate and strengthen the previous findings regarding the 
paucity of female participation in wargaming with statistical insights. 
 
Overall, out of 259 participants, 211 (81%) were male while 48 were female (19%). 
The highest disparity between genders was with military participants, most likely 
owing to a large starting imbalance amplified by the imbalances in wargaming and 
cyber security. The greatest parity was found in civil service participants, albeit 
from a small sample, and with two-thirds male there was still far from equal 
participation. A full breakdown of categories and subcategories is shown in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2: Gender breakdown of game session participants 
Category Subcategory Male Male % Female Female % 
All  211 81% 48 19% 
Military  39 91% 4 9% 
Mix  67 87% 10 13% 
Civilian  105 76% 34 24% 
 Academia 26 76% 8 24% 
 Civil Service 8 67% 4 33% 
 Industry 24 77% 7 23% 
 Mix 47 76% 15 24% 
 
These results reinforce the research stated in Chapter 5, which held that the 
environments the thesis investigates are predominantly male-dominated. The 
figure of 9% female military participants is close to the overall proportion of 
females in the UK armed forces (10.2%, as stated in Section 5.2.1). Encouragingly, 
the 19% female participation rate across all categories exceeds the proportion of 
females in both wargaming (1% to 16%) and cyber security (7% to 11%) by all 
metrics used in Section 5.2.1. Indeed, if we exclude the low female military 
participation rate, the overall figure rises to 23.5%. Despite a lingering male 
dominance in these fields, it may be possible that wargaming is a potential 
method to attract more gender diversity to cyber security, and vice versa – cyber 
security can encourage more gender diversity in wargaming. There is no shortage 
of research indicating the benefits of gender diversity in organisations, so this 
finding should be interpreted as a positive result.434 
 
6.1.2 In-game performance as a guide to real-world performance 
 
One use of wargames is to derive direct real-world lessons from the game results 
(the perils of which were discussed in Section 2.3.3). For example, an in-game 
action with positive results can be interpreted as a guide to action in the real 
world. Such an approach has been taken by Hagen Lindstädt and Jürgen Müller, 
who have developed a game theory tool that allows players to go through an 
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iterated decision-making process to find ‘the best path for different combinations 
of factors.’435 Although originally intended for business managers, this has also 
been used in a cyber security context.436 Another interpretation of game results 
might be that players’ accomplishments in the game correlate to their ability to 
perform their real-world roles. In the LOCKED SHIELDS cyber defence exercise, for 
example, a scoring system is implemented to measure participants’ performance 
and to structure feedback.437 
 
In the game developed for this thesis, the Victory Points game mechanic was 
designed with player engagement in mind, rather than as a method of ranking 
players or deriving real-world policy suggestions. Nonetheless, the design process 
shifted the mechanic away from a subjective measure which would have been 
different between each game session to an objective measure which was the 
same in each game session (as detailed in Section 4.3). With such a standardised 
mechanic, Victory Points can be compared across games and provide some 
insights along the lines which might be expected in an analytical game. 
Importantly, however, in this instance the exercise intended to illustrate a 
possible alternative use for the game; it does not provide any conclusive evidence 
about player performance. 
 
In terms of results, across all game sessions, the average Victory Points achieved 
were 19.08. This compares to a maximum score of 47 (achieved by a UK team 
played by a mix of players) and a minimum score of -2 (achieved by a UK team 
played by academic players). Looking at averages, the highest performing types of 
players were civilian industry players (23.33 Victory Points), followed by a mix of 
civilian plus military players (22.25 Victory Points). At the other end of the scale, 
the second-worst performers were academics (10.25 Victory Points), while the 
worst were civil servants (7.50 Victory Points). These scores could conceivably be 
used as a guide to determine which types of people are most suited to manage 
strategic national cyber security. 
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What the above conclusion fails to account for, however, is the inaccuracy of the 
game model. The game is not a simulation tool based on minute reconstruction of 
the real world. The game takes some aspects of the real world and represents 
them stylistically, often deliberately inaccurately (for example the non-existence 
of the relationship between the intelligence community and critical national 
infrastructure, as discussed in Section 4.2.2). Therefore, to conclude that players’ 
performance in the game is representative of their real-life capability would be 
akin to concluding that an expert chess player could command armies on the 
battlefield. A high score in the game only demonstrates proficiency at the game 
itself and does not prove proficiency in any other skill or activity.  
 
6.1.3 In-game results as a guide to real-world results 
 
One of the concerns a game designer should take into account is how closely 
game outcomes align with real-world outcomes. For historical games based on 
conflict that has already occurred where the outcome is known, Sabin has 
outlined different approaches in this space, referred to as the ‘width of probability 
distribution’, summarised in Figure 14.438 The game designer can choose the 
frequency with which game outcomes mirror the historical outcomes. In games 
where the outcome distribution is aligned with the historical outcome (a ‘narrow’ 
distribution), players who simply follow the historical events will usually not 
produce an unexpected game result. Consequently, if the players want to achieve 
an ahistorical outcome they will need to make decisions which do not follow the 
historical account. As an example, a game depicting the historical outcome of 
1815 Battle of Waterloo usually results in British/Allied victory, but to achieve 
French victory the players would have do something Napoleon did not, perhaps 
commit the Imperial Guard at an earlier opportunity. 
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The game designed for this thesis depicted a future, rather than historical, 
conflict, but it is possible to envisage that Sabin’s model can be flipped around to 
extrapolate predictions. In this approach, the distribution of game outcomes 
could be interpreted as a guide to the outcomes of future conflicts. Analysing the 
data through this lens results in a conclusion that a cyber conflict between the UK 
and Russia would be evenly matched. Across all game sessions, the UK achieved a 
50% win rate, with Russia at 42%, and 8% ties – reflecting a design approach 
which gave both teams a roughly equal chance of victory. Therefore, if the game is 
a guide to action, it suggests that both the UK and Russia need to make 
improvements to their current cyber capabilities and/or strategies in order to 
increase their chance of prevailing in conflict. 
 
Crucially, however, the inaccuracy of the game model means it is not a guide to 
action. The game outcomes are not intended reflect the probable result of a 
conflict between the UK and Russia and it would be a mistake to think that the UK 
and Russia are evenly matched in cyber capabilities based solely on knowledge 
gleaned from this game. Other wargames do strive to predict the future to help 
military planners when deciding force composition and disposition – such as the 
analytical games discussed in Section 2.1 – but that was never the purpose of this 
game. Indeed, as discussed in Section 4.6, the difficulty of ascertaining cyber 
capabilities means constructing such an analytical game would be very difficult for 
this topic. Instead, from a pedagogical perspective it makes more sense to take 
advantage of underlying assumptions of the game model and use them as 
Figure 14: Wargame outcome probability distributions. From Sabin (2012), p. 56 
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discussion prompts, from which players can derive learning moments and be 
enabled to ask the right questions. 
 
6.1.4 Playing styles of different groups 
 
To illustrate one final possible use of the quantitative data, figures from the 
record keeping sheets can be analysed to discern playing styles of different 
groups. This analysis is based on the 23 game sessions from which record keeping 
sheets were retained; of the ten sessions for which data does not exist, nine were 
early playtesting sessions where either the record keeping mechanism had not yet 
been introduced, or the values had not been standardised so cannot be used for 
comparison, while in one session (UK government department B) the participants 
kept the sheets for internal reference (along with a copy of the game). 
 
One approach using this data is comparing one group’s values to the average 
values across all game sessions. For example, looking at the average Resource and 
Vitality values for Energetic Bear we see Resource steadily decreasing and Vitality 
increasing. This would be expected since the objectives for Energetic Bear 
required them to increase Vitality (see Appendix A), which is achieved by spending 
Resource, and their attacking remit, which also requires Resource commitments 
(as discussed in Section 4.3.2). By comparison, the data from the second game at 
Swedish military education institution A suggests that the team which played 
Russia in this session were more intent on Attacking than completing Objectives. 
For this team, Energetic Bear had zero Resource from the third turn until the end 
of the game, meaning any new Resource gained each turn must have been spent, 
while the Vitality values did not increase (in fact they decreased towards the end 
of the game, suggesting unsuccessful Attacks). The Resource was therefore not 
spent on new Vitality, which means it was spent on Attacking (see Table 3), so this 
team de-prioritised their assigned Objectives in favour of some alternative 
strategy. 
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Table 3: Resource and Vitality values for Energetic Bear 
 Average Swedish military education 
 institution A, Game 2 
Turn Resource Vitality Resource Vitality 
Start 3 4 3 4 
January 3.00 4.52 3 4 
February 2.35 4.87 3 4 
March 1.74 5.04 0 4 
April 1.91 5.18 0 4 
May 1.64 5.32 0 4 
June 1.09 5.64 0 4 
July 0.90 5.62 0 4 
August 0.67 5.67 0 4 
September 0.44 5.94 0 4 
October 0.69 6.00 0 4 
November 0.83 6.42 0 3 
December 0.08 6.42 0 3 
 
 
Another approach could be to look at usage of Black Market Assets to measure 
attacking intent. In the standard setup of the game, both teams were assigned 
one offensive Asset at the start and Russia would be expected to use theirs (as 
well as any new ones acquired) because of their attacking Objectives. The UK, on 
the other hand, had no attacking Objectives, nor indeed any attacking remit 
(recall the lack of Attack Vectors, as discussed in Section 4.4.3). To even use their 
offensive Asset, the UK would first need to purchase an Attack Vector from the 
Black Market. Therefore, if at any point a team playing the UK had zero offensive 
Assets it must mean they not only used the Asset they had originally been 
assigned, but also purchased the additional prerequisite Asset. Such a strategy 
would be a significant deviation from the strategy proscribed by the UK’s 
Objectives, which generally rewarded what some players referred to as “turtling” 
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– an entirely defensive approach focused on preventing and deflecting Attacks 
while building up large amounts of Vitality.439  
 
Across all recorded game sessions, the Black Market Asset data indicate that eight 
UK teams pursued an offensive strategy (three mixed civilian, three military, one 
mixed civilian/military, one civilian industry), yet only three of these were 
ultimately victorious in the game. Indeed, the offensive strategy was catastrophic 
in two instances, causing a team from the UK military education establishment B 
to record a 23-7 loss, and a team from International military education institution 
A to lose by a margin of 28-7. Interpreting this data in the same vein as an 
analytical wargame would suggest that just because the UK has offensive cyber 
capabilities, it should not necessarily use them. 
 
Ultimately, however, it must again be stressed that none of this analysis is meant 
to accurately represent how these groups might approach strategy in cyberspace 
in real life. Downes-Martin has argued that such uses of wargames is not possible 
for games covering novel subject matters, of which cyber security is one.440 
Indeed, by virtue of the game being a safe space to experiment and express views 
(as discussed in Section 2.2.7), players may often have deliberately acted 
contrarywise to what their real-world course of action would have been. 
Importantly, such deliberately experimental actions often present ideal discussion 
opportunities, from which learning moments can be derived, thereby fulfilling the 
true purpose of the game. These discussions are not captured in quantitative 
data, but we must instead turn to qualitative data to discern how effectively these 
discussions were generated and what was contained within them. 
 
6.2 Learning through the game: expected and 
unexpected results 
 
In each game session, qualitative data was collected to address the central thesis 
research objective: what capacity did the game have to create learning moments 
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and enable players to share knowledge and ask the right questions? As discussed 
in Chapter 4, certain topics were deemed of high importance and were 
deliberately designed into the game, but there was also a high degree of open-
endedness to the design, intended to encourage players to contribute with their 
own knowledge and understanding to generate pedagogic debate. Resultantly, 
the observations made by the researcher were partly to capture whether the 
designed learning moments were discussed, and partly to capture any unintended 
moments (the challenges for the researcher in observing for both these outcomes 
are discussed in Section 7.1.2). The following sections analyse learning moments 
in relation to the themes outlined in Chapter 4 and, where applicable, the game 
component which prompted the moments to be created. Note that the learning 
moments presented herein are not comprehensive but selected based on two 
distinct measures: either how strongly the data suggested that a learning moment 
was created, or by the volume of discussion around the subject or the strength of 
the discussion. 
 
6.2.1 Entities 
 
The central components of the game board were the ten Entities representing 
different actors in cyberspace. Because players engaged closely with these 
through gameplay they were also popular targets for discussion. These 
discussions varied between debates around the actors already represented in the 
game and actors which were not represented but perhaps should have been.  
 
Critical National Infrastructure 
 
CNI was represented in the game via the UK’s and Russia’s respective nuclear 
energy operators: UK Energy and Rosenergoatom. Two primary learning moments 
were created in this area. Firstly, foreign ownership of the UK’s nuclear energy 
sector was debated, with players on two occasions remarking on the UK 
operations of EDF Energy, a French company. On one of these occasions the influx 
of Chinese investment was also discussed, which, when UK Energy were taking 
damage later in the game, led to one player exclaiming: “Where is that Chinese 
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money?!”441 For this player, this aspect of CNI had clearly stuck with them as an 
important consideration, and their vocalisation of this likely provoked other 
participants in that game session to engage with the topic, thereby enabling 
participants to ask more directed questions if they were to follow up with 
discussion or research after the game session.  
 
Secondly, and most crucially, on multiple occasions players engaged in discussions 
about the diversity of CNI. Recall from Section 4.2.1 that one of anticipated 
drawbacks of the design choice to explicitly focus on nuclear energy was that 
other CNI sectors would not receive attention. However, players across the 
spectrum were able to recognise that CNI comprises more than energy production 
and were keen to suggest how this Entity could be represented differently in the 
game. One participant argued that CNI should sit in the middle of the game board 
because all other parts of the trinity depend on it442, while banks443 and National 
Grid (the UK’s national electricity distributor)444 were proposed as alternatives. In 
one game session the group decided that CNI should be represented by 
something which, if not working, would “bring the country to a standstill.”445 After 
a lively debate which considered everything from supermarket Waitrose (thereby 
recognising food supply as a CNI sector) to tea-making manufacturers the group 
settled on train operators.446  
 
In terms of providing players with learning moments about the sheer diversity of 
CNI, this game component can therefore be considered a success. 
 
Russia as an actor 
 
The representation of Russia in the game, as a combination of Entities, was the 
subject of much discussion, often with a humorous dimension (see Section 7.3 for 
an in-depth analysis of the role of humour). Remarks around this topic often 
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centred on perceived characteristics of Russian behaviour and aspects of its 
autocracy. In one game session, for example, the following exchange was 
observed when a Russia team was deliberating its Black Market bids: 
 
Player 1 (to another player): “Don’t worry, you can’t make a wrong decision.” 
Facilitator: “That doesn’t sound very Russian.” 
P1: “But we know where your children live.”447 
 
Such exchanges were not uncommon, especially with players who exhibited a high 
level of engagement with the game (see Section 6.3.3 for further discussion of 
engagement), and enabled players to disseminate insight into Russian decision-
making. However, we must also recognise the caveat that the humour which 
inspired much of this debate also likely clouded the accuracy of the lessons 
learned. Unless the players had prior expertise on the functioning of the Russian 
state, exchanges like the one outlined above were likely based on knowledge of 
stereotypes depicted in films or literature such as the James Bond movie 
GoldenEye448 or Tom Clancy’s novel (and later film) The Hunt for Red October.449 
As Henri Tajfel outlined in a seminal 1969 paper, stereotypes are grounded in 
reality, but they also exaggerate and distort it.450 In this sense, players’ 
engagement with the game may in some cases only have served to reinforce 
stereotypes of the Russian state rather than provide insightful pedagogical 
outcomes. 
 
On the other hand, when players did have expertise in Russian state behaviour, 
the game provided an outlet to share these with other participants. On two 
separate occasions a player (one from a Russian background and one from a 
Finnish background) noted that there should be some mechanic in the game for 
Russia to cheat or bend the rules, because that is what they do in real life. The 
Finnish participant pointed to maskirovka (concealment, deception, and 
disinformation451) as an example of this452, while the Russian participant 
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suggested that stealing Resource from the facilitator’s supply or bribing players or 
the facilitator would not be out of character.453  
 
Such remarks exemplify players bringing their own knowledge of the world to a 
game session and using the game as a tool to disseminate this knowledge to other 
participants, thereby creating peer-led learning moments 
 
Missing Entities 
 
With only ten Entities on the board representing two countries, the game design 
was not an exhaustive representation of cyberspace. Players frequently 
recognised this and were able to discuss which actors were missing and perhaps 
should be present. The two actors which received the most commentary were 
Anonymous and China. Anonymous is a hacktivist group which has in the past 
attacked diverse targets including the Church of Scientology454, ISIS455, US security 
firm HBGary Federal456, and the city of Orlando, Florida.457 One civilian player 
noted that Anonymous’ non-affiliation would make them a perfect third party in 
the game because they can work against both Russia and UK as an unpredictable 
selfish actor.458 Military players, on the other hand, agreed that Anonymous 
should be in the game, but were divided as to how they should be represented. In 
one session with military players the prevailing opinion ascribed significant threat 
to Anonymous and that they should therefore be on the game board itself.459 In 
another such session, however, one player stated that the absence of Anonymous 
on the board made sense because the game models state-on-state conflict, but 
they could be added as a Black Market Asset that allows an unattributable 
attack.460  
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China had been omitted from the game design partly because Russia was judged 
by the designer to be a more imminent threat to the UK, and partly to limit the 
complexity of the game by only including two teams. The absence of China was 
noted by a variety of participants. A military observer, for example, asked where 
China was because “they’re the ones doing all the attacking,”461 while a civilian 
player in a different session said “they’re everywhere.”462 In a discussion during a 
civilian mixed game session, China was also proposed as an ideal third party 
because they could be antagonistic towards both UK and Russia.463 These 
suggestions for both Anonymous and China, and the rationale behind them, 
demonstrate how the game enabled learning moments where players could think 
about the important actors in cyberspace, despite these actors not being 
represented in the game, and articulate these thoughts to other participants.  
 
Energetic Bear as an actor 
 
Energetic Bear, representing Russian business interests, received only a moderate 
amount of attention in discussions. One of these discussions, however, was 
emblematic in demonstrating how the game enabled peer-didacticism between 
players. In a game session with a civilian mixed group of players, one participant 
asked a question about who Energetic Bear are. The question was directed at the 
facilitator, but before they could answer, another player stepped in and provided 
a detailed and accurate explanation of Fancy Bear (this was not confusion, as 
cautioned in Section 4.2.1) and Russian use of hacker groups for espionage and 
crime. They also expanded on this, pointing out that Energetic Bear is a rogue 
operator and suggested segmenting the game so that Energetic Bear was in a 
separate room and unable to communicate with the other Russia players.464 Given 
that the participant who asked the original question was clearly entirely 
unfamiliar with Energetic Bear, the game in this case fulfilled its potential for 
enabling players to ask the right questions, and the information provided by the 
knowledgeable player can only have been enlightening.  
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The example shows the capacity of the game to enable players to set up informal 
temporary knowledge-exchange relationships with each other, similar to how 
Jeroen de Kloet and Liesbet van Zoonen have described ‘fans’ who share their 
knowledge and experience of events or cultural artefacts, often with a 
‘performative dimension.’465 In this case the performative dimension was the 
game and the knowledge exchange was a learning moment focused on non-
destructive cyber threats. 
 
6.2.2 Entity relationships 
 
The relationships between the Entities represented interdependencies between 
different actors and the flow of Resource between them. These were the subject 
of a high degree of attention in discussions, here broken down into three topics: 
the link between UK Plc and GCHQ, UK Energy’s multiple relationships, and the 
overall asymmetry of the game board.  
 
The UK Plc-GCHQ relationship 
 
Firstly, the relationship between UK Plc and GCHQ had been intended to 
represent the transfer of expertise between the private sector and intelligence 
agencies. A learning moment exploring precisely  this was borne out in a game 
session with a civilian mixed group, where one player remarked on the inaccuracy 
of GCHQ’s ability to marshal Resource, to which another player retorted that 
GCHQ can contract out work to UK Plc, taking advantage of the industrial base.466 
On this occasion, therefore, the game component stimulated the exact debate it 
was designed to do. 
 
UK Energy’s relationships 
 
Secondly, similar to how UK Energy spurred significant debate about its role as an 
Entity, relationships connecting UK Energy to other UK Entities were also a source 
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of discussion. In two separate game sessions, players suggested that UK Energy 
should be directly connected to UK Plc467 and GCHQ respectively.468 The former of 
these likely reflects the context of that game session, which was held with a 
technology company. That company may have seen a role for itself, or the wider 
industry, either in helping protect CNI, or the suggestion inferred that UK 
businesses are dependent on electricity production and would suffer if production 
was compromised. Thinking about the dynamics of this issue allowed players to 
create learning moments which were not designed into the game. The latter 
suggestion, on the other hand, fulfilled a conscious design choice, in that 
realistically GCHQ does have a role to play in protecting CNI, but omitting this 
relationship in the game prompted discussion about the topic (as discussed in 
Section 4.2.2).  
 
In one game session, UK Energy’s relationships were discussed with regards to the 
context of Germany, where the game session was taking place. Here, one military 
player suggested that if the game design was based on Germany, the link between 
Government and CNI would have to be removed because the German 
government only regulates, it does not make investments.469 This observation 
demonstrates how the game can be used to challenge participants to consider 
alternative approaches to energy policy, and more broadly that strategy and 
policymaking are dependent on geopolitical context. This stands out as an 
example of players bringing their own knowledge to the game and using it to 
enhance learning moments for the wider group. 
 
Asymmetry of relationships 
 
Finally, one of the most prevalently discussed aspects of the game’s relationship 
was the asymmetry between the two sides. The design rationale behind this was 
discussed in Section 4.2.2, and it was encouraging that so many players were able 
to engage with the concepts contained within this game component. In one 
session with civilian industry players, the rationale was understood almost 
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verbatim, with participants noting how the UK’s better interconnectedness made 
them more vulnerable to residual damage from an attack, but also conferred an 
advantage in transferring Resource.470 Feedback from a military player in another 
session stated that their takeaway from the game was that “non-mirrored 
adversary models mean teams play to different rules.”471 For this player it would 
be clear that projected thinking – thinking that others think the same way as you – 
likely leads to misconstrued understandings of adversaries: every country’s 
context will influence how they approach policy and strategy, so we cannot 
assume that the UK’s approach is followed elsewhere. Also noteworthy is how this 
player’s interpretation the game and articulation of this interpretation reveals 
information about their professional and academic training. The player had a prior 
understanding of adversarial modelling, perhaps learned through military 
education, and this understanding shaped the learning moments they were able 
to create in the game. 
 
As a final example, we can consider the civil servant player who expressed their 
frustration at not being able to move Resource freely.472 It is unclear whether this 
frustration was also prevalent in their real-life role as a policymaker, in which case 
the game would be an accurate representation, or whether this was simply 
limited to the game itself. Regardless of the accuracy of the game model, it could 
be inferred that the game create a learning moment for this player, and the other 
participants with which they vocally shared their feelings, regarding a need to 
reduce barriers to strategic sharing of resources (capital or skills) to ensure 
effective policymaking in cyber security.  
 
6.2.3 Objectives 
 
As outlined in Section 4.3, Objectives were one of the game components which 
underwent significant change from conception to final implementation in the 
game. Throughout this process, however, the purpose of the Objectives as 
pedagogical instruments remained consistent. The idea was for players to 
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understand that in formulating cyber security policy and strategy, they must work 
backwards from the outcome they want to achieve.  
 
With this in mind, the game appears to have created learning moments along two 
lines: tactical distractions, and knowledge of the adversary’s objectives. Although 
the realisation of these moments was novel in the cyber context of the game, they 
are also manifestations of player behaviour observed by other wargamers. The 
idea of tactical distractions, especially, is not far removed from Frank’s concept of 
‘gamer mode’ (referenced in Section 4.3), or what Frey et al called ‘meta-gaming’, 
in which players manipulate game systems to win, losing sight of the purpose of 
the game.473 While tactical distractions as used here is meant to refer to in-game 
attention diversions, the final outcome of missing larger objectives still resonates. 
 
Tactical distractions 
 
One theme that emerged in several game sessions was that players lost sight of 
Objectives because of distractions in the game. One player noted how “in the heat 
of the moment” their team was more focused on what was happening in the 
game and how they would react, and Objectives were lost by the wayside.474 
Similarly, feedback from a military player stated that their lesson learned was that 
“distraction of toys + power means it distracts from original plans [sic].”475 In this 
game the UK team had acquired offensive cyber capabilities and decided to 
launch an all-out attack on Russia, which spectacularly backfired, resulting in the 
UK knocking itself out. In both cases it is evident that players became enamoured 
with the tactical action in the game at the expense of the bigger strategic picture. 
For the military player especially, the learning moment seems to have been a 
pertinent one: the allure of cyber capabilities may be strong, but they are not 
necessarily the right tools to achieve desired outcomes. The example can also be 
viewed as testament to the game’s ability to encourage self-reflection among 
players. By discussing how they played the game post hoc, players were able to 
realise nuances in their decisions and actions which they were not necessarily 
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conscious of at the time. Such reflection is a key part of the decision-making 
experience which makes wargaming a powerful learning tool (discussed further in 
Section 6.3.2). 
 
Knowledge of the adversary’s objectives 
 
In another game session with military players, the researcher observed decision-
making processes completely devoid of consideration of the other team’s 
Objectives. Although most of these were hidden, there was also a set of open 
Objectives visible to everyone. Towards the end of this game, the UK team had a 
seemingly difficult decision to make between two courses of action, but if they 
had simply paid attention to one of Russia’s open Objectives it would have been 
clear that only one of the courses of action was appropriate.476 In the post-game 
discussion, one player stated that their absolute key takeaway from the game was 
that you do not know what the other team’s Objectives are.477 This is a reflection 
of the real world in that publicly stated policies may only be partial guides to how 
an adversary or competitor is likely to act. The UK National Cyber Security 
Strategy, for example, leaves retaliatory options open, stating that responses to 
threats include ‘the full range of government capabilities.’478  
 
As a learning moment created, a player from a different military session wrote 
that it is “key to understand hostile cyber security strategy.”479 It is not clear 
whether this referred to published documents or an understanding based on 
observation of behaviour (or a combination thereof), but this player evidently 
thought that closely reading published material or thoroughly analysing an 
adversary’s behaviour would provide some sort of guide to action. Although this 
may be true to some extent, this message was not deliberately propagated in the 
game design, because an accurate guide to enemy behaviour requires a much 
more detailed game model. In this case, the game design therefore introduced 
scope for an unintended learning moment based on what the game model lacked. 
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6.2.4 Resource management 
 
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the game was designed to tease out some of the 
tensions between resources available to a country and their strategic goals. 
Players were not given enough Resource to achieve all their Objectives, forcing 
them to make difficult decisions, and the Resource and Vitality concepts in the 
game were purposefully vaguely defined to encourage debate.  
 
Economic models 
 
Across all game sessions, the most popular discussion topic around Resource 
management was the inaccuracy of the game’s economic model. For example, 
two players (one military and one civilian, in two different game sessions) 
remarked on the constant income teams received and suggested options for 
variable income game mechanics.480 This would reflect the rise and fall in a 
country’s economy, where industrial output and tax receipts will vary with time 
and affect the amount of money available to a government. In another game 
session with a civilian mix of participants it was noted that Rosenergoatom, UK 
Energy, and UK Plc are all revenue-generating, so Government income should be 
based on the Vitality of these.481  
 
While such discussions held some merit for players to engage with high-level 
strategic concepts, they were limited in contributing to the learning moments the 
game design was intended to enable because of the scant relation to cyber 
security. On the other hand, the examples illustrate how the game was able to 
elicit unintended learning moments. By presenting players with basic 
representations of various concepts within resource management, the game 
encouraged players to apply their own expertise. In imagining more advanced 
economic models, for example, players critiqued the in-game representation 
using their knowledge and understanding of the real world. By vocalising the 
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critique during a game session, the expertise was propagated among the 
participants, thereby enabling learning moments for all players. 
 
The case of India and Pakistan 
 
The topic of Resource also provided one example of a player being able enlighten 
the whole participant group with their own knowledge. In a game session with a 
civilian mix of players from an Indian background, a very lengthy discussion was 
had about the fact that Russia had bankrupted itself to win the game, which was 
felt to be unrealistic as a country must continue to function beyond the game 
scenario. One player, however, interjected that “this is what Pakistan does against 
India”, pouring money into ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence service) at the expense of 
economic development. The player then charted, with gesticulation, China’s and 
India’s economic growth since the 1970s, versus Pakistan lagging and actually 
decreasing.482 Again, the discussion was not directly relevant to cyber security, but 
it did begin to address some of the tensions governments face in deciding where 
to invest their resources, with concrete examples of how certain countries have 
made these decisions. 
 
More importantly, the example is illustrative of the game providing impetus to 
learning moments with constructive debate and sharing of knowledge. Pieter Van 
den Heede et al’s study of popular computer war-themed games concluded that, 
almost invariably, the representations of war in these games was idealised, 
morally unambiguous, and based on fictional scenarios as real post-1989 conflicts 
are mostly considered too controversial for commercialisation, thereby 
potentially reinforcing misconceptions about modern conflict.483 By contrast, the 
previous example demonstrates how the game designed for this thesis was a 
catalyst for rival geopolitical imaginaries and practices, albeit different from the 
representational politics present in the game (as discussed in Section 4.2.1), 
prompting players to link game concepts to real-world conflicts. Rather than 
reinforce misconceptions, as popular computer games might, the game used in 
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this thesis created learning moments where players could express their 
conceptions and share these with other participants. 
 
6.2.5 Attack and defence dynamics 
 
As detailed in Section 4.4, the game design included various components and 
mechanics intended to convey ideas about cyber attack and defence dynamics. 
Some specific learning moments are analysed in the following subsections, but it 
is also worth highlighting two broader themes which emerged across multiple 
game sessions. Firstly, there was division among players whether the game 
suggested attack held primacy over defence, or defence could withstand attack. 
One player, for example, stated that their takeaway from the game was that “it’s 
crucial to have a counterattacking capability,”484 while another noted that they 
had learned attack was stronger than defence, although they were able to 
accurately qualify this with “if the game setup is realistic.”485 In both cases, the 
game result would likely have affected the players’ judgement: both were UK 
victories resulting from UK launching devastating attacks on Rosenergoatom.  
 
Contrary to these views were players who thought defence would prevail. 
Feedback from one player stated that their lesson learned was about the 
“strength of defence”486, while one military player thought there were two main 
takeaways from the game: 
 
“1. It is not a question of if, but when an attack will happen – it’s a game, so 
people will always Attack. 
2. How effective it is to invest in defensive measures.”487 
 
Again, these judgements followed the progress of the game. In the first example, 
the UK lost the game, but only through a spectacularly unsuccessful Attack – their 
own defence had withstood multiple Russian Attacks – and in the second example 
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the UK had recovered from an early near-disaster with a strong defence which 
stopped Russia from further Attacks.  
 
There were no specific provisions within the game design commenting on the 
relative strength of attack and defence, only that both of these are important 
dynamics of cyber security. That players were able to make arguments for either 
case can therefore be taken as testament to the effectiveness of the game in 
promoting discussions, and thereby enabling learning moments, around this issue. 
It is important, however, to recall the warning issued by Dunnigan (as mentioned 
in Section 2.3.3) that a false prophet is usually only noticeable after it is too late. 
In the examples mentioned above, two players were able to temper their 
potential lessons learned with recognition of limitations of the game, but the 
other two took lessons more directly. With the first player in particular (who 
noted the importance of a counterattacking capability), the facilitator felt a need 
to intervene to add more nuance to this takeaway, for example that attribution is 
not always straightforward and the ethics around targeting CNI. (See Section 6.3 
for further examples of wargaming theory applied to the conduct of this 
research.) 
 
Secondly, Attacking held a very strong allure. As the quote above highlights, the 
fact that participants were playing a game (a safe environment, as discussed in 
Section 2.2.7) meant that Attacking was an attractive course of action and 
observations from other game sessions corroborated this finding. One military 
player noted, in semi-jest, that “if all you have is a hammer every problem looks 
like a nail,”488 while another player, on finding out their team had no attacking 
remit exasperatedly exclaimed “What, UK can’t Attack? That sucks!”489 Another 
UK team (played by Australian civilian industry participants), ignoring their lack of 
offensive remit, reasoned that “attack is the best form of defence” and played 
aggressively from the outset.490 Players clearly wanted to go on the offensive but, 
in most cases, it is unlikely this reflected their real-life aspirations. In one session 
with UK civil servants, however, the following exchange was observed: 
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P1: “Why has the UK only got one Attack Vector?” 
P2: “Because we play fair.” 
P3: “If we play at all…”491 
 
The final remark could be interpreted as frustration with UK policy, so a desire for 
some more offensive latitude in the game may well have reflected a similar real-
world desire. Similarly, one German military player complained that if the blue 
team represented Germany they could not have any Attack Vectors whatsoever 
and displayed clear frustration at this.492 Taking the allure of the offensive to the 
extreme were the UK team of military players who admitted that the primary 
reason they had purchased the Attack Vector was to deny Russia having it, but 
figured that once they had it they may as well use it.493 Despite a host of defensive 
capabilities available, and Objectives which rewarded defensive strategies, 
Attacking often proved too hard to resist.  
 
It is noteworthy that these findings run counter to Jacquelyn Schneider’s 
conclusions from a series of strategic wargames in the US, where participants 
were largely reluctant to resort to offensive cyber capabilities.494 However, two 
caveats temper the comparability of their findings with those of this thesis. Firstly, 
it is likely the purposes of Schneider’s games were different from the one used in 
this thesis. Whereas the latter is pedagogical, the former was likely intended to 
inform policy; this was the purpose of a 2017 wargame conducted by Schneider at 
the US Naval War College.495 Secondly, public information about the games 
referred to by Schneider is limited (with the notable exemption of the previously 
cited report). It is therefore not known what they represented, how they were set 
up, or who the players were. Different designs lead to different outcomes – 
consider Sabin’s probability distributions from Section 6.1.3 – so without knowing 
the design details it cannot be known if the outcomes are comparable. Optimally, 
combining analysis from many different types of wargames would yield greater 
insights, but such an exercise is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Capability development 
 
The game design included a representation of cyber capability development 
primarily through a Black Market where players could purchase Assets which 
enhanced their in-game capabilities. Three aspects of this mechanic are 
noteworthy with regards to creating learning moments. Firstly, one of the most 
frequently mentioned suggestions for improvements to the game was some sort 
of representation of internal capability development. Players across the spectrum 
of military and civilian participants recognised that cyber capability acquisition is 
not restricted to purchasing tools off the shelf, but that GCHQ, SCS and other 
intelligence agencies are rapidly developing capabilities of their own. In one 
session with civilian academic participants, one player was able to link the 
discussion to the recently-released Vault7 documents on WikiLeaks, which 
detailed the CIA’s efforts in this area.496 Other players suggested gameplay 
mechanics which could be used to model internal capability development, 
including GCHQ investing Resource into a pot and eventually gaining an Asset497, 
or a card drawn at random.498 In all cases, the game fulfilled its purpose of 
prompting discussion around this important cyber security topic and guided 
participants in thinking about some of the nuances around it. Although players 
were not able to engage with these nuances through gameplay (because the 
game lacked appropriate mechanics) learning moments could still be created 
through debate and discussion where the game had enabled players to make 
insightful remarks 
 
Secondly, the Black Market game mechanic created an opportunity for arms 
races. The Market functioned as an all-pay open auction; the teams could bid 
Resource on Assets during their turn, then during the subsequent turn the other 
team could counter-bid with a higher amount, and so forth until one team 
stopped bidding. In this sense an arms race dynamic could be created whereby 
the team willing to commit the most Resource would be better equipped in terms 
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of capabilities, but likely at the expense of neglecting other Entities in the game – 
in real life some, like Robert Strayer499 or Raymond Boudon500, have argued this 
dynamic contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The researcher observed 
numerous arms races in game sessions, yet the potential learning moments were 
largely missed. One player, for example, mirthfully noted in a post-game 
discussion how his team had “forced Russia to spend 19 or 20 Resource on the 
Attack Vector, but they could never use it because we put defences on all the 
targets,” yet failed to link this comment to any real-world concepts despite the 
clear presence of both an arms race and deterrence.501 The only instance of a 
participant creating a clear learning moment in this area was a military player who 
wrote that their lesson learned was the “threat to use Black Market led to 
defender behaviour in the market (threat of race versus actual race).”502  
 
Academics like Jarno Limnéll503 and Anthony Craig504 have argued that cyber arms 
races are very real, so it is unfortunate that the game failed to promote more 
discussion around this topic. This is not necessarily a failure of imagination on the 
part of the players because emphasis on arms races had been significantly toned 
down during the game development process (see Section 4.3.1). However, given 
the importance of the topic, future cyber wargames that include arms race-like 
mechanics – such as markets for capability development – may want to consider 
explicitly including this as an educational outcome. 
 
Lastly, one discussion around Black Market Assets resulted in a textbook example 
of players being enabled to ask the right questions. In a post-game discussion 
session with German military players, one participant made the following 
comment: 
 
P1 [no cyber expertise]: “This game is for decision-makers, yes? I think it’s perfect 
for people who don’t know what all these cyber things are to have a way of 
learning about this. For example, I had not heard of ransomware before but now I 
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can go look it up or ask one of these guys [motioning to two cyber experts sitting 
adjacent].”505 
 
In addition to fulfilling the primary purpose of wargames as tools to help ask the 
right questions – as defined by Peter Perla (quoted in Section 2.3.3) – the example 
demonstrates how the game enabled players to seek out ‘reducible ignorance’ (as 
stated by Hulse et al, see Section 2.1.2) and set up knowledge-exchange 
relationships. Ideally, these relationships lasted beyond the confines of the game 
session, extending the benefits of knowledge-sharing for a longer duration. 
However, follow-up studies to ascertain whether this is the case are not within 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
Through the game, players were exposed to concepts they had not encountered 
before, could identify colleagues who possessed more expertise in these 
concepts, and knew what questions to ask these colleagues in order to enhance 
their own knowledge. In the previous case, the player identified ransomware, 
which was represented by a Black Market Asset, as a gap in their knowledge and 
could point to the players who would be able to bridge that gap. Therefore, this 
example is emblematic of the game’s capability development mechanics enabling 
tangible cyber security learning moments. 
 
Attack vectors 
 
Attack Vectors were one of the game components which underwent drastic 
change as the game design was refined (see Section 4.4.3 for discussion). The final 
implementation of the Vectors was intended to convey both the constant threat 
posed by malicious actors and the UK’s overtly defensive approach as outlined in 
the National Cyber Security Strategy. Across all game sessions, two themes 
emerged as the most prevalently discussed. The first was the lack of UK Attack 
Vectors at the start of the game. Many players decried this from a gameplay 
perspective (as previously discussed with regards to the allure of the offense), but 
some also suggested that the game would be more accurate if the UK had some 
offensive remit.  
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In a game session with UK military players, for example, no fewer than four 
participants deemed a UK Attack Vector as a crucial addition to the game.506 
These players, whose professional roles all involved military cyber operations or 
policy, seemingly brought knowledge of the UK’s real-life approach and projected 
it onto the game model. Whilst certainly validating the game as a tool for spurring 
thought about an important cyber security topic, it was also a shame that these 
thoughts were projected into a veritable echo chamber. There were instances in 
other game sessions where players inquired about UK Attack Vectors – 
demonstrating the capacity of the game to enable players to ask the right 
questions – but the facilitator’s explanation (following the rationale in Section 
4.4.3) was accepted as gospel.507 On these occasions, the participants’ 
experiences would have been enriched if another player could have presented an 
alternative view point, challenging the facilitator’s perceived authority. 
 
Discussions around UK Attack Vectors created more successful learning moments 
when they considered intelligence gathering aspects. In two game sessions, both 
with civilians, players recognised the role of intelligence in establishing and 
maintaining Attack Vectors. One participant referred to the “persistent spying” 
which keeps Vectors open, thereby identifying the constant hostile activity in 
cyberspace the game design intended to convey.508 In a similar discussion in a 
different session, one participant with a deeper technical understanding was able 
to elaborate further, stipulating that UK actions in this area would likely not 
amount to penetrations of Russian targets, but more probably some sort of 
scanning efforts to map networks.509 Discussions like these can be deemed more 
successful from a pedagogical standpoint, such as that taken by Terence Mahoney 
or Stephen Downes-Martin (as quoted in Section 5.3), because the players 
themselves explored the nuances associated with Attack Vectors, rather than the 
facilitator dictating learning outcomes.  
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The second theme that emerged around Attack Vectors were discussions 
regarding strategic, legal, and moral limits on the UK’s attacking remit. For 
example, in one game session with military players it was noted that 
Rosenergoatom would be viewed very differently from something like Rosneft 
(Russia’s electrical distributor, equivalent to National Grid in the UK). Indeed, the 
laws of war prohibit targeting of civilian nuclear infrastructure but, said one 
participant, “it’s a different question if we’re just talking about the lights going off 
in Moscow.”510 Similarly, one civilian player thought that GCHQ attacking 
Rosenergoatom would not be “politically justifiable,”511 while a player from an 
academic background thought UK companies ‘hacking back’ would be 
internationally illegal and amount to an act of war.512  
 
Although the latter statement betrays an unrefined understanding of 
international laws on armed conflict as applied to cyberspace, another player was 
able to temper the assertion by saying that repercussions for a UK actor being 
caught on the offensive would be much greater than Russia. This sort of dialogue 
between players exemplifies the game’s capacity to inspire debate and create 
learning moments around a key cyber security concept. That players recognised 
the importance of ethics and the rule of law in these matters is significant because 
it indicates an understanding that cyberspace is not bereft of a rules-based order. 
Cyberspace is often portrayed as a ‘wild west’ where laws and regulations have no 
credence, yet efforts to codify international law, such as the Tallinn Manual, 
should be recognised as important developments which can hopefully limit 
aggressive behaviour in cyberspace.513 
 
Attack risk and reward 
 
The game design intended to convey the risk and reward payoffs associated with 
cyber attacks through a combat results table mechanic. The more Resource 
players committed to an Attack the higher their chances of causing significant 
damage, but there was also a higher risk of the Attack failing and backfiring. In 
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most game sessions, players were observed conducting risk assessments on their 
Attacks, weighing up the costs and benefits. However, very few players seemed 
conscious of this act and it was not often covered in post-game discussions, 
meaning the game mechanic was largely unsuccessful at creating learning 
moments. Intriguingly, teams playing Russia were more likely to heed their own 
advice from these risk assessments, with the most common Attack strength being 
three Resource (although this observation is anecdotal, statistics were not 
collected). Contrarily, UK teams (once they had acquired the ability to Attack) 
tended to dispense with assessments and launch any Attack they could afford.514 
However, rather than reflect the respective countries’ approach to cyber attacks, 
these dynamics are more a result of the game setup, the teams’ Objectives, and 
the allure of the offense. Overall, the dynamics around attack risk and reward 
largely represent a missed opportunity for players to have insightful discussions 
 
A more common discussion point arising from the game’s risk-reward structure 
was the role of dice and luck, with some players highlighting that die rolls 
determined the outcome of the game. On one of these occasions the comments 
led a useful discussion about whether players would commit to high-risk, high-
reward attacks in real life, to which the conclusion was that it all depends on 
context.515 On another occasion, a player from a UK civil service background was 
very sceptical about the amount of randomness which determined the game 
outcome and did not accept the facilitator’s assertion that “war is random.” In this 
instance circumstances had dictated a severely stunted game session (only four 
turns), which would have increased the impact of die rolls and thereby distorted 
players’ perception of their importance.516 Notably, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office have also admitted an aversion to dice in gaming, so this 
may be a trend within the UK civil service.517 These examples demonstrate some 
negative connotations of using dice, when players think about its impact too 
literally and fail to relate the game representation to a real-life concept (positive 
results of using dice for engagement purposes are analysed in Section 6.3.3). 
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More useful learning moments were created when players considered less the die 
itself and more what it represents: luck. Three pieces of written feedback from UK 
military players are emblematic of the levels of sophistication of questions players 
might be enabled to ask after playing the game. The first stated that “luck is a 
factor,” the second that “you can’t predict luck, but you can account for it,” and 
the third noted the “precariousness and resilience of risk management [emphasis 
in original].”518 We can see that the first merely recognises the role of luck, the 
second realises how luck plays into strategy, and the third relates luck to a real-
world concept. The third assertion especially demonstrates that player’s ability to 
link specific game mechanics to generic ideas, whereby the uncertainties of die 
rolls were interpreted to represent that all the risk management and planning a 
team does can be undone by one unpredictable factor (“precariousness”), and 
therefore it helps to have backup plans and failsafe strategies in place for these 
eventualities (“resilience”). It is notable that this level of sophistication was 
attained by a military player, whose modes of thinking are likely to be attuned to 
uncertainty of risk. After all, one of the most celebrated axioms of military 
strategy is Helmut von Moltke’s (paraphrased) assertion that ‘no plan survives 
contact with the enemy.’519 The game can therefore be considered successful in 
eliciting a learning moment derived from this axiom, but unfortunately only for a 
very limited audience. 
 
Attribution 
 
Dynamics of attributing cyber attacks were represented in the game through the 
permanent Attack Vectors (a deliberately inaccurate portrayal of attribution as a 
certainty) and in the Attack mechanics where a failed Attack would result in 
additional effects for being attributed. These were the source of insightful 
debates among players, some of whom recognised the nuances around 
attribution and how the game’s representation related to real-world concepts. In 
one session with military players, for example, an observer asked the UK team if 
their strategy or decisions had been influenced by “macro-level attribution” – the 
fact that they knew their opponent was Russia. Although no clear answer was 
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given, this instigated a discussion about how the game would be different if 
played blind, perhaps with a divider between the teams or in isolation from each 
other (see Section 6.2.7 for further analysis of visibility). There was also a 
suggestion to simply label the teams ‘A’ and ‘B’ to perhaps neutralise some of the 
prejudices which might taint gameplay when the teams have real-life identities, 
but this seemed unpopular because real-life actors were more engaging.520  
 
As a learning moment, this example illustrates how the game’s attribution 
mechanisms could be successful in terms of enabling players to explore aspects of 
anonymity in cyberspace. Understanding the dynamics of anonymity and 
attribution is important because many offensive cyber operations have been 
conducted under the auspices that attribution is difficult. When they know they 
can get away with it, criminals and other actors become more brazen in their 
actions. Thomas Rid has postulated that Russian covert action in 2017 and 2018 
was used to test red lines and Western resolve.521 The willingness of both the UK 
and US to publicly attribute certain operations to Russia, for example the 
NotPetya cyber attack, has subsequently demonstrated the limits to which Russia 
can operate anonymously.522  
 
In other sessions, discussions concerned attribution at lower tactical and technical 
‘micro’ levels. One civilian industry participant pointed out that the game does not 
account for Russian use of “proxy forces”: in real life Russia could sidestep the 
attribution mechanism by getting someone else to launch Attacks on their 
behalf.523 In a different civilian session one player, who overtly identified with the 
political left, related in-game Online Trolls attacks to “Blairites” hiring trolls but no 
one able to trace the money used to pay for them. Two other players built on this 
by discussing both the ease and difficulty of tracing Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses to physical locations. In order to further enhance this particular 
learning moment, the facilitator also injected points about the difference 
between technical and political attribution, and that knowing where a computer is 
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does not necessarily identify the person behind the keyboard.524 These examples 
demonstrate how the game prompted exploration of topics which were not 
explicitly contained in the game itself, but to which players could contribute their 
own knowledge and understanding, thereby following the observation made by 
Peter Perla and Ed McGrady that ‘great games capture meanings which have 
never been said’ (quoted in Section 2.2.4). By designing deliberately provocative 
attribution mechanics, the game thereby successfully promoted learning 
moments around this topic. 
 
Deterrence 
 
Deterrence is a central facet of the UK National Cyber Security Strategy525, but this 
concept was not overtly designed into the game as an educational point, largely 
due to the researcher’s own scepticism of cyber deterrence.526 Nonetheless, 
deterrent gameplay was observed by the researcher, for example in one game 
where the UK team piled Resource and Vitality into potential targets, effectively 
stopping Russia from Attacking them. However, despite the researcher expressing 
this observation to players, in this instance discussion did not progress further and 
the learning moment was not realised.527 German military participants playing a 
UK team, on the other hand, were able to recognise when they were deterring the 
other team and consciously employed this strategy to limit Russian attacks.528 In 
the post-game discussions a player from the opposing Russian team summarised 
the game and explicitly included deterrence, which they had perceived as UK 
opening the GCHQ-Rosenergoatom Attack Vector, forcing Russia to spend 
Resource to gain Vitality in this Entity.529 Their experience with the game led one 
of the players to conclude that the UK is well-placed to achieve the objectives 
outlined in the National Cyber Security Strategy, including deterrence, because 
they had successfully done this in the game.530 The researcher’s impression of this 
group of players suggests that they were aware that the game is not intended as a 
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simulation, so this assertion was likely not achieved solely based on the game 
model, but the player’s wider understanding of cyber security and the strategic 
landscape. 
 
In another game session with civilian industry players, one participant recognised 
that UK investing in Education had deterred Russia from Attacking the Electorate 
(the Education Black Market Asset caused any Attacks on Electorate to inflict only 
half damage). Moreover, the player felt that this was a realistic depiction of how a 
more cyber security-aware populace can limit the disruptive or destructive 
capacity of malicious actors, and that it sent a good message to players about the 
value of education.531 This was precisely what the Education Asset had been 
designed to convey, and in this instance, it was conveyed in the context of 
deterrence, thereby enabling two learning moments simultaneously.  
 
Overall, despite not explicitly designing deterrence into the game, the fact that 
players were able to recognise and discuss this concept is testament to the game’s 
flexibility as a cyber security learning tool. 
 
Passwords 
 
The importance of strong passwords is a mantra frequently touted as one of the 
simplest cyber security defences anyone can implement. However, because 
passwords are a very low-level concept it makes no appearance in the game – 
notice that it is not mentioned once in Chapter 4. Despite this, one UK civil service 
player participating in a mixed session was determined to discuss this topic, 
almost at the expense of everything else.532 The game session took place shortly 
after the National Cyber Security Centre had updated its public advice on 
passwords, changing its recommendation from forcing regular password changes 
to instead monitoring logins and notifying users of attempted logins, so it is likely 
the player had recently been exposed to this advice.533 This was the only recorded 
instance of passwords being mentioned by participants, but the example does 
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illustrate the game’s capacity to create learning moments where players could 
contribute their own knowledge about cyber security topics, even when they had 
no representation in the game.  
 
While the game represents strategic level cyber security, the example illustrates 
that learning moments could be achieved even at very tactical levels, in this case 
about an important defensive concept. 
 
6.2.6 Geopolitical realities and landscapes 
 
As detailed in Section 4.5, the game contained a deck of Event Cards which were 
drawn randomly to represent unpredictable events to which the players would 
have to react. The pedagogical reasoning behind this game mechanic was to 
introduce to players the idea that geopolitical realities, moods, and circumstances 
can impact cyber security agendas, even if an event does not immediately seem 
cyber-related.  
 
Effectiveness of Event Cards 
 
Intriguingly, there was some division among players as to the efficacy of the 
Cards. One military player suggested the Cards were a candidate for removal from 
the game, questioning whether “they add learning points beyond planning for 
random acts.”534 This comment is somewhat surprising because the Event Cards 
are one of the components which could be said to have the most thematic cyber 
security content, directly simulating real-life events which players would likely be 
aware of (for example civil servants misplacing laptops). Additionally, the 
“learning point” of planning for random acts is a crucial one and it seems odd to 
dismiss it. Other players were more positive, praising the Event Cards (in addition 
to the Black Market Assets) as the best source of learning and education in the 
game.535 The military player’s negative comment was the only one of its kind 
recorded, so can likely be viewed as an anomalous outlier. Furthermore, if we 
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accept that players did indeed find the Event Cards useful for education, they 
perhaps represent a missed opportunity to create further learning moments, 
because there was no guarantee that all the Cards would be seen by players in a 
game session (there were 16 Cards but only 12 game turns).  
 
Given players’ general approval of the Event Cards, a future version of the game 
might therefore place greater emphasis on these prevailing geopolitical realities 
and how players should deal with their effects in cyberspace. At the same time, 
the scepticism shown by one player indicates that there is scope for improvement 
of this game mechanic. In particular, questions about what might be seen as 
realistic or likely geopolitical realities need to be answered in order to ensure 
relevance and acceptance of the Cards. 
 
Impact of quantum computing 
 
One Event Card which created multiple learning moments was the Quantum 
Breakthrough card, which posited that Google rolled out quantum computing 
across all its devices and services, granting all Entities in the game one additional 
Resource and Vitality. In discussion, some players questioned whether quantum 
computing really was a benefit for society, as the Card entailed, and voiced 
concerns about negative consequences. One player from a mathematics 
background, for example, was able to talk about how quantum computing 
undermines many of the assumptions that enable modern cryptographic 
technologies.536 Other participants in this session, who may not have been 
familiar with concepts such as Shor’s Algorithm (discussed in Section 4.5.4), could 
therefore be said to have experience a learning moment where they were 
introduced to this idea. That players were able to highlight the inaccuracies of a 
game component and explain why reality might be different vindicates the design 
approach behind the game; learning moments could be achieved, in this case 
about quantum computing, by players discussing the game’s representation of 
this topic. 
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President Donald Trump 
 
The geopolitical reality which most frequently created learning moments was 
President Donald Trump. Multiple suggestions were made by players to add 
Trump to the game as an Event Card; often these suggestions had a humorous 
edge but were based on serious concerns about Trump’s ongoing geopolitical 
impact.537 In one game session, for example, a player jokingly asked where Trump 
was, to which another player responded “right here,” pointing to the middle of 
the red Russia triangle on the game board.538 In another session one player 
remarked that a “Trump Tweets” card was a “glaring omission”, with another 
player suggesting “Trump misspells Prime Minister’s name” as a candidate.539 The 
frequency with which Trump was mentioned indicates that players considered his 
presidency an exceptionally notable event, but seldom did discussion progress 
beyond repetition of popular tropes (such as Trump’s purported association with 
Russia or his social media habits) without deeper analysis. Learning moments 
around this topic were therefore more about recognition that the election of 
President Trump is an important event, but less about why it is important and its 
longer-term implications. 
 
6.2.7 Visibility in and of cyberspace 
 
In conflict results are not only unpredictable (as simulated by the game’s use of 
dice), but decisions are often made based on incomplete information. The idea 
that policy- and decision-makers do not have complete visibility of a situation was 
designed into the game through hidden player Objectives and secret cyber 
capabilities (Black Market Assets). However, players did have a very good view of 
the operating environment in that the game board itself was entirely visible with 
perfect information (for example, if the players could see a number of counters on 
the board, this was a true representation of the number of counters available).  
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Transparency and openness 
 
On numerous occasions learning moments were created where players 
recognised the representation of visibility in the game, especially the complete 
visibility of the game board, which was often highlighted as an inaccuracy.540 
Players from both military and civilian backgrounds were cognisant that 
cyberspace is a particularly opaque environment and could elaborate on the 
shortcomings of the game’s model, especially the game board, in this regard. In 
one game session, however, players defended the game’s representation of 
visibility in that real-life UK strategy is very transparent. One player specifically 
noted that the UK Government is subject to Freedom of Information requests 
which are prone to reveal more than what has previously been published on a 
given issue.541 Where the game falls short is that it applies the same logic to 
Russia, whereas in real life the Russian Government lags behind the UK in 
openness and transparency. Despite its inaccuracies, the game model can be 
lauded for promoting frequent debate about visibility in cyberspace, thereby 
creating learning moments about this topic. These moments were strengthened 
when players could link the broader concept to specific policies (such as Freedom 
of Information), potentially informing players’ understanding about the trade-offs 
facing an open, liberal democratic society. 
 
Deception 
 
Deception is a classic concept where an actor attempts to make an adversary 
believe they are doing something different to what they actually are, and it 
appeared as a theme in multiple game discussions. One player, for example, was 
keen to establish before the game began whether the information they could 
perceive was correct – if an Entity had a certain amount of Resource on the game 
board this represented the actual amount available to them.542 The player’s 
concern about hidden Resource can be used to build on the point about 
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transparency trade-offs, because an open society like the UK could be considered 
handicapped in how far it can exercise deception. The secrecy required for 
successful deception may be incompatible with policies of transparency. For 
instance, the UK Government would find it more difficult to conceal economic 
factors which enable or hinder its ability to act, compared to the Russian 
Government (who have allegedly tampered with their Gross Domestic Product 
figures).543 The game model did not enable such strategic deception, but most 
players seemed aware of this shortcoming and its implications, as reflected in 
comments about visibility. 
 
Other players were able to discuss deception at a tactical level. One participant 
from the Swedish civil service suggested a modified combat results table where 
players could spend Resource to hide Attacks.544 A UK military player looked at the 
issue from the defender’s side, suggesting secret use of the Black Market so that 
the defender could acquire Assets that would only become known to the attacker 
once they Attacked.545 Both these points reveal a sophisticated understanding of 
cyber attack and defence dynamics, highlighting how cyber security is a constant 
hostile process of attackers and defenders trying to hide their capabilities while 
discovering the other’s.  
 
The game model was clearly effective in prompting players to think about these 
dynamics of deception, thereby creating learning moments in this area in at least 
two game sessions. 
 
Secret moves 
 
A final component of visibility which was frequently discussed by players was the 
idea of secret moves. The game design enabled both teams to see each other’s 
actions and they were therefore able more proactively adapt to the other team. In 
one session, for example, the teams noted that many of their actions were based 
on predicting what the other team had enough Resources to do (for example 
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bidding on the Black Market), and the Russia team stated that they would not 
have concentrated their Attacks on the Electorate if they could not see that UK Plc 
were defended.546 The learning moment here echoes the one from deception, in 
that players recognised that in real life an attacker may not be aware of defences 
until they come up against said defences. Similar discussion points were also 
brought up in other sessions, with suggested remedies including confidential 
turns547 or simultaneously resolved moves.548 Although either of these approaches 
would create a more realistic game model, they would also add overhead and 
complexity (see Section 4.4.1 for further analysis).  
 
Ultimately, the design aim stated in Section 4.6 of forcing players to make 
decisions amid a Clausewitzian fog of war was not realised. By virtue of its 
openness, the game design was unable to generate sufficient stress and confusion 
to emulate the experience of making decisions with incomplete, inaccurate, and 
contradictory information. However, in terms of creating learning moments, the 
game design enabled players to recognise the limitations of the game’s open 
moves and discuss why actions in cyberspace are made with less visibility. 
Therefore, dynamics around visibility serve as examples of the game enabling 
players to contribute their own knowledge and understanding to enhance the 
learning experience for all participants. 
 
This is the final learning moment theme analysed in this chapter and discussion 
now moves on to how theories of wargaming were realised during the practice of 
the thesis. 
 
6.3 Practicing wargaming theory 
 
Previous chapters have analysed some of the theory which underpins both 
wargame design and use. Much of this theory is based on practice, but very little 
of the foundational theory – largely laid by Perla and Dunnigan (as frequently 
referenced in Chapter 2), or even modern scholars such as Sabin – is based on 
                                                          
546 Author fieldnotes, 29 June 2017 
547 Written player feedback, 15 May 2017 
548 Author fieldnotes, 21 April 2016 
215 
 
cyber wargaming, partly because cyber security is a nascent field, and partly 
because of the dearth of cyber wargames (described in Chapter 3). 
 
This thesis therefore presents an opportunity to assess the applicability of 
wargaming theory to the practice of cyber wargaming. Although the confines of 
the research prevent any wide generalisation beyond the experience of the 
researcher, future cyber wargaming practitioners may compare their experiences 
and future work could attempt to amalgamate these into a more profound 
contribution to the field. Such contributions might perhaps ascertain whether 
cyber wargaming is a fundamentally different challenge than other topics from a 
practical perspective (many differences with regards to design were discussed in 
Chapter 4). 
 
The following sections highlight four theoretical aspects widely recognised in 
wargaming literature, taken from Chapters II and V, and how these materialised in 
the practice of wargaming for this research: realism versus complexity, human 
decision-making, the engagement value of games, and the benefits of using 
manual games. 
 
6.3.1 Realism versus complexity 
 
A game designer’s difficulty in balancing the realism (accuracy) of a game with its 
complexity (playability) was discussed in Section 4.1. In the game used for this 
thesis, player engagement with the thematic content was valued above the 
realism of the game model. More particularly, the issue manifested itself in the 
length of the game rules, which were considered a potential barrier to 
engagement and therefore kept to a maximum length of one double-sided A4 
sheet. Often game sessions included discussions around this topic and several 
players recognised the trade-off between realism and complexity.549 Most often 
this was well-accepted, and players seemed supportive of the decision to limit the 
rule length. One player, who had some wargaming experience, suggested two rule 
sets could be produced: a simple version for lay players (the current two pages), 
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and an advanced version for more expert players (up to eight pages).550 Whilst 
certainly compelling in terms of future developments, such an implementation 
falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
Despite efforts to keep the game rules short and relatively simple, many instances 
of friction between the players and the rules were observed. Usually this was 
confined to the beginning of a game session; most of the time, within two or 
three turns most players had grasped the intricacies, or at least the basics, of the 
rules.551 Clarification questions which appeared frequently included the possibility 
of moving Vitality, converting Vitality into Resource, or transferring Resource to 
multiple Entities. Occasionally these resulted in opportunities for discussion (the 
researcher liked to joke that converting Vitality to Resource might represent 
people selling their kidneys), but no learning moments were recorded as created 
in this way. In one game session the rule sheets had been distributed the day 
before (along with player dossiers), giving participants overnight to absorb the 
rules. However, when the facilitator explained the rules the following day, 
ostensibly just to reinforce what the participants should already have known, it 
became apparent that for most it was their first time hearing them. Only one 
player claimed to have read the rules beforehand, but also confessed that the 
facilitator’s explanation had been helpful because the rule sheet on its own, 
without the various game components laid out at hand, had been confusing.552 
This suggests that there is both scope and requirement to further simplify the 
game design and rule set given a target audience of non-specialist participants; or 
that players are reluctant to engage with game material until they are in a game 
session, unless they already have an interest in games or wargaming. 
 
The tension between realism and complexity can therefore be said to have been 
prevalent during both the game design and deployment phases of this research. 
Although the rules for the game were not very long by wargaming standards, they 
were sufficiently complicated to create moments of friction with many players. 
This may partly be a result of the rules being too complex for the target audience 
but could also reflect the designer’s inexperience in writing rule sets. Jim 
                                                          
550 Author fieldnotes, 29 June 2017 
551 Author fieldnotes, 6 December 2016; 18 April 2017; 7 December 2018 
552 Author fieldnotes, 28 April 2017 
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Wallman, an experienced wargame designer, has written about the ease of 
writing rules, yet simultaneously reported other designers’ frustrations with the 
process.553 Practical experience suggests that expressing game mechanics in 
simple terms is a profound challenge which should not be underestimated.  
 
6.3.2 Decision-making experience 
 
As elaborated in Chapter 2, particularly Section 2.2.5, one of the key benefits 
propounded in wargaming literature is that games enable players to actively make 
decisions. Rather than have a scenario relayed to them, players progress the 
scenario through their own actions, providing what Perla and McGrady called a 
‘story-living’ experience (cited in Section 2.2.5) richer than other learning 
methods. Although the game designed for this thesis did not contain a narrative 
scenario, teams still had to progress the game by making decisions about which 
Objectives they would pursue and how to allocate and spend their Resource. 
  
The game rules stipulated that teams were limited to three minutes per turn. This 
was partly to ensure the game could fit into a two-hour time slot, but also forced 
players to make decisions under pressure (any Actions not performed within the 
time limit were forfeit). It is noteworthy that as a general trend, teams playing UK 
far more frequently pushed the time limit than teams playing Russia. The 
researcher often observed what might be termed ‘analysis paralysis’ in teams who 
sought to evaluate every possible permutation.554 One German military 
participant, who had played as Russia, remarked in post-game discussions that 
they certainly felt like they were playing against a democracy because UK’s 
decision processes were so long.555 Another player in the same session pointed 
out that UK have more Transfer options so naturally take longer to make 
decisions.556 This can be seen as an accurate reflection of real life, where the UK’s 
governance mechanisms are more decentralised than Russia’s, and the economy 
is more diversified. The game’s ability to replicate these dynamics should be 
                                                          
553 Wallman (2007), p. 11 
554 Author fieldnotes, 6 December 2016; 30 March 2017; 29 June 2017  
555 Author fieldnotes, 24 January 2017 
556 Author fieldnotes, 24 January 2017 
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considered a success in terms of giving players a story-living experience where 
they could step into the shoes of a policymaker (on either side) and experience 
decision-making from their point of view, albeit an experience which can vary in 
scope and tone depending on the background of the players. 
 
6.3.3 Engagement 
 
An extension of the story-living experience is that wargames are a high-
engagement activity. Because they require active participation and immersion 
rather than passive attention, games engender a higher level of engagement than 
other pedagogic methods such as traditional classroom teaching, educational 
videos, or online training modules.  
 
Over the course of this research, the game’s qualities could be analysed with 
reference to the role of emotion, roleplay, fun, and ‘distractions’; themes which 
are prevalent in wargaming literature. The ability of games to ‘challenge the 
competitive spirit,’ as Hausrath wrote (cited in Section 2.2.4), refers to the 
presence of emotion during wargaming. The dangers of distractions, meanwhile, 
were alluded to both in the Boeing game report and by Wilhelmson and Svensson 
(cited in Section 5.4.2) who consider the possibility of evaluators disturbing 
games. The idea that wargames should be fun has a contentious status in 
professional wargaming. Graham Longley-Brown, for instance, has emphasised 
the fun qualities of gaming as critical to player engagement.557 On the other hand, 
Stephen Downes-Martin has decried such a focus on enjoyment and instead 
promoted ‘professionally satisfying and constructive’ as the primary requirements 
of a wargame.558 The analysis conducted in the following sections builds on this 
existing literature by supplementing the practical experience of conducting the 
research for this thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
557 Longley-Brown (2015) 
558 Downes-Martin (2015), p. 8 
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The emotive power of dice 
 
The game’s use of dice changed during game development. As detailed in 
Section 4.4.4, feedback from an experienced wargamer resulted in adoption of a 
regular six-sided die rather than a four-side one and combat mechanics that 
rewarded high rather than low rolls. These changes were made to align the game 
with existing norms in board gaming and minimise friction for players unfamiliar 
with specialised wargaming approaches (such as irregular dice). Observations of 
player reactions to die rolls certainly suggests that the implementation of dice in 
the game was successful at eliciting emotional investment. Outbursts for 
successful rolls, and equally dejected reactions to unsuccessful ones, were 
observed in almost every game session, with some participants particularly 
emotive.559  
 
The photograph in Figure 15 captures one die-rolling moment from a public game 
session run by the researcher. The player on the right (the roller) has drawn 
attention to the die rolling action with an exaggerated hand motion, signalling the 
significance of the roll. The player on the left, meanwhile, awaits the result with 
anticipation; the hands placed together could be interpreted as an unconscious 
prayer motion. It is here worth recalling Baumeister et al’s insight about the 
power of anticipating emotion (Section 2.1.2). 
 
                                                          
559 Author fieldnotes, 25 April 2017; 28 April 2018 
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These reactions were enhanced when rolls were potentially game-winning or 
game-losing. One session with UK military players was remarkable for the 
intensity of reactions, with the final die roll (a UK Attack rolling 1, resulting in UK 
Government knocking itself out) producing a very loud combination of jubilant 
hollers and despondent groans.560 A still photograph could not do this dynamic 
justice, so the reader is instead recommended to view a promotional video of a 
game session which captured a similarly dramatic (though more muted) reaction, 
which can be accessed online.561 
 
The physicality of the game should not be underestimated as a factor in eliciting 
these emotive responses. As argued by Marcus Carter et al, the material feel of 
the die and the sound it makes as it hits the board provide sensory feedback to 
players, both the roller and others around the table.562 Indeed, given that such 
experiences are mostly lost in digital environments, many computer games 
incorporate sound effects of rolling dice, prompting players to recall the physical 
and emotional sensations attached to this action. In an online discussion 
                                                          
560 Author fieldnotes, 15 May 2017 
561 Information Security Group (2017), the moment in question is around the 06:40 mark 
562 Carter et al (2014), pp. 18-21 
Figure 15: A rolling moment, showcasing the emotive power of dice. (Image credit: NATO 
CCDCOE. Image source: CyCon Flickr 
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/133800821@N02/albums/72157697650970535).  
Image in public domain.) 
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regarding development of the virtual tabletop Fantasy Grounds, forum poster 
Aesir affirmed that ‘the missing sounds from dice rolling is currently the only real 
thing I happen to notice.’563 The act of rolling dice is entwined with the materiality 
of the object, and this aspect should not be discounted as a contributor to game 
engagement. 
 
Roleplay and the suspension of disbelief 
 
The final version of game was designed so that in-game teams had real-life 
identities (UK and Russia), rather than the anonymous blue and red teams of early 
game versions. This design decision paid dividends in terms of players identifying 
with the Entities represented in the game, often resulting in moments of roleplay. 
Russian characters in particular made frequent appearances. One player spoke of 
sending ineffective teammates to Gulags564, while another awarded “medals to 
everyone” after a successful attack.565 One player encouraged the Russia team to 
adopt an offensive mindset, saying “go on, be Putin.” Later in the game this team 
considered ‘turtling’ for the Victory Points but decided this would be 
uncharacteristic so remained on the offensive.566 One UK team complained that 
“they’ve got some radio frequency manipulator targeting your [facilitator’s] 
watch,” when the Russia team took too long during their turn567, and a team of 
military players remarked that they “need some fur hats” to complete the Russian 
image.568 Taking this roleplaying to the extreme was the civilian industry player 
who turned up in a full Russian military uniform costume, saying that he also had 
a British one but decided beforehand he wanted to play Russia. Multiple jokes 
from other players suggested a vodka bottle would have completed the picture.569 
 
There was also some roleplaying on UK teams. One team complained about the 
leadership of their “Theresa May” (incidentally the only female player on that 
                                                          
563 Aesir (2005) 
564 Author fieldnotes, 24 March 2017 
565 Author fieldnotes, 8 May 2017 
566 Author fieldnotes, 6 March 2017 
567 Author fieldnotes, 30 march 2017 
568 Author fieldnotes, 13 March 2017 
569 Author fieldnotes, 7 December 2017 
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team had ended up in the Government role).570 In another game session the 
player taking control of UK Energy returned from the game after a short absence, 
only to discover their team had lost and the company was broken. Upon hearing 
this they exclaimed “Oh I don’t care, I just want to know if I still have my 
pension.”571 Not only does this demonstrate that the player was able to identify 
with the character they had been assigned, but that they understood prevailing 
corporate attitudes to cyber security. Often the repercussions of a cyber security 
breach, in terms of lack of significant negative effect on companies’ stock prices, 
means the problem has not been taken seriously.572 The game successfully 
encouraged the participant to express this view in a roleplayed character which 
had strong resemblance to real life. 
 
The participants who engaged in roleplaying can be described as achieving a 
‘suspension of disbelief’ – the audience’s ‘tolerance of the fictionality of the 
media content.’573 The game adheres to Eve Schaper’s definition of a fiction 
where suspension of disbelief can take place: ‘any works…in connection with 
which it makes sense to speak of characters appearing and events taking place in 
them.’574 The game itself did not present individual characters, only amorphous 
Entities, yet players were keen to both identify and identify with important 
individuals such as Vladimir Putin and Theresa May.  
 
Roleplaying in this way is a suspension of disbelief because the players were both 
willing and able to look past the game’s shortcomings – both the representations 
made therein and its form as a board game – to engage with its thematic content.  
 
Fun and entertainment and their role in pedagogy 
 
Finally, comments and feedback from many players emphasised the fun and 
entertaining qualities of the game. When asked about their thoughts about the 
game, “fun” was the word which first sprung to mind among participants from the 
                                                          
570 Author fieldnotes, 24 March 2017 
571 Author fieldnotes, 25 April 2017 
572 Jones (2016), p. 18; Wilcox (2017) 
573 Böcking (2008) 
574 Schaper (1978), p. 31 
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UK military575 and Australian civilian industry576, while one UK civilian academic 
stressed how they “really, really” enjoyed it [speaker’s emphasis]577, and another 
UK civilian stated that “it really felt like a game” (in that they were actually playing 
against an opponent).578 What can be judged as a more nuanced comment was 
made by a German military player, who thought the game had limited value in 
teaching cyber security, but emphasised the element of fun as key to making it a 
good general education tool.579 In defence of the game’s cyber security pedagogic 
potential, it should be noted that this player was already a cyber security expert 
so it is understandable why they derived limited learning moments from the cyber 
security content.  
 
By way of illustrating these dynamics, Figure 16 captures participants in the 
middle of having fun; the players on the far right and far left are executing some 
gameplay action, while the two in the middle have shared some humorous 
observation with the other team. Everyone can be seen laughing and engaged 
with the game. 
 
                                                          
575 Author fieldnotes, 13 March 2017 
576 Author fieldnotes, 7 December 2017 
577 Author fieldnotes, 24 March 2017 
578 Author fieldnotes, 6 September 2017 
579 Author fieldnotes, 24 January 2017 
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Perhaps the strongest indicators of the ability of the game to impress and 
captivate participants were when sceptics became adherents. As an emblematic 
example, consider the cyber security expert player who admitted that “at first I 
was like ‘what the hell is this?’ but after three turns I was like ‘hell yeah, let’s do 
this!’”580 Some players may have initially doubted the value of a board game 
covering an inherently digital subject (also see Section 6.3.4), but the barriers to 
participation were lowered once they were exposed to the game’s mechanics and 
drawn into its engaging qualities. The following exchange serves as a final 
testament to the overall capacity of the game to elicit enjoyment: 
 
Facilitator: [Wrapping up discussion] “Is there anything else outstanding?” 
P1: “The only thing outstanding here is this game.”581 
 
From a pedagogical perspective, the reactions, roleplay, fun, and entertainment 
indicate an emotional investment which can be capitalised on when eliciting 
learning outcomes. Although players’ experience with the game does not quite 
adhere to what Jan Packer calls ‘learning for fun’ (valuing learning for its own 
                                                          
580 Author fieldnotes, 29 May 2018 
581 Author fieldnotes, 29 June 2017 
Figure 16: The fun and entertaining qualities of the game embodied in players. (Image credit: 
NATO CCDCOE. Image source: CyCon Flickr (https://www.flickr.com/photos/133800821@N02/ 
albums/72157697650970535). Image in public domain.) 
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sake)582, other academics such as Dan Rea et al have contested that fun ‘provides 
opportunities for greater learning satisfaction and success.’583 If participants feel 
connected to the activity they are more liable to positively receive the lessons 
contained therein.  
 
A notable dissenting opinion on this matter comes from Erling Dastool who avers 
that fun ‘has very little to do with deeper student satisfaction, or with real 
learning.’584 Dastool’s objections, however, are based largely on their own 
anecdotal observations, whereas later contributions to the field follow more 
thorough methodological approaches (such as Packer’s use of surveys). It has also 
been recognised that ‘fun’ is a term fraught with contradictions. Marc Prensky 
notes a ’major duality’ in the division between fun as amusement or ridicule and 
fun as enjoyment or pleasure.585 Whereas the former is frivolous, the latter can be 
associated with serious activities, including pedagogy. Dastool infers that ‘fun’ 
mostly carries connotations of entertainment, but there is greater academic 
support for the view that fun can be harnessed to create engaging educational 
experiences.586 
 
As a summative reference on this issue, Bob Stramba and Christian Bisson state 
that ‘studies have demonstrated that using more engaging and experiential 
instruction strategies is yielding greater academic success and higher student 
satisfaction.’587 Prensky, citing Ellen Langer, adds that active participation from 
students results in greater engagement and retention.588 Although this thesis does 
not include measurement of the viscosity of learning outcomes achieved (such as 
longitudinal study of lessons learned), the high engagement value produced by 
the game lays the foundations for strong pedagogic retention. 
 
                                                          
582 Packer (2006), p. 341 
583 Rea et al (2000), p. 24 
584 Daastol (1995), p. 15 
585 Prensky (2002), p. 7 
586 See Bisson and Luckner (1996) 
587 Stremba and Bisson (2009), p. 11 
588 Langer, Ellen J. (1997), The Power of Mindful Learning (Perseus Books: Cambridge) in 
Prensky (2002), p. 9 
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Distractions and failure to engage 
 
Just as the best games achieve a ‘suspension of disbelief’, so it could be said that 
they also achieve suspension of belief – a temporary disconnect from reality and 
full immersion in the game world. In the interest of a balanced assessment, it 
should be recognised that the game was not always successful in engaging players 
to the extent of such a suspension of belief. On multiple occasions players were 
observed interacting with their smartphones, suggesting that the game was 
unsuccessful in distracting players from the reality of their job roles.589 A more 
serious charge would be to claim that these players were bored, directly 
contradicting earlier assertions about the game’s fun and entertaining qualities. 
Thankfully these moments were outnumbered by examples of high engagement, 
so on balance the game’s fun factor can be adjudged as a positive element.  
 
In other instances, distractions were directly disruptive to game proceedings. In a 
session with Indian participants, one player interrupted the game to announce 
“for all the Indians in the room” the just-broken news that a high-profile Indian 
had just been arrested in London.590 In the same session, the 2017 UK ‘snap 
election’ was announced, and consequently the post-game discussions revolved 
largely around election wargames, which was off-topic from cyber security.591 
These examples demonstrate how real-world events can impinge on the game 
and cause players to lose focus. In another session, one non-participant twice 
came to observe the game, but instead of offering anything constructive waved 
their hands over the game board distractingly in a juvenile manner (possibly 
inebriated – the game was played in a bar).592 Instead of real-world events 
providing mental distractions, here the real world provided a very direct physical 
distraction, although it could be argued that this is an added degree of realism – 
distractions of this nature arise in the real world. The solution to both these 
problems would be to isolate the game environment to minimise distractions, but 
in the course of this research the environment could not always be controlled in 
                                                          
589 Author fieldnotes, 13 March 2017; 24 March 2017; 30 March 2017 
590 Author fieldnotes, 18 April 2017 
591 Author fieldnotes, 18 April 2017 
592 Author fieldnotes, 25 April 2017 
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this way, indeed it was rarely possible for the researcher to decide where a game 
took place (see Section 7.1.2 for further discussion). 
 
6.3.4 Manual wargaming and advantages over computers 
 
The benefits of using manual wargames over computerised games were lauded in 
Section 2.2.1, also justifying the decision to use a manual game for this research. 
Nonetheless, a popular point of inquiry from players directed at the researcher 
was why the game was not a computer game.593 The frequency with which this 
question appeared suggests one of, or a combination of, three things: the cyber 
security subject matter was most associated with digital media and a board game 
was therefore not an intuitive method to interact with the subject (see 
Section 2.3.1 for related discussion of medium and fidelity); the advantages of 
manual games were not widely understood; or computer games contemporarily 
enjoy greater popularity than board games. Unfortunately, this thesis does not 
offer scope to interrogate which of these are true, other than to remark on the 
noteworthiness of the issue.  
 
Sometimes discussions around a computerised version of the game took on more 
nuance. In one session, for example, the player who had originally asked the 
question was convinced by the facilitator’s explanation and suggested a 
touchscreen table would be a great hybrid solution.594 Some of the literature 
referenced in Section 2.3.3 also analyses such devices, and they may present 
future potential, but are currently prohibitively expensive (compared to personal 
computers or tablets).595 In another session one of the players (a seasoned civilian 
wargamer) was able to field the question, outlining the advantages and 
disadvantages with computerised games.596 This is another demonstration of 
players setting up temporary knowledge exchange relationships, though in this 
case the pedagogical outcomes concerned wargaming rather than cyber security.  
 
                                                          
593 Author fieldnotes, 28 April 2017 
594 Author fieldnotes, 30 March 2017 
595 In the region of $10,000-$12,000 according to Paul Ridden (2013) 
596 Author fieldnotes, 6 September 2017 
228 
 
Intriguingly, but perhaps unsurprisingly, when computer scientists asked 
questions about computer games they also offered potential technical solutions. 
On two occasions, implementations of Monte Carlo simulations were suggested to 
attempt to find an optimal strategy to the game.597 Although there is certainly 
value in such an approach (wargaming as operations research or systems analysis, 
as mentioned in Section 2.1), the suggestions also betray a naivety about the 
purpose of the game as designed for this research; the purpose was never to find 
answers, only enable players to ask questions. The person who took this initiative 
the furthest was an academic at Heriot-Watt University who placed 
computerisation of the game on their list of potential computer science MSc 
projects.598 In this case the academic did understand the purpose of the game and 
only wanted a pure digital conversion, maintaining the original design principles 
and enhancing them with digital technology. In the end no student elected to 
pursue the project, so it will remain unknown whether the conversion would have 
been successful. 
 
Modifiability 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, one specific advantage manual wargames offer over 
computerised games are their modifiability. Manual games can be modified a lot 
more easily in that they do not require any technical skills to edit, and changes 
can be made even during the progress of a game. Because of this accessible 
modifiability, players’ wisdom can find its way into games – in wargaming 
parlance referred to as ‘wizard wheezes.’599 Wizard wheezes were successfully 
implemented on numerous occasions during the course of this research. 
Sometimes a game might finish earlier than anticipated when one team was 
knocked out; but players wished to keep going, so a justification was invented 
why the failing Entity could be granted some Vitality and the game could 
continue.600 As long as the justification was realistic and reasonable the facilitator 
                                                          
597 Author fieldnotes, 25 April 2017 
598 Draft specification at 
http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~hwloidl/MScProjects/MScCyberSecurityGame.html 
599 Phrase used in Past Perspectives (2016), p. 2 and Stone Paper Scissors (2018), p. 5 
600 Author fieldnotes, 6 October 2016 
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would allow it. This is similar to de Koven’s advice that ability and willingness to 
modify a game can be crucial to keeping the game going (Section 2.1.4). 
 
More advanced wizard wheezes occurred on two occasions when players 
suggested Event Cards which could be added. One, from a German military player, 
suggested that Energetic Bear control the Black Market for one turn, receiving all 
proceeds from bidding.601 The other, from a UK civilian player, made a similar 
suggestion, but with the effect that Russia receive a discount on the Black Market 
for one turn.602 In both cases the suggestions illustrated good understanding of 
the underlying cyber security topics, and the players’ explanations warranted 
their immediate inclusion in the game by simply writing the details on a piece of 
paper (see Figure 17) and shuffling it into the Event Card deck. 
 
 
Figure 17: Wizard wheeze Event Card written by German military player (author's own image) 
 
As Nick Luft has remarked, wizard wheezes can sometimes be negatively received 
by the team who it works against, even resulting in criticism of the umpire who 
allows it.603 Although the facilitator did not experience any undue criticism 
regarding the above wizard wheezes, in the latter case there was some pushback 
from the UK team who felt there should be some reciprocal event advantaging 
                                                          
601 Author fieldnotes, 24 January 2017 
602 Author fieldnotes, 29 May 2018 
603 Luft (2002), p. 5 
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them. This notwithstanding, the fact that the game both enabled players to 
imagine wizard wheezes and was flexible enough to accommodate the ideas is 
ample illustration of the modifiability advantage of using a manual game instead 
of a computer game. 
 
The implication of this modifiability is that player engagement was increased. 
Because players realised they could make amendments to the game, they 
critically analysed game components and mechanics, rather than simply accept 
them as presented. In turn, such critical engagement led to opportunities for 
learning moments, especially when players applied their own knowledge and 
understanding of cyber security to the context of the game. 
 
Chapter 6 conclusion 
 
During the course of this research, a notable number of game sessions (33) with a 
wide range of participating organisations and individuals yielded both varied and 
insightful data. Analysis of the data has subsequently fallen into three distinct 
categories: uses of quantitative data, the game creating learning moments, and 
wargaming theory in practice.  
 
Firstly, quantitative data about player demographics corroborated prior assertions 
about the ratio of gender participation. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, the military, 
cyber security, and wargaming are all male-dominated fields, and data from game 
sessions corroborates these findings. Encouragingly, however, the numbers also 
suggest that cyber wargaming may be a tool for increasing female participation. 
Other uses of quantitative game data demonstrated how alternative approaches 
to wargame analysis (Sections 6.1.2 to 6.1.4) can reveal insights about player 
performance, real-world outcomes, or the playing styles of different groups. 
These are legitimate uses of other types of wargames, such as ones focused on 
operations research (mentioned in Section 2.1) or policy formulation (such as the 
US Naval War College referenced in Section 6.2.5). In the scope of this thesis, 
however, the analysis was only intended to be indicative of these possibilities, not 
provide grounded conclusions. 
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Secondly, qualitative data based on the researcher’s observations about player 
discussions show that a multitude of learning moments were created using the 
game. In Chapter 4, the design rationale for game components were analysed 
with regards to what cyber security concepts the components were intended to 
convey to players. This chapter has shown that most of the designs were 
successful: players were able to have discussions around the topics intended, 
ranging from key actors in cyberspace and their relationships, to cyber attack and 
defence dynamics, to geopolitical realities. More importantly, in some cases the 
game served as a catalyst for peer-didacticism, with players able to forge 
knowledge-exchange relationships during game sessions. Consider the German 
military player who had no cyber security expertise, yet after their experience 
with the game now knew what questions to ask and where to direct their 
questions in order to learn more (in this case about ransomware, see 
Section 6.2.5). In these instances, the game fulfilled Peter Perla’s assertion that 
the primary purpose of wargames is to help ‘ask the right questions’ (cited in 
Section 2.3.3). 
 
Lastly, the practical experience of the researcher in designing and deploying the 
game provided insights relating to wargaming theory. The tensions between 
realism and complexity, highlighted by Sabin and others (as referenced in 
Section 4.1), were prevalent both throughout the design process and the 
deployment phase. In particular, the researcher’s difficulty with writing simple yet 
comprehensive game rules did not adhere to Wallman’s claim that this is an easy 
task (cited in Section 6.3.1). The game also seemingly succeeded in providing what 
Perla and McGrady called a ‘story-living experience’ (referenced in Section 2.2.5) 
with a high level of engagement from players. Evidence of the emotive power of 
dice, roleplaying, and overall fun aspects of the game, as documented in 
Sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.3, amplifies the idea of the game as an experiential learning 
activity, which pedagogic scholars such as Stramba and Bisson assert are more 
conducive to effective education (cited in Section 6.3.3). As final notable 
examples, the prevalence of ‘wizard wheezes’ – a term used by Luft and others 
(referenced in Section 6.3.4) – during game sessions evidenced the modifiability 
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advantage of using a manual game over a computer game, as lauded by both 
Curry and Price, and Sabin (see references in Section 2.2.1). 
 
The following chapter proceeds to analyse the researcher’s experience of 
conducting the research, with close reference to methodological concerns 
outlined in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 7: A wargaming 
practitioner’s experience 
 
In general, it could be said that there is dearth of critical scholarly work on the 
practice of wargaming. With notable exceptions, such as the previously 
referenced Sabin and Downes-Martin, or Rex Brynen604, who have academic 
backgrounds, the wargaming corpus is largely written by practitioners for 
practitioners. Anecdotally, this researcher can attest that gatherings such as the 
Connections series of conferences (held annually in multiple locations around the 
globe) are more gatherings for wargamers to share ideas about games than to 
analyse more fundamental building blocks about wargaming practice. The 
researcher’s impression from immersion in the wargaming community is that 
wargamers somewhat rely on a set of unspoken and unwritten assumptions about 
how wargaming is done.  
 
Because of this, it is the researcher’s assessment that progress in wargaming has, 
to some extent, stagnated and knowledge become stale. ‘For a very long time,’ 
say Pat Harrigan and Matthew Kirschenbaum (editors of the comprehensive 
anthology Zones of Control, a much-needed influx of literature in the field) ‘there 
were only a handful of essential but well-worn texts on the subject of 
wargaming.’605 Giants such as Perla and Dunnigan are rightly held aloft for their 
contributions, but neither of these have written anything ground breaking for at 
least a decade (even Perla’s chapter in Zones of Control draws heavily on his own 
seminal 1990 book The Art of Wargaming606), and novel ideas or critique are not 
forthcoming at a rapid enough rate to keep the field fresh. Elizabeth Bartels607 
leads a small vanguard of nascent wargamers with academic credentials (also 
including the likes of Anders Frank608, Johan Elg609, and Ivanka Barzashka610), but 
there is ample scope for further contributors to make an impact. 
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With this in mind, the present chapter seeks to make meaningful contributions to 
the practice of wargaming by relating some of the experiences the researcher 
encountered during the conduct of this thesis. The intention is to inject 
observations and analysis which seem to be lacking in wargaming literature, 
challenging unspoken assumptions and enriching the corpus by linking 
experiences to methodological aspects outlined in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the 
analysis draws on academic fields which might initially be considered far removed 
from wargaming, especially regarding participatory research, thereby introducing 
new intellectual capital which may help reinvigorate wargaming as a field of 
critique.  
 
The chapter begins with an examination of the topic of positionality; both 
strategic positionality – covering the impact of the researcher’s background on 
creating research opportunities – and tactical positionality – including subsections 
on challenges associated with facilitation, note taking, and game environments. 
Next, Section 7.2 contains analysis of classification and secrecy issues which were 
encountered during the course of the research and how they affected the 
progress of the research. Finally, Section 7.3 comments on the important role of 
humour during game sessions through two lenses: making fantasy of the familiar, 
and satirising those in power. A summary section then concludes the chapter. 
 
7.1 The impact of the researcher’s positionality 
 
In Chapter 5, two dimensions of positionality were defined. The first is strategic 
positionality, inspired by Hammersley and Atkinson’s ‘background knowledge, 
social characteristics and circumstances’ (cited in Section 5.2.1), which refers to 
aspects of the researcher’s background that should be accounted for when 
conducting the research and analysing data. The second is tactical positionality, 
which refers to researcher behaviour during the conduct of the research and how 
this could affect data collection. Tactical positionality is further delineated to 
encompass two sets of tensions the researcher would encounter while running 
game sessions: the first, drawing on cautions issued by Dunnigan (cited in Section 
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5.3.1), is between the roles of game designer and facilitator/adjudicator; and the 
second, extending the work of Boeing, Wilhemson and Svensson, and Kainikara 
(all cited in Section 5.4.2), is between the roles of facilitator/adjudicator and 
researcher. While the definitions were largely theoretical and based on relevant 
literature, this section analyses how these dynamics materialised in practice. 
 
7.1.1 Creating research opportunities 
 
In traditional ethnographic studies, the researcher often embeds themselves in a 
location or a community to study it in-depth. Seminal anthropologist Mead lived 
with Samoan natives for nine months, while the influential Leach spent six years 
with the Kachin people in Burma (both referenced in Section 5.2). It should be 
noted that Mead’s work has been the subject of much debate, including Derek 
Freeman’s criticisms of bias611, and Melvin Ember’s subsequent charge that bias is 
also present in such criticisms.612 For this thesis, however, the broad central 
research question meant that collecting data from a wide gamut of organisations 
was more suitable than a narrow subset, and the researcher would need to gain 
access to these organisations only for a relatively short amount of time – enough 
to run a game session; a matter of hours, rather than months or years, thereby 
setting the thesis apart from traditional ethnographic work. 
 
Other researchers conducting participatory work within gaming have used 
differing strategies to garner participants. Frank (referenced in Section 5.3), for 
example, already had access to students on a military course he was involved in 
convening. An option frequently used in economic, psychological, and medical 
studies is to publicly advertise the research seeking volunteers. Bos used a variant 
of this, displaying recruitment posters on university campuses.613 However, 
neither of these options were feasible for this thesis. The researcher did not have 
ready access to groups of students as Frank did, and while it may have been 
possible to publicly advertise the work, this is more conducive to recruiting 
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individual participants than the groups required to play the game, in addition to a 
number of ethical and methodological complications.614 
 
Instead, the researcher secured the participation of organisations via direct 
contact, either through professional relationships, by meeting interested parties 
at events (such as conferences), or targeted contact via email. In the following 
sections, some successes and failures of this approach are analysed, with close 
attention to the researcher’s personal, professional, and educational background 
(detailed in Section 5.2.1) as influencing factors. 
 
Strategic positionality in networking, opportunism, and serendipity 
 
When reflecting on the process by which organisations came to participate in the 
research, a common theme which underpins many examples is the role of 
serendipity and opportunism. Other academics have noted the importance of 
serendipity, Frank Pieke even going as far as calling it ‘the essence of fieldwork 
research.’615 The experience of this researcher certainly reinforces this notion 
because serendipity and opportunism were indispensable to the conduct of the 
research. Without meeting the right people, largely by accident, and helped by 
the researcher’s strategic positionality, many of the game sessions might never 
have taken place. 
 
As an example, the participation of UK government department B came about 
through the researcher meeting a department representative at an academic 
network meeting organised by a security and international relations think tank in 
March 2015. When talking to the representative, it appeared that a shared 
background as War Studies graduates (albeit some years apart) to some extent 
gave the researcher credibility. Further email contact eventually resulted in a 
game session at department’s premises in London. In another case, German 
military education institution A became involved after the researcher gave a 
presentation at the ITEC 2016 conference in London. ITEC is organised by the 
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researcher’s former employer, so the researcher had an advantage in that it was a 
familiar environment, inhibiting the onset of conference nervousness which many 
academics experience.616 After the researcher’s presentation, a German military 
officer approached the researcher for further discussions, which eventually, 
following further telephone and email contact, resulted in an invitation to visit the 
institution to run the game. Finally, consider the participation of Swedish military 
education institution A, whose involvement came about after the researcher met 
a Swedish military officer at the Connections UK conference in both 2015 and 
2016. Although the officer was proficient in English, they seemed more at ease 
communicating in their native language, which the researcher was capable of. 
Discussions at the conference and subsequent email communication culminated 
in the researcher visiting the institution to run the game. 
 
These examples illustrate how the researcher’s strategic positionality – 
educational (King’s War Studies), professional (events company), and personal 
(Swedish) background – was beneficial in establishing rapport with key 
gatekeepers who could ensure the participation of diverse organisations. In other 
ethnographic work, (potential) gatekeepers may be identified and a plan of 
contact drawn up as part of the research design; both Carla Reeves617 and Morrill 
et al describe how their initial contact with organisations was through pre-
identified top managers.618 Importantly, unlike these authors, none of the 
meetings with the individuals in the previous examples were premeditated. In this 
sense, the characteristics of the research reflected those described by David 
Fetterman as the reality of ethnographic work: ‘serendipity, creativity, being in 
the right place at the right or wrong time, a lot of hard work, and old-fashioned 
luck.’619  
 
Serendipity was a notable omission from the methodology outlined Chapter 5, but 
purposefully so; after all, luck cannot be planned for. The thesis can therefore be 
said to adhere to what Isabelle Rivoal and Noel B. Salazar called ‘good 
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ethnographic work,’ which ‘can and should never be completely orderly.’620 Just as 
wargaming is both an art and a science, combining the chaotic with the 
calculated, so was the practice of this thesis rife with research opportunities 
which began as unstructured and unplanned but were cultivated into meaningful 
experiences. The value of serendipity was therefore immense to this thesis, but 
owing to the role of strategic positionality, other researchers’ experiences may 
vary and there can be no template to work from when taking advantage of 
unexpected opportunities. 
 
The ‘snowballing’ effect 
 
Serendipitous meetings like those outlined in the previous section were often 
instrumental in getting the fieldwork components of the research off the ground. 
However, as the project progressed, opportunities also arose without the 
researcher instigating contact with organisations. On several occasions the 
researcher was contacted by organisations who had heard about the game either 
via word of mouth or through social media. 
 
The participation International military education institution A is emblematic of 
this process. A representative from the institution had seen a photo of the game 
on Twitter, originally posted by one of the players at German military education 
institution A.621 This representative then contacted the German institution to find 
out more and was referred to the researcher. Further email exchanges led to an 
invite to run a game session at the international institution. In turn, this game 
session directly led to the involvement of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) based in Tallinn. A CCDCOE representative was at 
international military education institution A at the same time as the researcher 
and was intrigued by the game. Further discussion eventually resulted in the game 
being run as a dedicated workshop at CCDCOE’s annual CyCon conference in May 
2018.622 The chain of events outlined here therefore evidences the research 
spreading across three organisations in three separate countries (from a German 
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military education institution to an international military education institution to 
CCDCOE in Estonia), largely due to the efforts of key individuals within these 
organisations, but without advertising or recruitment actively done by the 
researcher. 
 
The idea of fieldwork self-perpetuating in this way has not eluded other 
ethnographers. Jeffrey Sluka, for example, notes how such ‘snowballing’ was 
paramount during his fieldwork in the ghettos of Belfast at the height of the 
Troubles.623 Moreover, Sluka’s account is indicative of the importance of 
‘snowballing’ in sensitive research areas. Once his work had been accepted by key 
gatekeepers in the community (a priest and a former IRA member), these 
individuals effectively became evangelists for the research, helping it become 
accepted by others.624 Although this thesis was written at an unclassified level, 
NATO is nonetheless an organisation which handles sensitive information and 
many parts of the organisation require security clearance to access. By individuals 
on the inside championing the game internally within NATO at CCDCOE, the 
researcher did not have to contend with these barriers for the research to gain 
traction, thereby creating fieldwork opportunities (although see Section 5.2 for 
discussion of how security and classification hampered the research). 
 
Meanwhile, both Catherine Palmer and Ian Alam relied on ‘snowballing’ as a 
methodological technique in order to gain access to more research subjects in 
Australian Rules football fandom625 and corporate marketing respectively.626 
Although this thesis did not consider ‘snowballing’ in its methodology, practical 
experience indicates that this effect was crucial in developing new fieldwork 
opportunities. Because other researchers in gaming and wargaming recruited 
research participants in different ways (Bos’ posters and Frank’s students, as 
referenced previously), ‘snowballing’ does not appear to have been considered in 
wargaming literature. With this in mind, the researcher’s experiences presented 
in this section can be considered an original contribution to the corpus. 
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Failures to gain traction 
 
Despite a plethora of examples demonstrating how research opportunities could 
occur through both serendipitous meetings and ‘snowballing’, these cases were 
outnumbered by the amount of times the game failed to gain enough traction for 
a game session to the organised.  Sometimes the researcher would contact an 
organisation who had been deemed as potentially interested in engaging with the 
game, only to receive a negative response, or no response at all. Other times 
information about the game might be positively received and inroads made into 
establishing a foothold in the organisation, only for communication to peter out. 
This could be caused by the point of contact leaving the organisation, or by 
imperatives outside the contact’s control (see, for instance, example with legal 
barriers in Section 7.2.1), but often the reasons for communication ceasing 
remained unknown. 
 
The following (anonymised) examples from the researcher’s interactions with 
various organisations demonstrate different stages of failure. Representatives of a 
large cyber security company, for instance, were introduced to the researcher via 
email by a staff member at the researcher’s university. However, after following 
up the introductory email with more information about the research and the 
game, no reply was received from the company. In another case, the researcher 
contacted a security-oriented intergovernmental organisation, which had been 
suggested by a German military game participant (though no point of contact was 
provided).627 The initial response was surprisingly swift and positive given the 
unsolicited contact, but after providing more information about the game nothing 
was heard from them again. More progress was made with a representative from 
a large investment bank, who had originally learned of the research from seeing 
an academic poster displayed at a Royal Holloway open day. Email 
correspondence followed for the next six months, yet logistics proved a hindrance 
to organising a game session and communication eventually stopped. Finally, 
consider the examples of both a non-profit information security 
professionalisation organisation and an aerospace and defence company. In these 
cases, the researcher had made significant progress in establishing contact, 
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including telephone conversations with the professionalisation organisation and 
hosting a meeting with a representative from the defence company to showcase 
the game. Despite strong expressions of interest, however, no game sessions with 
either organisation materialised, and communication ceased. 
 
Contextualising failures in academic literature 
The researcher did not systematically record their interactions with organisations, 
so a complete breakdown of the failure rate is not attainable, but it can be 
estimated that failures outnumbered successes by around three to one. It is 
difficult to know how this compares to other academics doing fieldwork, 
particularly in gaming. In Bos’ research he describes encountering ‘indifferent or 
hostile’ responses when attempting to recruit participants via online in-game 
communication but does not provide a number to quantify these failures.628 
Aforementioned Morrill et al state that their ‘initial forays into polyarchies often 
met with failure’, but without a reference point it is not known how ‘often’ 
compares to the experience of the present researcher.629  
 
On the other hand, failures are not just statistical events, but also carry qualitative 
implications and offer opportunities for reflective practice. Failure can be a 
demotivational factor which stops the researcher progressing further or can affect 
how future fieldwork attempts are approached. Jo Lindsay, for example, writes 
that after her initial failures to recruit participants for survey research she herself 
‘felt like a complete failure’ and that approaching the same organisation again 
went ‘against her initial feelings’, but she was then ‘relieved’ when an amended 
recruitment tactic was successful.630 Although these extremes were not directly 
shared by the present researcher, the process of creating research opportunities 
was certainly an emotional experience. The elation and excitement of receiving 
assent from a high-profile organisation such as UK government department B or 
the German military education institution were memorable and can be contrasted 
with the disappointment of failures, though never to the point of causing 
despondence.  
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It is possible that the feelings of this researcher were tempered by the drawn-out 
process by which most participants were recruited (usually involving initial 
discussions followed lengthy email chains), while for other academics success or 
failure was more instant, thereby eliciting stronger emotional responses. 
However, another important facet to consider in this regard is the role of strategic 
positionality. The stereotype that males are less emotional will not be propagated 
here, but the researcher’s experience outside academia may have contributed to 
why they received failure more stoically. Martin Schwartz has posited that 
‘students who are accustomed to getting the answers right’ struggle with the idea 
that academia ‘allows us to bumble along, getting it wrong time after time, and 
feel particularly fine as long as we learn something each time.’631 Although writing 
specifically about science, the point can be made that students with a greater 
breadth of experience, either with other academic disciplines or generally outside 
academia, react less extremely to failure. In her study of international exchange 
students, Tracy Rundstrom Williams refers to this as ‘emotional resilience’ – the 
ability to ‘face failures…and to continue working towards positive interactions’ – 
as one of the key benefits of studying abroad.632 Given that the researcher had 
both professional experience outside academia and personal experience living in 
different countries (as outlined in Section 5.2.1), these aspects should not be 
discounted when analysing the researcher’s reactions to failed fieldwork 
opportunities. 
 
7.1.2 Tactical positionality 
 
In Chapter 5, tactical positionality was defined as distinct from strategic 
positionality. Where the latter can be said to encompass macro issues that 
influenced the research, the former concerns micro issues which had influence 
during game sessions. These micro issues were in turn classified into two types, 
the first of which concerned the tensions between the role of game designer and 
facilitator/adjudicator. Dunnigan (cited in Section 5.3.1) highlighted that ‘false 
prophets’ usually only become evident after it is too late, and this was taken to 
mean that game designers can sometimes become overzealous about the capacity 
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of their games to achieve their intended outcomes (in the case of this thesis: 
teach lessons). If players trust the designer’s promise implicitly or uncritically, 
they may not recognise limitations of a game, thereby perhaps placing excessive 
faith in the game outcomes (in the case of this thesis: learning the wrong lessons).  
 
The second type of tactical positionality concerned the tensions between the role 
of facilitator/adjudicator and researcher. The literature on wargaming is already 
conscious of these tensions, as highlighted by Wilhelmson and Svenson and 
Kainikara (all cited in Section 5.4.2). Here, difficulties can arise when one person 
attempts to simultaneously be in the thick of the game action to facilitate 
engagement or adjudicate on a game matter, whilst also being removed 
(sometimes physically) and invisible to players in order to make research 
observations and record notes. These dual roles can compromise each other, for 
example a researcher influencing a game with a biased adjudication decision in 
order to duplicate a previous research finding, rather than adjudicating impartially 
and fairly.  
 
In the following sections, the tensions of tactical positionality are analysed 
through the researcher’s experience of three themes: facilitation, note taking, and 
the game surroundings. As an example of the interdisciplinary nature of this 
research, these sections all draw on different strands of literature, though there is 
also overlap and cross references.  
 
Experiences in game facilitation 
 
It was noted in Section 5.4.2 that the researcher, in convening a wargame, would 
have to tread a careful balance between being facilitator who effectively 
encourages players to achieve learning objectives, and a good researcher who 
ensures proper data collection. This balance would encompass the physical 
presence of the researcher, their interventions in the game, and their interactions 
with the players. The researcher’s practical experience of being a wargame 
facilitator, in the context of this thesis, are here analysed under four themes 
which became apparent as the researcher reflected on their experiences: 
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facilitator competency, game session control, facilitation mistakes, and physical 
energy. 
 
It should be noted that the researcher had no prior experience or expertise in 
wargame facilitation. They had some awareness of the rituals and principles of 
facilitation through wargaming literature and participating in wargames facilitated 
by others, but these are no substitute for first-hand experience. The challenges of 
dealing with difficult players or situations, or making facilitation mistakes, were 
initially faced with improvisation, but over time the researcher became more 
accustomed and confident in facilitating the game. The account in this section 
partly captures the researcher’s journey from a novice to becoming an 
accomplished wargame facilitator. 
 
Facilitator competency 
Something which became abundantly clear after running the game session at 
International military education institution A was that facilitator competency 
directly affected potential learning moments. In this session three games were 
run simultaneously in two separate rooms, but the researcher had trained three 
institution staff members to act as facilitators (by demonstrating the game and 
giving some basic facilitation advice), ostensibly freeing the researcher up to flit 
between games to make observations or assist when necessary. Unfortunately, 
out of the three staff members, only one proved to be an accomplished game 
facilitator (even improvising their own adjudication methods), while the other two 
lacked competency and one was reluctant to run the game without the presence 
of the researcher.633 The researcher’s impression was that in the games facilitated 
by the less competent staff members, the vast majority of players’ attention was 
focused on grappling with the game rules rather than the thematic content, 
thereby limiting the potential learning moments that could be created. In the 
game facilitated by the accomplished staff member it is likely less friction with the 
rules enabled greater engagement with the cyber security aspects of the game; 
however, because the researcher was forced to spend a disproportionate amount 
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of time with the other games they were limited in what observations they could 
make.634 
 
The effect of the competency of the facilitator on learning moments was also 
prevalent in a game session with students at UK military education institution B. 
Here, only one game was run, facilitated by the researcher, with an institution 
staff member assisting. This staff member’s competency as a facilitator became 
prevalent in the post-game discussion, where their pedigree as an educator came 
to the fore. The staff member was able to lead the discussion along paths that 
clearly illuminated  learning moments, for example with an exercise using Post-It 
notes.635 The structure of the discussion forced participants to vocalise and 
rationalise their thoughts about the game in such a way that the lessons learned 
could be shared among the whole group, thereby maximising the pedagogic 
potential of the game. The staff member’s competency as a facilitator was key in 
enabling this. These examples illustrate what other wargaming practitioners like 
Mahoney, Wiggins, and Burns (all referenced in Section 5.3) have advised with 
regards to facilitation. The institution staff member was adept at drawing out 
opinions, creating feedback loops, and driving the discussion towards game 
objectives.  
 
The researcher’s own proficiency in this facilitator role is difficult to judge without 
external assessment. However, if the amount of learning moments created can be 
used as a guide (Chapter 6), the researcher should be considered a successful 
wargame facilitator within the remit of this thesis. Being a good facilitator both is 
and is not a requirement for this research. In one sense, good facilitation was 
crucial to ensuring player engagement with the game (see Section 6.3.3), without 
which players might not have learned as many lessons. But such facilitation need 
not have been done by the researcher; for example, the game could have been 
designed to be playable without a facilitator, in the vein of popular board games 
such as Monopoly. In such a setting, the researcher could have retreated into an 
observational role, thereby perhaps capturing more detailed analysis of players 
behaviour and discussions (see next section for discussion of fieldnotes). The 
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point here is that the researcher’s proficiency as a facilitator shaped the outcome 
of the research, but that does not preclude less competent facilitators from 
pursuing similar work. 
 
Controlling game sessions 
Another facet of facilitator competency is the ability to control a game session, 
both to ensure frictionless flow of the game and to create learning moments. In 
the same way that a Dungeon Master in Dungeons & Dragons is tasked with 
conjuring a game world, progressing the game’s story, and adjudicating on 
players’ actions, all while ensuring player enjoyment – as wonderfully described 
by John Eric Holmes – so must a wargame facilitator lead a game session, often in 
challenging situations.636 During the course of this research several instances of 
difficult player behaviour were encountered that pushed the researcher’s ability 
to control a game session.  
 
In a post-game discussion at German military education institution A, the topic of 
anonymity in cyberspace and proxy actors was the source of intense debate 
between several of the participants. What started out as good observations by 
two people grew into a heated (though cordial) argument, with other participants 
joining in on either side. Eventually the discussion reached an impasse too far 
from cyber security and the researcher felt a need to intervene to bring it back on 
topic.637 The challenging component of this was that every participant was a 
military officer between Major and Lieutenant Colonel on a strategic leadership 
course; people with exceptionally strong influence and command skills. Despite 
them being perfectly friendly and welcoming to the researcher, there was 
nevertheless an intimidating element to interjecting in the debate given the 
researcher’s clear status as an outsider in this environment. In the end the 
interruption successfully brought the discussion back on track, but the 
researcher’s experience is noteworthy from a wargaming practitioner’s 
perspective. 
 
                                                          
636 Holmes (1980) 
637 Author fieldnotes, 24 January 2017 
247 
 
On other occasions the researcher ceded control of the game session to more 
capable facilitators. Most prominently this occurred during both the International 
academics A and B sessions, where a British military officer was present and able 
to assert control of discussions.638 Both sets of participants were unruly (see 
examples from Section 6.3.3), often interrupting each other or vying for attention. 
The researcher wrote in their fieldnotes that “it was very lucky [officer] was there 
(in combats) as his authority helped keep players in check (as they themselves 
acknowledged).”639 The presence of a uniformed military officer created structure 
in the game session, which the researcher is unlikely to have been able to conjure 
on their own. This structure could be considered a positive atmosphere (as 
attributed to Wilhelmson and Svensson in Section 5.3) where the point of 
authority was neutral, thereby not inhibiting discussion. Indeed, despite their 
unruliness, many learning moments were successfully created in these game 
sessions, which must be at least partially attributed to the officer’s capacity to 
control the sessions. 
 
Finally, the researcher’s experience at one edition of the Connections UK 
wargaming conference (London, September 2017) stands out as an example of 
challenging participant behaviour. In this game session, all players were strangers 
to each other, and on the Russia team this resulted in huge personality clashes. 
From the outset, one of the team members found themselves isolated and unable 
to argue for their preferred course of action. By the second game turn the player 
had sourly relegated themselves to a spectator and in turn three, following a final 
argument with their team, stood up and left the game.640 At the time, the 
situation was enormously awkward, and the researcher was unsure how to 
proceed. Ultimately it was decided to ignore the situation and complete the 
game, which was done successfully, but the researcher felt compelled to offer an 
apology to the player the next day, which was well-received. The player, an 
experienced wargamer, also provided a note of caution about strong personalities 
in central roles; other wargamers have similarly testified that ‘personality 
conflicts, over-competitiveness, and anger’ can be features of game sessions.641 
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This may be counterintuitive if we consider stereotypical wargamers as a more 
reserved characters – Jim Dunnigan himself admits to being ‘a shy person by 
nature’642 – yet it also makes sense in the context of socialisation: the process 
which ‘establishes common definitions in the way a situation is perceived.’643 Terri 
Toles-Patkin has written that ‘should the socialisation process prove 
unsatisfactory, the [player] can remove himself from the situation,’ which is 
precisely what happened in this game session.644 As an experience of facilitating 
wargames this is perhaps an extreme example, but one which embodies the 
difficult challenge of game session control. 
 
Facilitation mistakes 
In addition to challenges created by participants, the researcher also made 
unforced errors when facilitating games. In one game session, for example, the UK 
team had accidentally been allowed to place the Software Update Asset on the 
Electorate, which is not possible according to the restrictions of the Asset. The UK 
team brought this to the researcher’s attention and the Asset was quietly 
swapped out for the Education Asset, with the effects carried over. Russia did not 
notice the swap and the researcher decided it would have been more complicated 
to explain than let the game progress.645 The error was inconsequential to the 
result of the game but did illustrate that human wargame facilitators are not 
infallible. The capacity of facilitators to make mistakes has been recognised in 
related literature646, and in the wargaming context by Craig Orme, who 
emphasises the objectivity of simulators (computers) in adjudication.647 On the 
other hand, the modifiability of a manual game (as discussed in Sections 2.2.2 and 
6.3.4) was also showcased in this example. 
 
Facilitation mistakes were more serious when they compromised the impartiality 
of the researcher and impacted gameplay. In one session the researcher 
inadvertently advised Russia against transferring Resource for an Attack because 
the UK target was protected by an Asset. The UK team did voice a complaint at 
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this but did not harbour further ill feelings.648 Nonetheless, the researcher had 
clearly intervened in the game in a way which did not adhere to the neutrality and 
impartiality advocated by Kainikara (referenced in Section 5.4.2). In another 
session such impartiality was impossible to maintain owing to player availability. 
For long periods of a game with civilian industry participants, the UK team was left 
with only one player owing to team members leaving for phone calls and 
meetings. The game contains too much material for one player to manage, so at 
these points the researcher stepped in to offer advice, though was careful to 
always let the player make the final decision on any actions.649 This was less of an 
unforced error than it was a conscious intervention by the researcher, but it did 
jeopardise the fairness of the game’s competition because the researcher, in also 
being the game designer, could provide knowledge imparting an unfair advantage.  
 
The takeaway from these paragraphs is that while manual wargames benefit from 
human knowledge and ingenuity, they are also fraught with human frailties. As 
the previous examples illustrate, facilitation mistakes can impact the course of the 
game and players’ experiences. This problem is exacerbated when the facilitator 
simultaneously undertakes multiple roles – in the case of this thesis also game 
designer and researcher – placing additional stress on the facilitator’s faculties. 
 
The physical and mental energy drain 
One final issue which was a central aspect of the researcher’s experience, but is 
remarkably absent from wargaming literature, is how facilitating wargames was 
physically and mentally taxing. Warren Wiggins has noted that facilitators may 
need some mental resilience when delivering contentious adjudication 
decisions650, while Solomon Smith warns that ‘it is important to mentally prepare 
for various scenarios,’ although he is more concerned with the context of the 
classroom than wargaming in general.651 Neither of these, however, give any 
indication as to the high cognitive load a facilitator is liable to experience. With 
regards to the physicality of facilitating, wargaming literature only concerns 
maintenance of positionality (as discussed in Section 5.4.2), but not how the role 
                                                          
648 Author fieldnotes, 6 September 2017 
649 Author fieldnotes, 6 March 2017 
650 Wiggins, p. 5 
651 Smith (2013), p. 571 
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can be draining. The researcher’s experience, as recounted in the following 
paragraphs, can therefore be considered an original contribution to the 
wargaming corpus. 
 
The researcher is not an unfit individual, but even a regular two-hour game 
session with a single game would often leave the researcher exhausted. This 
condition was amplified if multiple games were run simultaneously within one 
session or multiple sessions run sequentially.652 The cause of this was likely a 
combination of physical and cognitive factors. As a central focal point, the 
facilitator would usually stand at the end of the table between the seated teams, 
able to reach all parts of the game board. Sitting down was normally not an option 
as it limited the researcher’s reach, but in order to become more immersed in the 
game and be able to talk with players rather than down at them, the researcher 
spent long periods of time stooped over table. Despite not involving a great deal 
of movement, this position was nonetheless physically demanding. 
 
In addition to the physical dimension, mental taxation was also a significant 
factor. As facilitator, the researcher would have to pay close attention to every 
move in the game to ensure no rules were broken (either inadvertently or 
purposefully) as well as address questions or comments from players. Meanwhile, 
in their role as a researcher they would also have to make mental notes about the 
conduct of the game, players’ engagement, and discussions (see Section 7.1.2 for 
further analysis of notetaking). Given that a single game could have up to ten 
participants, these cognitive processes would need to be running in multiple 
instantiations concurrently. Doing this for two hours or more, in combination with 
the physical exertions, often resulted the researcher being exhausted after a 
game session. 
 
That physical and mental strain is mostly absent from wargaming literature is 
likely due to the majority of the corpus being written by gamers for gamers. One 
of the unwritten assumptions in the wargaming community, as mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, may be that facilitation is taxing, but no one has 
taken time to further critically reflect on this, or report it in writing. This is to the 
                                                          
652 Author fieldnotes, 6 September 2017 
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community’s detriment, because if we consider honest, reflective contributions 
on these aspects in other fields, we see that these fields are richer for it. In, 
ethnography, for instance, Samantha Punch recounts the strain of striving to 
interact positively with research participants, speaking a foreign language, and 
‘behaving in culturally appropriate ways.’653 Writing through the lens of public 
health, Virginia Dickinson-Smith et al are cognisant that academics are socialised 
against speaking of their emotions, thereby suppressing them.654 Meanwhile, 
Michael Wilkinson, coming from a general facilitation perspective (such as training 
seminars) analyses the importance of high energy to energise topics, engage 
participants, and elevate the facilitator.655 From a broader anthropological 
standpoint, Lynne Hume and Jane Mulcock issue the warning that during 
fieldwork ‘the possibility of experiencing physical and emotional trauma is 
frequently unavoidable.’656 Although the researcher’s experience as a wargame 
facilitator was far from traumatic, there was nevertheless noteworthy physical 
and mental strain, as outlined in the preceding paragraphs. It is hoped that the 
present contribution is valuable to wargaming, much in the same way that 
Punch’s account is valuable to ethnography, in writing openly about the realities 
of fieldwork. 
 
Experiences with fieldnotes 
 
Fieldnotes are one of the most rudimentary techniques for recording observations 
during fieldwork. There is no shortage of analysis of the role of fieldnotes in 
anthropology and ethnography, and guides on how to take them657; a chapter by 
Roger Sanjek even outlines specialist vocabulary associated with fieldnotes.658 
Fieldnotes were the primary means by which the researcher’s observations of 
game progress and players’ behaviour and discussions were recorded, but this 
technique was not used uncritically. In Section 5.4.1 some methodological 
considerations around notetaking were identified, including drawbacks outlined 
                                                          
653 Punch (2012), p. 90 
654 Dickinson-Smith et al (2009), p. 66 
655 Wilkinson (2004), pp. 239-240 
656 Hume and Mulcock (2004), p. xxii 
657 As an example, see Emerson et al (2011) 
658 Sanjek (1990) 
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by Hammersley and Atkinson. Of these, a particularly prevalent aspect 
experienced by the researcher was that the character of notes changed as the 
research progressed. In early stages of the fieldwork the researcher attempted to 
take handwritten notes during the game sessions. This proved untenable as the 
demands of facilitating games left no time to make substantive notes. As the 
research progressed, it became clear that these notes would not provide 
sufficient data to meet the research objectives, and a decision was instead made 
to write up notes after the conclusion of a game session, which was a significant 
improvement; consider the difference in the following examples: 
 
 
21 October 2016 29 June 2017 
“[Player] comment about visibility”659 "The idea of blindness was raised early 
on by [player], but I parked it and 
returned to it in the post-game 
discussion. 
- Asked if teams would have played 
differently if they couldn't see what 
the other team were doing; answer 
was unanimously yes. 
-- Lots of actions were taken on basis 
of predicting what other team had 
Resources to do (e.g. bidding) 
-- Russia in particular said they would 
not have known to concentrate 
attacks on Electorate if they could not 
see UK Plc were defended."660 
 
The note on the left is from a game session early in the fieldwork, made during 
the game, and is characterised by its brevity. Although it alludes to a learning 
moment, in this case visibility (discussed in Section 6.2.7), the note does not 
capture any specifics about what players said, when they said it, or how it was 
                                                          
659 Author fieldnotes, 21 October 2016 
660 Author fieldnotes, 29 June 2017 
Table 4: Comparison of fieldnotes as the research progressed 
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said. The note on the right, on the other hand, made after a game session later in 
the fieldwork, demonstrates the comparative richness of these notes. Here, the 
note contains information not only about specific comments regarding a learning 
moment, but also the timing of those comments and the structure of the 
discussion (researcher-moderated). Fieldnotes made after the conclusion of a 
game session were invariably more detailed than those made during games, 
making them more valuable in terms of providing research data. The pictures in 
Figure 18 illustrate the differences in early and later fieldnotes in practice. 
 
 
The approach of writing fieldnotes after game sessions meant relying on the 
researcher’s memory for notes, as no other recording mechanisms were 
employed (as justified in Section 5.4.1). With the pressures on the researcher’s 
cognitive faculties analysed in the previous section, it is perhaps understandable 
that the quality of the notes was sometimes affected. The following examples 
demonstrate lapses in the researcher’s memory which negatively impacted data 
gathering: 
 
“[Player] (?) said something profound in pre-game discussions, but have 
forgotten what.  
Figure 18: Comparison of early (left) and later (right) fieldnotes. Note paucity of detail in the 
earlier note, as well as its brevity; earlier note is A5 paper, later note is A4 and continues for 
multiple pages (author's own photograph, participant details obscured for anonymity. 
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- Maybe about China.”661  
 
“[Player] said something about relationships changing through the course of the 
game, e.g. Russia Government-Rosenergoatom breaking down after first quarter 
(can’t remember details or context).”662 
 
In both cases participants contributed something valuable but the researcher 
failed to adequately capture it. Without excusing the researcher’s notetaking 
performance on these occasions, the context of the game sessions should be 
expounded because they influenced notetaking capacity. In the first example, 
logistical contingencies meant that the note was made two days later. It may 
therefore be understandable that some details of the game session escaped the 
researcher’s mind in the intervening time between the session and the note being 
made. In the second example the note was made after a double game session, 
with two games having been run sequentially, thereby providing more data to 
memorise and note, as well as multiplying the physical and mental strains on the 
researcher.  
 
In Robert Emerson et al’s overview of the literature on fieldwork, they observe 
that strategies on timing and organisation of fieldnotes differ; however, the 
researcher’s approach of writing notes immediately after a game session seems to 
be accepted practice in ethnography.663 In the researcher’s experience, this 
practice also resulted in nearly all fieldnotes being written under less than ideal 
circumstances. A large portion were written on trains travelling back from game 
sessions, when the researcher’s memories were still fresh, while others were 
written in conferences (where a game had been run) or hotel rooms. In the past, 
‘travel writers’ were often considered ‘superficial’, largely because their 
association with movement intimated that in-depth observations could not be 
made.664 In modern ethnography, however, James Clifford has contested that with 
increased global mobility ‘”the field,” seen as a place of writing, leaks,’ and its 
boundaries ‘begin to blur.’665 The “field” today is not contained to the site of 
                                                          
661 Author fieldnotes, 25 April 2017 
662 Author fieldnotes, 6 September 2017 
663 Emerson et al (2007), p. 354 
664 Clifford (1997), p. 201 
665 Clifford (1990), p. 64 
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study, but permeates the entire research journey. The point here is that fieldnotes 
for this thesis really were fieldnotes, recorded away from the comforts of the 
researcher’s office. The experience of the researcher certainly corroborates 
Clifford’s assertion about the malleability of the “field”, while, despite dips in 
quality as outlined previously, the researcher’s notes provide sufficient depth to 
demonstrate that writing on the move can be a successful notetaking strategy. 
 
Challenging game surroundings 
 
Just as the act of taking fieldnotes had to be adapted to circumstances, so did the 
researcher have to adapt to the challenge of different game surroundings. 
Because the majority of game sessions took place away from the researcher’s 
institution, they had little control over the setting for the game. Most 
organisations were accommodating by asking about requirements, for example 
table size. Usually the game took place in a classroom or boardroom of 
appropriate size with few external distractions, which meant running the session 
was relatively straightforward. Occasionally, however, challenging situations 
materialised, forcing the researcher to adapt facilitation of the session. In this 
section, challenges are delineated and analysed according to three types: physical, 
environmental, and atmospheric. 
 
Physical challenges: multiple games in one session 
In sessions where the researcher had to facilitate multiple games simultaneously, 
efforts were made to place tables close together to minimise physical movement 
required, as illustrated in Figure 19. Although players may have been more liable 
to be distracted by what was going on in the adjacent game(s), it was necessary to 
ensure the researcher had quick access to all games in order to effectively 
facilitate them. 
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In one case, at International military education institution A, three games were 
split across two rooms, making it impossible to place all tables in close proximity. 
Here, facilitator competency (discussed in Section 7.1.2) was used to determine 
the setup, with the more competent facilitator taking charge of one game in one 
room and the other two games being placed in the other room where the 
researcher could easily supervise both. 
 
Environmental challenges: informal settings and social spaces 
Some settings were more informal, with games being run in social spaces. In these 
situations, the players’ attention was not always committed to the game, meaning 
player engagement might differ from that discussed in Section 6.3.3. On the other 
hand, these settings created a relaxed atmosphere conducive to player 
enjoyment, even if the presence of food and drink was at times unnerving for the 
researcher given the risk of spillage damaging game material.666 In these social 
                                                          
666 Author fieldnotes, 9 February 2017 
Figure 19: The researcher (standing centre) explaining the game rules to three tables being run 
simultaneously at CyCon 2018. An assistant facilitated the game on the left with occasional input by 
the researcher, while the researcher facilitated the two games on the right, which had been placed 
close together for ease of access. (Image credit: Nick Robinson. Image source: Nick Robinson on 
Twitter (https://twitter.com/nickdr92/status/1001440409825013760). Image in public domain.) 
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spaces the provision of appropriate tables was not always guaranteed, forcing the 
researcher to improvise by using whatever surfaces could be found.  
 
Atmospheric challenges: overbearing superiors 
A different type of challenging environment, directly counter to the relaxed 
atmospheres of the social settings, was the presence of an imposing superior. This 
was only encountered in one game session with Australian civilian industry 
participants, where players had entered the room and divided themselves into 
teams (including the aforementioned enthusiast in Russian uniform). However, 
before play began another participant joined and promptly assigned teams to all 
players, resulting in four of the players swapping sides.667 At the time this seemed 
like a manager throwing their weight around and the researcher later confirmed 
that the participant in question was a Partner at the firm. The Partner was not 
present for the duration of the game session, but the times they were in the room 
there was a palpable change in atmosphere with several players reticent to voice 
opinions. Recall from Section 5.3 that Wilhelmson and Svensson, and Burns all 
warned that the presence of an overbearing superior may stifle player 
participation. In this case, although an isolated one, the experience of this 
researcher attests to this possibility being realised.  
 
Flexibility as a trait of tactical positionality 
The previous examples demonstrate that the game surroundings, both material 
and affective, could not always be controlled by the researcher and sometimes 
posed challenges. The ability of the researcher to adapt to situations was 
therefore paramount to conducting game sessions and the researcher’s tripartite 
role of designer, facilitator/adjudicator, and researcher was important in enabling 
this adaptability.  
 
With regards to the designer-facilitator nexus, Perla et al identified creativity is a 
core trait of wargame designers, and it can be posited that adaptability of 
facilitators is an extension of this.668 With the researcher in this thesis assuming 
both the roles of designer and facilitator, it makes sense that the creativity which 
                                                          
667 Author fieldnotes, 7 December 2017 
668 Perla et al (2002), p. 21 
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underpinned game development was also applicable during game deployment. As 
for the facilitator-researcher junction, the researcher adopted a simplified version 
of Sabin’s assertion (cited in Section 4.1), that it is better to play than not to play. 
This stance posited that learning moments could still be created even in less 
optimal game surroundings, so the researcher could be flexible about how a game 
was set up and run, optimistic that useful research data could still be collected. 
 
In the vein of flexibility, it is also pertinent to link the researcher’s experience to 
the advantages of using a manual game. Because the game was not dependent on 
any electronic hardware (an advantage propounded by Curry and Price in 
Section 2.2.1) or precise environmental configuration (for example separating the 
teams) it was possible to use it in a wide variety of settings, adapting the layout 
according to the environment. The flexibility of both the game and the researcher 
therefore enabled challenges associated with game surroundings to be overcome.  
 
7.2 Secrecy, security, and classification of information 
 
It was noted in Section 5.2.2 that both cyber security and wargaming can carry 
heavy classification labels, even more so in the case of cyber wargames such as 
exercises ELIGIBLE RECEIVER and LOCKED SHIELDS. Issues around secrecy were 
encountered multiple times during the course of this thesis research, both in 
terms of access (to participants and other games) and participant contributions 
during game sessions. However, classification did not prove a hindrance to the 
thesis as ample alternative unclassified sources were accessed and player 
contributions were substantial, as elucidated in Chapter 6. While the following 
sections outline some of the researcher’s more frustrating experiences at the 
fringe of classified environments, the takeaway for others in the cyber wargaming 
field is that it is worth persevering with unclassified work because very good 
results can be achieved even without access to closed doors and secret 
information. 
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7.2.1 Access denied 
 
Only persons with relevant security clearances can access classified information 
and environments. The researcher did not hold a clearance during the time of the 
thesis, although in the design of the research this was inconsequential because 
the work was intended to be entirely unclassified. Nonetheless, the topics of 
cyber security and wargaming, combined with the researcher’s institutional 
affiliations and professional networking, resulted in the research having close 
proximity to government, security, and military establishments where classified 
work took place. Two instances of the researcher encountering classification 
barriers are worth exploring; one demonstrating restrictions on participation and 
one hinting at inaccessible work.  
 
First, through a mutual acquaintance (who had taken part in one of the game 
sessions), the researcher was introduced to a staff member at a US military-
affiliated academic institution. Over initial email exchanges the institution 
appeared very interested in the research and the game, asking insightful 
questions and providing an outline of some of their own efforts in cyber 
wargaming. However, when the researcher offered to organise a game session, 
either in person or by sending a copy of the game, they were met with the 
following response: 
 
“With much regret, [institution] can’t be directly involved with game play testing 
and feedback, according to our lawyers. There are some sticky legal wickets 
which would make it problematic.”669 
 
There was no further elaboration on what these ‘sticky wickets’ were, but the 
underlying premise could be interpreted as one of classification. If the institution 
participated in a game session and provided feedback about the game, they might 
inadvertently reveal information about their own cyber wargames, which were 
classified. Such inadvertent revelation has been considered by Lenore Manderson 
et al in their introduction to a dedicated anthropology journal supplement on 
secrecy and disclosure. They conclude that seemingly innocuous descriptors and 
                                                          
669 Author email correspondence with US institution, 7 February 2017 
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actions like ‘names, body language, and strategic silence’ can all reveal secrets.670 
From the institution’s point of view, limiting all interaction and communication 
was likely the most effective way to prevent inadvertent revelation of classified 
material. 
 
The international aspect may have played an additional role, with US military-
affiliated researchers being restricted in how much they could interact with UK-
based civilians. Furthermore, there may have been issues with the institution’s 
official affiliation, which might have been considered the institution endorsing the 
game as a US government representative. This problem could be understandable 
given some of the contentious geopolitical events depicted in the game. 
Whatever the exact legalities, the example illustrates how classification-related 
barriers could prevent potential participants from playing the game. 
 
Second, the researcher had been introduced to the person responsible for Cyber 
Skills and Education within UK government department C. After initial contact via 
email and a meeting hosted by the researcher, the person was very keen to see a 
game session in action and rallied a few interested people. The session was 
organised at the UK military education institution B, but on the day of the game, 
everyone attended apart from the person who had been the primary driver 
behind organising it. The researcher was informed that the person had instead 
decided to participate in a cyber wargame at UK government department C’s 
offices in London.671 The game session was a success regardless, but the 
experience highlighted that much work in this field goes on behind closed doors. 
The nature of UK government department C’s wargame was not divulged to the 
researcher, so nothing is known about its design or intended outcomes. It is also 
reasonable to assume that further cyber wargames have been conducted by UK 
government department C and in other classified organisations, both in the UK 
and overseas. The corpus of cyber wargaming is therefore much bigger than that 
explored in Chapter 3, but without access to classified spaces this researcher was 
only able to analyse the tip of a presumed iceberg. 
 
                                                          
670 Manderson et al (2015), p. S189 
671 Author fieldnotes, 8 May 2017 
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These examples demonstrate how classification and secrecy can introduce a 
degree of ambiguity to research. In the researcher’s experience, there were 
agendas hidden shrouded by classification markings which were often hinted at 
but never revealed. Some participants’ interest in the research, for example the 
UK government department C person in the previous example, was unclear, and it 
is largely unknown what they did with the information they received. In this 
respect, Celso Castro has testified that ‘being classified as “friends” or “enemies” 
by the military’ can be fundamental to the success or failure of research.672 During 
the course of this thesis, the researcher’s successes with the likes of the German 
military education institution, the International military education institution, and 
UK military education institution B suggests that individuals from these 
organisations categorised the researcher as a ‘friend’. Other times, notably the 
example from UK government department C in the following section, the 
researcher’s lack of security clearance clearly put them in the ‘enemy’ category. 
Extrapolating this notion further, it could be posited that the failures outlined in 
Section 7.1.1 were also symptomatic of the researcher being categorised as an 
‘enemy’, despite these not being military organisations.  
 
In the researcher’s experience, managing the uncertainty associated with 
classification can be a challenge because there may not be clear indicators 
whether another party would see the researcher as ‘friend’ or ‘enemy’. 
Furthermore, initial categorisation may not be final, and a researcher can flip 
between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, periodically granted or denied access.  
 
7.2.2 Stifled participants 
 
Issues around classification did not just affect what the researcher could access, 
but also restricted what some players could contribute. Participants with 
knowledge of secret information were not able to share this, even if would have 
been conducive to creating learning moments where knowledge could be shared, 
because all game sessions were unclassified. The starkest example of the 
constraints of classification occurred in a meeting the researcher had with UK 
                                                          
672 Castro (2013), p. 13 
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government department C, where they had been invited to showcase the game to 
a number of interested parties. When all attendees had assembled, but before 
the meeting had begun, one person asked what classification level the meeting 
was at and seemed disappointed to learn it was an unclassified level. The person 
later admitted that to build an accurate game model for use in a decision-making 
game, the designer would need access to classified data concerning both the blue 
and red teams.673 Their disappointment at an unclassified meeting suggests the 
person had insights to share – perhaps data to create a more accurate game 
model – but were unable to do so.  
 
Additionally, their stated requirement for classified data emphasises the difficulty 
of designing an accurate cyber wargame. With traditional, especially historical, 
wargames a wealth of data is available to the designer (for example rifle calibres, 
artillery ranges, or aircraft speeds) on which they can model game mechanics.674 
In cyberspace the characteristics of offensive and defensive capabilities are more 
difficult to measure; partly because of the lack of physical manifestation, but 
largely because of the amount of secrecy surrounding these topics. This vindicates 
the design philosophy behind the game used in this thesis: create a stimulating 
representation rather than an accurate simulation. Attempting to create an 
accurate simulation would have been futile in an unclassified research 
environment, whereas a stimulating representation could be created based solely 
on publicly available information. 
 
As a final example of tensions around classification, a notable incident occurred 
during a game session with a mixed civilian participant group. During this session 
the players discussed transparency on the Russian side, noting that Government 
and Rosenergoatom are reasonably transparent, whereas SCS and Energetic Bear 
are very opaque. At this point the discussion was punctuated by the following 
exchange observed between two participants: 
 
[UK civil servant 1, player]: “As if we don’t have good insight into these [pointing 
to Russia Government and Energetic Bear].” 
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[UK civil servant 2, observer]: “[UK civil servant 1]’s views do not necessarily 
reflect those of their employer.”675 
 
Although conveyed with a strong sense of humour (more on which in Section 7.3), 
UK civil servant 2’s assertion nonetheless carries serious undertones. The game 
session took place at an unclassified academic conference and UK civil servant 1’s 
participation in the game was not in an official representative capacity. The 
researcher’s interpretation of the exchange was therefore that any statements 
should be taken as personal assertions and any inferences about the UK’s 
intelligence capabilities are merely conjectures which are not endorsed by the UK 
Government.  
 
Since the game session, information has become public to suggest UK civil servant 
1’s assertions had realistic grounding – Dutch intelligence agency AIVD had 
infiltrated and monitored the networks of Russian hacking group Cozy Bear since 
2014.676 Whether UK civil servant 1 was alluding to these operations cannot be 
known, but the example illustrates how the secrecy which permeates much of 
cyber security can be stifling for participants who have classification clearances 
but are unable to share their insights.  
 
7.3 Humour as a pedagogical tool  
 
Despite the seriousness of the subject matter in the game, the importance of 
humour to the conduct of game sessions and to creating learning moments should 
not be understated. The role of humour has been recognised in various 
pedagogical fields, for example Heather Baird and Nicky Lambert’s study of 
nursing and midwifery education677, or Phyllis Guthrie’s analysis of teaching 
developmental readers.678 These studies show that humour enables stronger 
participant engagement and lesson retention by bridging divisions between 
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students themselves and between students and teachers, while also making 
participants emotionally identify with the subject matter.  
 
No formal analysis of the role of humour exists in wargaming literature, in fact the 
word ‘humour’ does not appear at all in key books by Perla679, Dunnigan680, or 
Sabin681, nor the authoritative anthology edited by Harrigan and Kirschenbaum.682 
This is perhaps a consequence of wargaming’s historical roots as a military activity 
distanced from frivolity, but the topic has been given attention in other 
ludological fields, particularly video games. Claire Dormann and Robert Biddle, for 
instance, attest that humour ‘enables the mediating process between player and 
object.’683 Humour can help break down barriers between player and games, 
heightening immersion and engagement. A cautionary note, however, is provided 
by Ivan Lombardi who writes that ‘excessively reiterated use of humour in 
teaching materials is very likely to interfere with the learning process itself, for 
humour has the tendency to monopolise the attention and being associated with 
frivolousness.’684  
 
Because of the lack of treatment in wargaming literature, neither the 
methodological approach of the thesis nor design of the game consciously 
considered the use of humour (note the absence of this in Chapters IV and V). 
However, the game did incorporate a few humorous elements uncritically, mostly 
contained in the Event Cards. The Clumsy Civil Servant card exemplifies this (as 
seen in Chapter 4, Figure 9), using an image from the popular British sitcom Yes, 
Minister to invoke comedic associations. However, humour was not a design 
principle and it appeared sparingly in game components, striking the balance 
iterated by Lombardi largely by accident. The amount of fun and entertainment 
elicited by players, as outlined in Section 6.3.3, should therefore not necessarily 
be attributed to manufactured humour, but instead to the game’s ludic qualities 
which encouraged players to create their own humour. 
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Many instances of player-originated humour have been cited in previous chapters 
and sections, but these are only a small subset of all humour encountered during 
game sessions. The author’s fieldnotes contain 38 notes labelled ‘humour’, but 
even this number is likely not a true reflection of the amount of jokes and 
humorous inferences made by players, given the shortcomings of the fieldnotes as 
discussed in Section 7.1.2. By way of meaningfully analysing players’ use of 
humour we can employ lenses provided by Klaus Dodds and Philip Kirby, who 
suggest two interpretations: ‘how humour makes the familiar seem fantastical’, 
and ‘the role of humour in satirising those in power.’685 
 
7.3.1 Elevating mundanity through humour 
 
When viewed through the lens of fantasticating familiarity, humour can be said to 
take a reality, sometimes mundane, and elevate it to something entertaining and 
engaging. In this way, jokes could be an important tool for players to convey a 
serious message by less serious means. Consider the following examples: 
• One player suggested that the game needed a “potato harvest” Event 
Card for a Russian economic boom. The suggestion was made in jest but 
was grounded in the observation that in-game Russia was a lot poorer 
than its real-life counterpart.686  
• GCHQ’s poor cashflow was the butt of multiple jokes from both civilian 
and military players, with one player asserting “this is a familiar situation” 
when the in-game Entity was reduced to one Resource, having previously 
been well-off.687 In reality GCHQ’s finances are not available for public 
scrutiny, other than a budget for all UK’s security services and intelligence 
agencies (also including MI5 and MI6) for 2016 which totalled £2.8 
billion.688 These humorous outbursts may therefore reveal players’ 
frustration with GCHQ’s funding.  
• One German military player, in summarising the Russian team’s strategy, 
noted their use of “General Winter” to launch Attacks at the beginning 
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and end of the game, with quiet seasons in the intervening period.689 This 
was a historically-aware joke, referring to Russia’s strategic use of their 
harsh winters to resist and repel invaders (Sweden in 1708-09, France in 
1812, Nazi Germany in the Second World War).  
• When an observer in a game session with civilian industry participants 
asked how fake news could influence the Electorate, a player injected 
with “this is post-Brexit, they have already been influenced.”690 A similar 
joke was made in another session, where the Russian team admitted that 
their approach of targeting the Electorate was to “get at them through 
the Sun,” referring to the tabloid newspaper.691 These players were 
attuned to the contentious role of news media in subverting democratic 
processes. 
• Finally, in a game session with military participants, a joke was made 
about PA Consulting being the new Universal Exports. PA Consulting is a 
real-life consultancy firm, while Universal Exports is a fictional company in 
the James Bond novels and films, serving as cover for the British Secret 
Service.692 PA Consulting does serve the defence and security sector, but it 
is not clear if the joke was grounded in a reality inaccessible to the 
researcher (classified information).693 
 
These remarks illustrate that humour could serve as an outlet for players to 
express views or provide insight about a range of issues without compromising 
themselves or the enjoyable environment created by the game. A discussion 
about the finer points of GCHQ’s financing could certainly have been mundane, 
but through some well-timed wit the player referenced above made a sharp point 
without dragging the discussion towards dullness. Additionally, by turning reality 
into something fantastical, humour perhaps enabled some players to say things 
they otherwise could not have. Whatever business PA Consulting does with the 
UK intelligence community might not be public information, but a joke about this 
relationship may have provided a cathartic outlet to the utterer, whereas anyone 
                                                          
689 Author fieldnotes, 24 January 2017 
690 Author fieldnotes, 30 March 2017 
691 Author fieldnotes, 29 June 2017 
692 James Bond Wiki website 
693 PA Consulting website 
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without inside knowledge would likely consider it to be based in fantasy. In other 
words, players could get away with saying things because they were just jokes. 
 
7.3.2 Poking fun at Presidents 
 
When viewed through the lens of satirising the powerful, humorous moments in 
game sessions often concerned overplaying individuals’ characteristics and 
national stereotypes. The two most notable subjects of such satire were 
Presidents Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. Players’ discussions surrounding 
Putin and Trump were analysed in Sections 6.3.3 and 6.2.2, and 6.2.6 respectively, 
but they are worth revisiting to focus on the role of humour.  
 
In real life, both Putin and Trump have engineered personas that set them apart 
from the political mainstream. Putin has carefully curated an image of masculinity, 
depicting himself as an avid outdoorsman and promoted his physical and sporting 
prowess.694 Trump, meanwhile, built part of his 2016 election campaign on the 
slogan ‘drain the swamp’, emphasising his candidacy as an outsider to a corrupt 
and dysfunctional political system in Washington, and has not shied away from 
controversial outbursts, often using social media platform Twitter to attack 
opponents (and allies).695 While evidently successful (both men are currently in 
power), in portraying themselves as different from the dull greyness of politics, 
they have also made themselves targets of lampooning. Through the Internet and 
the rise of ‘meme culture’, satirical and ridiculing images spread quickly, 
sometimes purely as humour but often with critical or subversive motives.696 In 
the Russian context in particular, Anastasia Denisova has noted how the 
‘humorous and seemingly harmless form’ of memes have been ‘instrumental in 
overcoming censorship.’697  
 
Memes about Putin and Trump have also proliferated offline, making their way 
into discussions during game sessions conducted for this thesis. One player, for 
                                                          
694 CBS News 
695 BBC (2016) 
696 Zittrain (2014), p. 388 
697 Denisova (2017), pp. 979-980 
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example, joked about Putin riding bears698 – a popular memetic adaptation of 
Putin horseback riding – while others mocked Trump’s Twitter antics, suggesting 
him misspelling someone’s name could have geopolitical ramifications (as 
referenced in Section 6.2.6). Humorous assertions of this nature also had more 
serious undertones. The player joking that “we know where your children live” 
(see Section 6.2.1) may have been referencing Putin’s history as a KGB agent, and 
the player who placed Trump “right here” in the middle of the Russian side of the 
game board (see Section 6.2.6) was likely referencing the popular trope that Putin 
can influence or even control Trump.  
 
As with the idea of fantasticating familiarity, where humour provided a veil behind 
which observations or criticisms could be made, so did humour enable players to 
make disparaging comments about world leaders without becoming embroiled in 
political debates. In this sense, humour might be considered a ‘safety valve’ by 
which political tension and frustration could be released in a harmless way.699 The 
game environment encouraged players to make use of humour as a satirical 
outlet, allowing them to make useful contributions towards learning moments 
where knowledge was shared while enhancing their enjoyment of the game 
activity.  
 
7.3.3 Using humour to engineer affective atmospheres 
 
Despite humour originally not being a methodological or design consideration, as 
the fieldwork progressed, the researcher came to realise the important role of 
humour in player engagement and for eliciting learning moments. The researcher 
therefore adopted humour as a deliberate tactic when facilitating game sessions 
in order to engineer the affective atmospheres of the sessions. The concept of 
‘affective atmospheres’ has primarily gained traction in human geography, where 
a seminal paper by Ben Anderson describes atmospheres (moods, feelings, 
ambiences, tones) as ‘perpetually forming and deforming, appearing and 
disappearing, as bodies enter into relation with one another.’700 Other 
                                                          
698 Author fieldnotes, 24 March 2017 
699 Ziv (1988), p. 360 
700 Anderson (2009), p. 79 
269 
 
geographers have applied this concept to diverse subjects such as surveillance701, 
passenger mobilities702, and nationalism.703 The idea that atmospheres could be 
‘engineered’ was first suggested by Derek McCormack, who traced Salomon 
Andrée’s 1897 balloon expedition from its use of technology to manipulate 
material atmospheres, to the effect the expedition had on public consciousness 
and perception.704 
 
In the context of this thesis, engineering affective atmospheres refers to the 
researcher’s attempts to set the tone of a game session, particularly through the 
use of humour to create a relaxed ambience and lighten the mood. For instance, 
when explaining the background to the game and why the game board is set out 
in the way it is, the researcher would say: 
 
“And on this side of the game board is Russia. Their setup mirrors that of the UK 
with the same five Entities. Now, I haven’t read the Russian cyber security 
strategy, partly because it’s classified and partly because I don’t read Russian, but 
these five Entities nonetheless exist in their society, so it is fair to model it in this 
way.” 
 
Although not initially intended as humorous, the parts about the Russian cyber 
security strategy being classified and the researcher not being able to read the 
language almost always resulted in a ripple of laughter among players. As such, 
this spiel was repeated more or less verbatim every game session, thereby setting 
the tone from the outset.  
 
Most humour which appeared in game sessions, either from the researcher or 
from players themselves, was successful, but sometimes the humour missed the 
mark. In his exploration of teacher strategies, Robert Stebbins writes that 
‘subjects and audience also define the humorous situation’ and ‘jokes may fall 
flat’ if they do not take the audience into account.705 A prime example of this 
occurring during the thesis was with the aforementioned Yes, Minister image; a 
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reference which was lost on most non-British audiences. In addition to limited 
international airtime, it might also be said that Yes, Minister is quintessentially 
British, requiring an understanding of both Britishness and the quirks of the British 
civil service to fully appreciate. In a doctoral thesis examining the challenges of 
translating Yes, Minister into Catalan, Patrick Zabalbeascoa suggests four 
categories of humour in the show that are particularly difficult to translate: 
‘national-culture-&-institutions’ jokes, ‘national-sense-of-humour’ jokes, 
‘language-dependent’ jokes, and ‘national-&-language-dependent’ jokes [sic].706 
Given these challenges, it is perhaps understandable why non-British audiences 
failed to relate to the humour in the Event Card. 
 
Overall, in this researcher’s experience as a wargaming practitioner, the role of 
humour was of great importance and deserves further attention, both as a 
methodological consideration and in wargaming design and analysis. 
 
Chapter 7 conclusion 
 
Although this thesis has solid theoretical foundations, both within research 
methodology and within wargaming, it was to a large extent a practical 
endeavour. Having spent significant time out in the field as a wargaming 
practitioner, it would be remiss not to reflect on this experience, partly with a 
view to filling the void in wargaming literature identified in this chapter’s 
introduction. The researcher’s experiences allow some of the unspoken 
assumptions which seemingly underpin the practice of wargaming to be queried, 
or at least brought into the public domain for further debate. This chapter has 
contributed to the wargaming corpus in four main areas. Firstly, there is a lack of 
explanation in wargaming literature about how wargames occur and are 
organised. The starting point for much wargaming advice already assumes the 
existence of a ‘sponsor’ who has requested (and paid for) a game, and then 
proceeds to outline ways of designing or delivering the game to meet the 
sponsor’s objectives (although as a notable exception, Downes-Martin has 
outlined cases where it would be useful to design a game which deceives the 
                                                          
706 Zabalbeascoa (1993), pp. 322-325 
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sponsor707).708 In reflecting on the researcher’s experience of garnering interest in 
the game and arranging game sessions, this chapter has drawn on ethnographic 
literature which recognises both the role of serendipity (such as Pieke, cited in 
Section 7.1.1) and ‘snowballing’ (for example Sluka, cited in Section 7.1.1), while 
also taking into account the researcher’s strategic positionality – personal, 
educational, and professional background – in shaping game deployment 
opportunities. In this way, one valuable contribution of this thesis can be 
considered its analysis of a stage of the wargaming process, what might be called 
a pre-sponsor stage, which is not widely covered in existing wargaming literature. 
 
Secondly, issues around tactical positionality – the tensions between roles of 
designer, facilitator/adjudicator, and researcher – are not covered in wargaming 
literature from an experiential point of view. Ample warnings exist about how 
designers can become overzealous proponents of their games (Dunnigan, cited in 
Section 5.3.1) or the careful balance that researchers need to tread to 
simultaneously be close enough to observe a game but also not interfere in its 
progress (Wilhelmson and Svenson, and Kainikara, all cited in Section 5.4.2). 
However, other than to provide methodological advice, simply reading wargaming 
literature, even thick descriptions such as Holmes’ (cited in Section 7.1.2), will not 
prepare a facilitator for the rigours of wargame facilitation. Here, the researcher’s 
experiences, as recounted in Section 7.1.2, can be considered instructive. The 
researcher’s experience of dealing with difficult players and awkward situations, 
for example, can be considered more insightful than generalised warnings such as 
that provided by Johnson (cited in Section 7.1.2). Similarly, in other fields, authors 
have not shied away from writing about physical and mental strains experienced 
in the field, and the researcher’s contribution to wargaming on this topic might 
mirror that of Punch to ethnography (cited in Section 7.1.2).  
 
In other ways, the researcher’s experience corroborated literature advice 
regarding tactical positionality issues. Regarding notetaking analysed in 
Section 7.1.2, Hammersley and Atkinson’s assertion (cited in Section 5.4.1) that 
the character of fieldnotes can change over time certainly rang true during this 
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thesis; consider the differences between the notes illustrated in Figure 18. 
Attempting to multitask by taking notes while facilitating games also proved 
wholly ineffective but could be remedied by either monotasking (take notes 
afterwards, as the researcher did), or having dedicated observers as most large 
professional games do (for example the Boeing game referenced in Section 5.4.1). 
Of the variety of challenges posed by game surroundings – physical, 
environmental, and atmospheric – the researcher encountered one example of an 
overbearing superior dramatically affecting the conduct of players. This 
experience provided evidence attesting to Wilhelmson and Svensson, and Burns’ 
warnings that players can be stifled by the presence of superiors (cited in 
Section 5.3). In providing an experiential account of being a wargame practitioner, 
this thesis therefore provides a relatable contribution that goes beyond the 
generalised advice usually encountered in wargaming literature. 
 
Thirdly, one of the problems the wargaming community is currently grappling 
with is how to wargame cyber security, operations, or warfare in unclassified 
environments. The researcher was present at a workshop session on this topic led 
by Downes-Martin at the 2018 Connections US conference in Washington DC, 
which led to some ideas for future progress.709 However, a recurring theme (in 
this workshop and others at the same conference) was a fear of ‘retroactive 
classification’ – that games may become too close to reality that the government 
would classify them, despite only using unclassified information.710 The 
experience of the researcher in conducting this thesis should be considered a 
positive sign in this regard. Despite encountering a few issues where classification 
denied access to potential game participants, or stifling what participants were 
able to contribute during game sessions, as analysed in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 
respectively, overwhelmingly the results of the research have been successful. A 
game has been designed based only on unclassified information (Chapter 4), 
played only in unclassified settings, and generated many useful learning moments 
for players (Chapter 6). The wargaming community should therefore be 
encouraged about the possibility of wargaming cyber at unclassified levels. 
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Finally, Perla and McGrady’s article ‘Why Wargaming Works’ (cited in 
Section 2.2.5) has become the de-facto reference point for explaining how the 
‘story-living experience’ makes wargames engaging. Others, such as Longley-
Brown (referenced in Section 6.3.3), have added that fun is an important element 
to the success of wargames. What the wargaming literature lacks, however, but 
which has been recognised elsewhere, for example Guthrie in teaching or 
Dormann and Biddle in video games (both referenced in Section 7.3), is analysis of 
the role of humour. Using lenses provide by Dodds and Kirby (cited in Section 7.3), 
the researcher’s experience showed that humour was a paramount tool for 
creating learning moments by elevating mundanity and satirising those in power. 
Furthermore, as a game facilitator, the researcher was able to use humour’s 
affective qualities to engineer the atmosphere of game sessions, ensuring they 
were relaxed and conducive to discussion. Humour may not be suitable for every 
wargame, for example analytical decision-making games, but for games where the 
primary outcome is to generate engagement and discussion, the researcher’s 
experience has demonstrated that humour should not be discounted as a 
pedagogic tool. 
 
Overall, the researcher’s experience as a wargaming practitioner was varied and 
challenging, but above all enjoyable. Despite the shortcomings of the literature, 
particularly in preparing for the trials and tribulations of the facilitator role, 
wargaming is an exceptionally rewarding activity because it entertains and 
enlightens players. For this research especially, being able to create real learning 
moments, as analysed in Chapter 6, made it meaningful and worthwhile to 
pursue. In overcoming the multitude of challenges explored in this chapter, the 
researcher has made a detailed and personal experiential contribution to the 
body of knowledge on wargaming practice. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
This thesis has explored the use of tabletop wargames for cyber security 
education. Cyber security has become a paramount challenge in modern societies 
at national, organisational, and personal levels. At the same time, cyber security is 
often viewed as a niche, perhaps even mysterious, field accessible only to 
computer scientists or technology enthusiasts. Wargaming, this thesis has posited, 
may be an effective way to introduce non-specialist people to key cyber security 
concepts and terminology in an interactive setting. The central thesis objectives 
were: 
 
• Create a wargame for cyber security education. 
• Analyse the capacity for the game to create learning moments and enable 
players to share knowledge and ask the right questions. 
• Reflect on the researcher’s experience as a wargaming practitioner. 
 
By increasing awareness and understanding of cyber security, the barriers to 
engaging with the subject are lowered and the perception of cyber security is 
altered from a niche problem for technologists to solve, to one which everyone 
can contribute to. Ultimately, increased and more effective engagement with 
cyber security should result in increased awareness of cyber threats and adoption 
of mitigation tools and techniques, leading to more secure and resilient societies. 
 
The primary means of investigation for the research was the creation of an 
original wargame based on the UK National Cyber Security Strategy (both 2011 
and 2016 versions). The game pitted the UK against Russia, the most combative of 
the UK’s near-peer adversaries. The two sides were divided into five Entities 
representing government, business, individuals (a core trinity found in the 
Strategy), military/intelligence, and critical national infrastructure. Players took 
control of these Entities to achieve conflicting Objectives using limited Resources 
at their disposal. The purpose of the game was to expose players to a wide range 
of cyber security concepts, from key actors in cyberspace and their relationships, 
to cyber attack and defence dynamics, to geopolitical realities. By fostering 
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discussion and debate around these topics, players would create learning 
moments, thereby addressing the central thesis objectives (see Chapter 4 for 
game design process and analysis). 
 
The game was deployed to a range of organisations, from military establishments 
and government departments to private companies and academic institutions, 
both in the UK and abroad. Qualitative (and some quantitative) data was 
gathered, in the form of fieldnotes, about player discussions and their 
engagement with the game to determine its pedagogic efficacy. It has been found 
that the game was successful in stimulating debate about a multitude of cyber 
security topics; players were able to contribute their own knowledge of issues to 
enhance the understanding of other players. To a succinctly address  the central 
thesis objective, it can be stated that the game successfully created many learning 
moments. But perhaps more importantly, the game fulfilled Peter Perla’s 
assertion that the primary purpose of wargames is to help players ‘ask the right 
questions’ (cited in Section 2.3.3). Even if players did not come away from the 
game having learned concrete lessons, they were armed with knowledge that 
would help them learn lessons in the future (see Chapter 6 for game data 
analysis). 
 
By way of summarising the results of the thesis, research findings are here 
discussed according to three themes: how the findings corroborated or diverged 
from wargaming literature, the key original contributions of the thesis and their 
importance, and some suggestions for the way ahead. 
 
8.1 Research findings compared to the literature 
 
Despite wargaming not being an academic discipline in and of itself, there is 
ample academic literature analysing wargames and their uses. This thesis has 
taken heed of this literature, including standard works in the field such as those 
from Perla and Dunnigan, and more specialised publications from the likes of 
Downes-Martin and Wilhelmson and Svensson. Being a highly practical research 
project, it has been possible to compare the theories expressed in the literature to 
the researcher’s experience with wargaming. Most notably, this has manifested 
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itself in four ways: the story-living experience, the modifiability of manual games, 
realism versus complexity, and the difficulty of writing game rules. 
 
8.1.1 Corroborating the story-living experience 
 
One of the most critical features of wargaming that make them effective learning 
tools is that they provide participants with what Perla and McGrady called a 
‘story-living experience.’711 Compared to more passive learning experiences, such 
as reading a book, watching a video, or taking an online course, wargames are 
highly interactive, forcing players to make decisions and experience the 
consequences of those decisions. In this way, wargames are a more experiential 
and therefore more impactful learning method.  
 
The game designed for this thesis seems to have been successful in evoking such 
“story-living experiences” for players. For example, as remarked in Section 6.3.2, 
one player noted that it felt like the opposing team – in this case the UK – had 
been a democracy, given their long decision-making processes. The game was 
able to conjure a feeling as if the player had stepped into the shoes of a 
policymaker and experience decision-making from their point of view. This 
reinforces Perla and McGrady’s assertion that wargames provide story-living 
experiences. 
 
8.1.2 Corroborating the modifiability advantage of manual games 
 
As lauded by Dunnigan, one of the advantages of manual games over computer 
games is their accessible mechanics, where rules, procedures, numbers, and 
probabilities are fully transparent to players.712 This enables games to be easily 
modified, either by designers or players themselves, even while a game is being 
played. Moreover, where modifying a computer game would require coding and 
graphics skills, making modifications to a manual game requires no technical 
proficiencies, merely imagination (and perhaps some basic arts and crafts 
abilities). 
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During the course of this research, the modifiability advantage came to the fore 
numerous times. When the facilitator made a mistake, as detailed in 
Section 7.1.2, it was simple to rectify without interrupting the flow of the game. 
More prominently, the advantage of modifiability manifested itself in wizard 
wheezes. On two occasions, players made suggestions for new game components 
(Event Cards) which they felt would help the game more accurately represent the 
real world. Creating these components was a simple as writing the suggestions on 
pieces of paper and inserting them into the Event Card deck mid-game (illustrated 
in Figure 12). The ease with which these modifications were made could not be 
replicated in a computer game environment. 
 
8.1.3 Corroborating the balance between realism and complexity 
 
The tensions between realism and complexity, also characterised by Sabin in 
terms of accuracy versus simplicity or realism versus playability, must be tackled 
by every game designer.713 The closer a game models the real world, the more 
realistic it is, but such realism also increases the complexity required to play the 
game. A more complex game may be able to impart more accurate lessons to 
players but may also require significantly more time to understand the game 
rules, thereby inhibiting participation. 
 
The difficulty of balancing realism and complexity was encountered multiple times 
during the game design process of the research. It can be seen, for instance, in the 
development of the combat results table (Section 4.4.4) which started out based 
on a very simple formula but ended up being expanded into a more nuanced table 
representing real-world risk and reward payoffs. The final version of the combat 
results table (Figure 11) has 36 possible results, whereas the first version (Figure 
10) only had 16. A more realistic game would likely have an even larger matrix, 
such as the 360 possible outcomes for calculating casualties in George Gush’s set 
of rules for wargames covering the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries.714 The 
game designed for this thesis was therefore relatively simple (by an order of 
                                                          
713 Sabin (2012), p. 19 
714 Gush (1979), p. 46 
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magnitude compared to Gush), but this was a conscious decision made to 
encourage playability rather than attempt to accurately model the real world. 
 
8.1.4 Game rules are not easy to write 
 
As elaborated in the game design process (Section 4.1.1), a decision was made to 
limit the length of the game rules, erring on the side of simplicity and playability 
over complexity and realism. The justification for this was that the researcher 
wanted to maximise the time players spent engaging with the thematic cyber 
security content of the game, rather than grapple with the game mechanics. The 
rules were capped at one double-sided A4 page, which players would be able to 
read in ten minutes, minimising the time spent not interacting with the main 
game material. For comparison, the latest rules for World in Flames amount to 88 
pages, not including campaign guides and additional spreadsheets for game 
setup.715 
 
Despite a relatively short rule set (by wargaming standards), moments of friction 
between players and rules were encountered during game sessions. Particularly at 
the beginning of game sessions, players often asked clarifying questions or 
attempted to do Actions prohibited by the game rules, suggesting the rules were 
not as simple as intended. Jim Wallman, cited in Section 6.3.1, has opined that 
writing wargame rules is easy, yet the experience of the researcher contradicts 
this. Writing game rules is by no means easy, especially when constrained by 
length and targeting a generalist non-gaming audience. On this point, the findings 
of the research therefore diverge from the view in the literature. 
 
8.2 Novel takeaways for wargamers 
 
As a contribution to the wargaming corpus, in addition to comparing findings to 
extant literature, this thesis generated two pieces of evidence of potential value 
to wargamers (and others) seeking to delve into the field of cyber wargaming. In 
merging distant literature and creating a catalogue of best-practice in cyber 
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wargame design, the thesis has created resources that wargamers can draw on 
both for justifying their choice of manual games and for guiding design choices 
when developing cyber games.  
 
8.2.1 Merging distant literature 
 
Astute observers may query the decision to use a manual game over a computer 
game, especially considering that the subject matter may seemingly closer fit a 
digitised environment – after all, the cyber domain would not exist without 
computers. Extant wargaming literature already makes a compelling case why 
manual games hold many advantages over computer games (see Section 2.2.1), 
but by consulting literature from other fields, this thesis has been able to 
strengthen these claims. 
 
Research in computer science, specifically interface design and human-computer 
interaction, has shown paper prototyping and scenarios were equally or more 
effective than computerised methods for generating ideas in the early stages of 
systems development (see Section 2.3.1). To generalise these findings, it can be 
said that low-fidelity tools are effective for promoting high-level thinking. This is 
something which wargamers have been cognisant of for decades, perhaps even 
centuries, but which can now be backed with data from “hard” science. Studies 
merging wargaming with computer science literature have not been done before 
and therefore constitutes useful evidence for wargamers who seek to justify the 
use of manual games over computer games. 
 
8.2.2 A catalogue for best-practice in cyber games design 
 
Although this thesis is inspired by a dearth of cyber wargames, some games in this 
genre do exist, and a comprehensive review was conducted in Chapter 3. The 
analysis evaluated the design of the games as well as their pedagogic potential, 
seeking to ascertain what constitutes best practice in the field which other 
designers should take heed of. Across games that varied hugely by style and 
quality, some aspects appeared recurrently in the best games: including ludic 
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components, having an adversarial nature, utilising cards, simulating 
unpredictability, and marketplaces. 
 
The value of this chapter to the wargaming community is in critiquing key cyber 
games to establish a catalogue of best practice in cyber game design. Although 
the website boardgamegeek.com is a sprawling repository of games, it is not 
necessarily always an informative source for theme-specific design principles. The 
results when searching for “cyber”, for example, includes the game Scooby-Doo! 
Cyber chase, which is of no relevance to people interested in wargames or 
educational games.716 From the researcher’s experience, especially at the 
Connections US 2018 conference, other wargamers are not always aware of 
existing games in the field, and the catalogue of best practice provided in this 
thesis therefore serves as a reference point which can be consulted and learned 
from.  
 
8.3 Key original contributions of the research 
 
The thesis can be said to have made three original contributions to the field of 
cyber wargaming: developing a novel game, relating a practitioner’s experience, 
and positive answering the central thesis question. These were summarised in 
Section 1.5 but are worth restating for readers who have skipped to the end or 
struggle to recall what they read some 250 pages ago. 
 
8.3.1 Development of a novel cyber wargame 
 
Given the dearth of educational cyber wargames, especially looking at cyber 
security from a strategic national policymaking angle, this thesis presented an 
opportunity to create a new game to fill this void. The game design analysis 
conducted in Chapter 4 took into account many of the standard challenges faced 
by wargame designers, including gameplay phases, visibility, victory conditions, 
and the aforementioned balance between realism and complexity. Moreover, 
these challenges were discussed with regards to cyber security concepts which 
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were designed into the game in order to elicit learning moments from players. 
The game design therefore drew not only on wargaming literature, but also cyber 
security literature to ensure game components and mechanics could be related to 
the real world. 
 
Unlike other games in the genre, such as [d0x3d!] which is based on Forbidden 
Island (see Section 3.1.1), the game designed for this thesis was created from 
scratch. Although it borrowed concepts from other games, such as Privacy’s event 
cards or Decisions & Disruptions’ marketplace (Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively), 
every game component was original, and many were entirely unique. The game 
artefact itself therefore constitutes an original contribution to cyber wargaming. 
 
8.3.2 A wargaming practitioner’s experience 
 
Existing wargaming literature is largely written by wargamers for wargamers. That 
is to say, there is ample material presenting new game ideas or describing how a 
game has been used, but there is very little critical reflection on the practice of 
wargaming. A novice reading the standard textbook works from Perla and 
Dunnigan would not learn much about what it is like to run wargames, and it is 
the researcher’s impression that much of wargaming practice is based on 
unwritten assumptions in the wargaming community. 
 
In Chapter 7, the researcher sought to challenge, or at least bring attention to, 
some of these assumptions by relating their experiences as a wargaming 
practitioner. By analysing the process by which game sessions were organised, 
including the important element of serendipity, it has been possible to shed light 
on what might be called the pre-sponsor stage in wargame deployment. 
Subsequently, the physically and mentally taxing nature of facilitating wargames 
was exposed through candid reflection on the researcher’s experience in running 
game sessions. Since wargaming literature is largely devoid of such experiential 
accounts, the researcher’s contributions should be considered both original and 
valuable. 
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8.3.3 Addressing the central thesis objective 
 
Perhaps the most crucial contribution of the research is in positively addressing 
the central thesis objective: the game did create learning moments where players 
could share knowledge and were enabled to ask the right questions. These 
moments were outlined in Chapter 6 and broadly aligned with the intended game 
design, including key actors in cyberspace and their relationships, cyber attack 
and defence dynamics, and geopolitical realities. However, because of the 
flexibility of the game (another advantage of manual gaming, as per 
Section 2.2.6), unintended learning moments were also achieved, for example 
regarding the rivalry between India and Pakistan, password guidance, and 
President Donald Trump. What players can learn from a game for cyber security 
education and awareness training therefore depends on what lessons are 
designed into the game and what opportunities the game makes for player 
contributions. In this thesis, the game had a wide variety of lessons built in and 
offered ample scope for players to provide their own input. 
 
In addition to enabling cyber security learning moments, the game also proved to 
be an effective pedagogical tool. Players exhibited very high engagement 
behaviours during game sessions, including emotive reactions, role playing, 
humour, and a sense of fun – all of which lays strong foundations for pedagogic 
retention. Whilst this is not in itself an original claim, the wealth of data used to 
back it up far supersedes previous studies; Rieb and Lechner only ran Operation 
Digital Chameleon once717, Frey et al played Decisions & Disruptions with 43 
participants718, while Barnard-Wills and Ashenden tested Privacy with 130 players 
– this research had over 250 participants across 33 very varied game sessions.719 
The research therefore shows, with greater weight of evidence than previously 
published, that wargames should be part of the toolkit for cyber security 
educators. 
 
                                                          
717 Rieb and Lechner (2016), p. 8 
718 Frey et al (2017), p. 9 
719 Barnard-Wills and Ashenden (2015), p. 153 
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8.4 The way ahead 
 
No research endeavour is ever complete and can always be further refined, 
developed, or extended. This research is no different and two avenues for future 
work are suggested herein. First, there is scope to make a computerised or hybrid 
version of the game. As discussed in Section 6.3.4, some players with technical 
nous already suggested this approach and even offered to make digital versions of 
the game. The researcher is of course cognisant that computerising the game 
would forego many of the advantages of manual gaming, but at the same time 
computers offer capabilities that could enhance the game in certain ways. As an 
example, a computer could easily keep track of scores and game histories, 
enabling deeper analysis of quantitative data. Additionally, one of the main 
shortcomings of the game was its lacklustre representation of attribution because 
players had complete visibility of the game board. Digital games offer more 
options for manipulating graphics including hiding information or parts of the 
game board. By computerising the game designed for this thesis, new modes of 
play could be created to achieve a greater range of learning moments. 
 
Second, a public version of the game should be produced. Every game component 
is available in Chapter 4 and Appendices A and B, but it would be difficult to piece 
these together into a complete product. Given that the game is both engaging and 
useful, it would be a shame if the game, as an artefact, was lost at the completion 
of the research. Instead, it would be more valuable to produce a distributable 
version of the game and making this available in an online repository together 
with instructions for running a successful game session. Interested parties could 
simply download all the material and print their own copy of the game to be used 
as they see fit, perhaps even modified for specific contexts and depending on the 
learning moments desired. Since this research is publicly funded this material 
could be provided free of charge, or for a small contribution towards upkeep of 
the online repository. In this way, the successes of the game do not stop with the 
research but continue with the wargaming community. 
 
Wherever the game ends up, even if it does not spread beyond this thesis, the 
researcher is confident that wargaming is an effective tool for cyber security 
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education and awareness training, and the work presented herein has had a 
tangible impact on the participants who contributed to it. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Player Dossiers 
 
UK Government 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
UK Government 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing the UK Government. 
 
The Government plays a central role in the exercise. It is the point to which all new 
resources flow at the beginning on each turn, and you are therefore responsible to 
doling these out to the other Entities on your team. The Government is also directly 
connected to all other Entities, so is any damage you sustain will reverberate across 
your entire team. Likewise, any damage taken elsewhere will also impact you.  
 
You may have the possibility of opening one attack vector, targeting Russian 
Government. This reflects the UK’s stature in international organisations and its 
economic power, through a combination of which you can mount attacks that 
damage the vitality of the Russian Government. This would be a one-way vector, 
so you cannot be retaliated against in this way. 
 
Player objectives 
 
You have two main objectives: 
1. Election time – buy popular support ahead of 2021 elections by making 
sure the people prosper. 
+1 Victory Point for every month Electorate ends with 4 or more Resource 
 
2. Aggressive outlook – drive home a strong anti-Russia rhetoric. 
+5 Victory Points if Russia Government ends the game with less Vitality 
than it started (4). 
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Electorate 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
Electorate 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing the Electorate. 
 
The Electorate represents the people of the UK. According to the UK Cyber 
Security Strategy, the people are one of the key constituents (along with 
government and business) ensuring the UK’s prosperity and security in cyberspace. 
You are responsible for holding the Government accountable for their actions, as 
well as maintaining your current quality of life, which largely depends on keeping 
the UK’s critical infrastructure intact. You may therefore want to balance your 
demands of the Government with recognition that they have other priorities. 
 
Although you have no outgoing attack vectors, you may be subject to direct attack 
from Russian Online trolls, seeking to undermine political, cultural, and social 
cohesion. 
 
Player objectives 
 
You have one main objective: 
1. Resist the drain – avoid having your wealth taken away from you. 
 -1 Victory Point every time Resource is transferred away from Electorate. 
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UK Plc 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
UK Plc 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing UK Plc. 
 
UK Plc represents UK businesses, which in the UK Cyber Security Strategy, along 
with government and people, form the key components of the UK’s prosperity and 
security in cyberspace. Your interest lies not only in growing your business, but 
also in supporting the military and intelligence apparatus with your products and 
expertise.  
 
Although you have no outgoing attack vectors, you may come under direct attack 
from Energetic Bear conducting commercial espionage. 
 
Player objectives 
 
You have one main objective: 
1. Weather the Brexit storm – build a cash flow buffer to deal with Brexit 
uncertainties 
+2 Victory Points for 3 or more Resource at the end of April 
+3 Victory Points for 6 or more Resource at the end of August 
+4 Victory Points for 9 or more Resource at the end of December 
(Cumulative) 
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GCHQ 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
GCHQ 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing GCHQ. 
 
GCHQ represents the UK military and intelligence communities. You are 
supporting the UK’s offensive cyberspace operations. In this role, your primary 
aim is to ensure the UK’s superiority in cyber capabilities, while denying those 
capabilities to your adversaries.  
 
Player objectives 
 
You have one main objective: 
2. Recruitment drive – swell your staff numbers by increasing Vitality every 
quarter (end of March, June, September and December). 
+1 Victory Point for single quarters 
+3 Victory Points for two consecutive quarters 
+5 Victory Points for three consecutive quarters 
+7 Victory Points for the entire year 
(Not cumulative) 
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UK Energy 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
UK Energy 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing UK Energy. 
 
UK Energy is one of Britain’s largest energy providers. It produces electricity from 
a range of sources, including coal, gas, solar, wind, and nuclear. In this last regard 
it plays a pivotal role as the sole operator of nuclear power plants in the UK, spread 
over seven locations, generating about one sixth of the UK’s electricity. You must 
ensure this critical function is maintained by not only keeping up the production of 
energy, but also keeping your main customer – the Electorate – a viable market by 
guaranteeing its electricity supply. 
 
Player objectives 
 
You have one main objective: 
1. Grow capacity – increase the energy output of your power plants. 
+2 Victory Points if you have 6 or more Vitality at the end of June 
+3 Victory Points if you have 9 or more Vitality at the end of December 
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Russia Government 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
Russia Government 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing the Russian Government. 
 
The Government plays a central role in the exercise. It is the point to which all new 
resources flow at the beginning on each turn, and you are therefore responsible for 
doling these out to the other Entities on your team. The Government is also directly 
connected to all other Entities, so any damage you sustain will reverberate across 
your entire team. Likewise, any damage taken elsewhere will also impact you.  
 
You have no outgoing attack vectors, but may be directly attacked by the UK 
Government if such a vector is open. This reflects a greater economic and 
diplomatic clout enjoyed by the UK. 
 
Player objectives 
 
You have two main objectives: 
1. Some animals are more equal than others – keep a slice of your income for 
yourself. 
+1 Victory Point every month you end with 3 or more Resource 
 
2. Control the Trolls – don’t let the trolls get overconfident. 
-1 Victory Point every time Online Trolls launch a 3 or 4 Resource attack 
-2 Victory Points every time Online Trolls launch a 5 or 6 Resource attack 
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Online Trolls 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
Online trolls 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing Online trolls. 
 
Russia is well-known for employing an army of online trolls to run honey pot 
social media accounts, propagate pro-Russian news, and make inflammatory 
comments on news stories and message boards. The role of the trolls is to 
undermine the UK people’s confidence in their government and shift negative 
attention away from Russia.  
 
You have one outgoing attack vector targeting the UK Electorate through which 
you can mount direct attacks. 
 
Player objectives 
 
You have one main objective: 
1. Success breeds confidence – small-scale harassment is beneath your 
capabilities. 
+4 Victory Points every time you launch an attack with 3 or more 
Resource and the Ransomware asset. 
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Energetic Bear 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
Energetic Bear 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing Energetic Bear. 
 
The use of the Internet for industrial espionage has become part and parcel of 
offensive cyber operations, and Russia is no exception to this. Energetic Bear is the 
code name for one of the many espionage groups that seek to further Russian 
business prosperity at the expense of the UK’s.  
 
You have one outgoing attack vector targeting UK Plc with which you can launch 
direct attacks. 
 
Player objectives 
 
You have one main objective: 
2. Those who can’t, steal – grow your business by whatever means possible. 
+1 Victory Point for having more Vitality at the end of April than the start 
of the game 
+3 Victory Points for having more Vitality at the end of August than April 
+5 Victory Points for having more Vitality at the end of December than 
August 
(Cumulative) 
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SCS 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
Special Communications Service (SCS) 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing the Special Communications Service (SCS). 
 
The SCS is responsible for signals intelligence, communications security, and 
cryptology. You are supporting Russia’s offensive cyberspace operations. In this 
role, your primary aim is to ensure Russia’s superiority in cyber capabilities, while 
denying those capabilities to your adversaries. 
 
Player objectives 
 
You have one main objective: 
2. Win the arms race – have a better cyber arsenal than the UK. 
+2 Victory Points every month you end with more Attack assets than the 
UK’s defence assets 
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Rosenergoatom 
 
Cyber Security Wargame Dossier 
 
Rosenergoatom 
 
 
 
Player overview 
 
You are playing Rosenergoatom. 
 
Rosenergoatom is Russia’s nuclear power stations operator. The organisation is 
responsible for running 10 nuclear power plants, a number which is planned to 
expand drastically. You must ensure this critical function is maintained, while also 
preparing for expansion.  
 
Player objectives 
 
You have one main objective: 
1. Grow capacity – increase the energy output of your power plants by 
growing Vitality every quarter (end of March, June, September and 
December) 
+1 Victory Point for single quarters 
+3 Victory Points for any two consecutive quarters 
+5 Victory Points for three consecutive quarters 
+7 Victory Points for the entire year 
(Not cumulative) 
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Appendix B: Game Rules 
 
Setup: 
The game pits two sides, the UK and Russia, against each other. Each side is divided into five Entities:  
UK Russia 
Government Government 
Electorate Online Trolls 
UK Plc Energetic Bear 
GCHQ Special Communications Service 
UK Energy Rosenergoatom 
Each Entity has two sets of counters it must manage: Resource (yellow, representing wealth) and 
Vitality (blue, representing well-being).  
 
Rules of play: 
 
Basics: 
How to win the game: 
• Earn more Victory Points than the opposing team. 
 
How the game is played: 
• The game lasts 12 turns: January-December 2020. 
o A turn consists of one team performing Actions with all their Entities, after which the other 
team performs Actions with all their Entities. 
• Each turn, each Entity may perform one of five courses of Action: 
o Distribute: transfer Resource to any single connected Entity 
o Revitalise: spend Resource to gain Vitality 
o Attack: spend Resource to attack along an attack vector 
▪ Note: Teams may not attack in January 
o (GCHQ/SCS ONLY) Access Black Market: bid on black market goods 
o Abstain: do nothing this turn 
 
Details: 
Turns: 
• At the start of every Month a card is drawn from the Event Cards pile and its effects implemented 
immediately. 
• At the start of each team’s turn, the Government Entity is granted 3 Resource. 
• There is a time limit of 3 minutes per team each turn. Any actions not performed within this limit are 
forfeited. 
• At the end of each turn, teams must fill in their respective Record Keeping Sheets. 
 
Distribute: 
• Resources can be transferred between Entities connected by thin black lines. 
• Arrows denote one-way transfer relationships. 
• The maximum number of Resource that can be transferred in one Action is 5. 
• There is no limit on how much Resource an Entity can possess. 
 
Revitalise: 
• Cost of Vitality goes up with the amount converted: 
Vitality Cost 
(Resource) 
1 1 
2 2 
3 4 
4 5 
5 6 
6 7 
• There is no limit on how much Vitality an Entity can possess. 
 
Attack: 
• An Entity can attack along the attack vector attached to it – purple for UK, orange for Russia.  
• The attacking Entity must spend Resource to perform at attack: minimum 1, maximum 6. 
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• The attack result is calculated by rolling one six-sided die and consulting the Combat Resolution 
table below. 
o In the event of a negative result, the attack backfires and the attacker suffers damage to their 
own Vitality. 
▪ Additionally, such a poorly executed attack can be attributed by the defender to the attacker, with 
repercussions detailed in the Attribution table below. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Residual damage is also suffered by any Entities directly connected to the damaged Entity.  
o This is calculated in the ratio of 1:2. 
o This also applies to backfire damage. 
 
Access Black Market: 
• GCHQ or SCS can spend Resource they have to bid on items in the Black Market. 
o If a team bids on an item and the other team does not increase on that bid in their 
immediately following turn, the bid winner receives the item on their subsequent turn. 
o Multiple items can be bid on in one turn. 
o It is an all-pay auction, meaning Resource used for all bids is considered spent – losing bids do 
not get refunded and do not count towards subsequent re-bids. 
• Items can be hoarded for later use or played with immediate effect. 
• All items can be bought by either team. 
 
End of game: 
• If an attack results in any Entity being reduced to 0 Vitality, the attacker is awarded 10 Victory Points 
and the game immediately ends. 
o Remaining Victory Points up to that point are tallied up after full effects of attack have been 
finalised (i.e. residual damage). 
▪ Note: It is possible to launch a successful game-ending attack and still lose the game. 
At the end of December each team states their Objectives and Victory Points are tallied up. The 
team with the most Victory Points is declared the winner. 
 
 
  Die Roll 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 
R
es
o
u
rc
e 
sp
en
t 
1 0 1 1 1 1 2 
2 0 1 1 1 2 2 
3 -1 0 1 2 2 3 
4 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
5 -2 -1 2 3 3 4 
6 -2 -1 0 3 5 6 
  Attribution Level 
  -1 -2 
A
tt
ac
ki
n
g 
En
ti
ty
 
Energetic 
Bear 
UK gains Software Update asset. UK gains Software Update and Recovery 
Management assets. 
Online Trolls UK gains Education asset. UK gains Education asset, Online Trolls cannot 
launch attacks for 2 turns. 
SCS UK gains Software Update asset, SCS 
cannot bid on Black Market for 2 
turns. 
UK may choose to open up GCHQ-Rosenergoatom 
or UK Government-Russia Government attack 
vector at no cost. 
GCHQ GCHQ cannot launch attacks for 2 
turns. 
GCHQ cannot perform any actions for 2 turns, UK 
Government loses 1 Vitality. 
UK 
Government 
Russia gains Bargaining Chip asset. Russia gains Bargaining Chip asset, UK Government 
lose additional 2 Vitality and 2 Resource. 
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Appendix C: Game Sessions 
 
This appendix lists all 33 game sessions which were used for data collection for the thesis, including information about session types, settings, participants, 
and game results. Note that some records are incomplete as the relevant data was not collected or changes were made to the methodology; for example, 
game results using early versions of the game are not included because the game used different rules, so the results are not comparable. Indeed, all 
sessions using earlier versions of the game were effectively playtest sessions which often resulted in major changes to game design (as elaborated in 
Chapter 4), whereas the design remained stable once the final version was produced. Nonetheless, qualitative data was collected from the earlier sessions 
which informed the analysis in Chapter 6. 
 
Session name Description Type Sub-type Setting Male Female Result UK score Russia 
score 
UK technology 
company A1 
Large computer 
technology company 
with global presence, 
players from a variety 
of technical and 
business roles. 
Civilian Industry Boardroom 7 1    
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UK academics A1 University, players 
from postgraduate 
social science courses. 
Civilian Academia Office 3 1    
UK academics A2 University, players 
from postgraduate 
technical courses. 
Civilian Academia Office      
International 
Academics A 
International education 
programme hosted at a 
UK military education 
institution, Indian 
players from senior 
roles in government 
and industry. 
Civilian Mix Classroom 5 1    
Connections UK 
2016 1 
Conference for the UK 
wargaming community 
hosted at King’s College 
London, players from a 
range of backgrounds. 
Civilian Mix Large room 5 1    
299 
 
Connections UK 
2016 2 
Conference for the UK 
wargaming community 
hosted at King’s College 
London, players from a 
range of backgrounds. 
Civilian Mix Large room 6 0    
UK media company 
A + UK government 
department A 
Small interactive media 
company and a central 
government 
department, players 
from industry and 
technical civil service 
roles. 
Civilian Mix Meeting room 4 2    
UK academics A3 University, players 
from postgraduate 
social science courses. 
Civilian Academia Meeting room 4 2    
UK government 
department B 
Central government 
department, players 
from policy roles. 
Civilian Civil Service Meeting room 3 1 UK win 10 5 
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UK academics A4 University, players 
from technical 
postgraduate courses. 
Civilian Academia Meeting room 6 2 Russia win -2 3 
German military 
education 
institution A1 
Officer training 
institution, players at 
OF-2 to OF-4 grades 
from all service 
branches. 
Military  Classroom 7 1 Russia win 15 17 
German military 
education 
institution A2 
Officer training 
institution, players at 
OF-2 to OF-4 grades 
from all service 
branches. 
Military  Classroom 8 0 UK win 19 16 
Swedish military 
education 
institution A1 
Officer training 
institution, players 
from a range of military 
and government roles. 
Mix  Officers’ mess 9 1 UK win 32 14 
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Swedish military 
education 
institution A2 
Officer training 
institution, players 
from a range of military 
and government roles. 
Mix  Officers’ mess 5 3 UK win 21 12 
UK technology 
company B 
Large technology and 
engineering company 
with strong ties to 
defence, players from a 
range of business roles. 
Civilian Industry Meeting room 4 0 Russia win 22 26 
UK military 
education 
institution A 
Specialist training 
school for all ranks, 
players at OF-2 to OF-3 
grades from multiple 
service branches. 
Military  Office 4 2 UK win 22 16 
UK academics B University, 
undergraduate players 
from technical courses. 
Civilian Academia Classroom 8 2 Russia win 11 29 
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UK technology 
company A2 
Large computer 
technology company 
with global presence, 
participants from a 
variety of technical and 
business roles. 
Civilian Industry Meeting room 7 2 UK win 34 30 
International 
academics B 
International education 
programme hosted at a 
UK military education 
institution, Indian 
players from senior 
roles in government 
and industry. 
Civilian Mix Classroom 6 1 Russia win 13 17 
UK government 
department C 
Central government 
department, 
participants from policy 
and procurement roles. 
Civilian Civil Service Meeting room 5 3 (No gameplay, discussion only) 
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CDT Advisory Panel Internal Royal Holloway 
conference, players 
from central 
government, industry, 
and academia. 
Civilian Mix Bar 5 2 UK win 4 3 
International 
military education 
institution A1 
Specialist training 
institution for officers 
and senior government 
representatives, 
players from OF-2 to 
OF-4 grades, policy, 
and analyst roles. 
Mix  Classroom 7 3 UK win 36 31 
International 
military education 
institution A2 
Specialist training 
institution for officers 
and senior government 
representatives, 
players from OF-2 to 
Mix  Classroom 10 0 UK win 29 13 
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OF-4 grades, policy, 
and analyst roles. 
International 
military education 
institution A3 
Specialist training 
institution for officers 
and senior government 
representatives, 
players from OF-2 to 
OF-4 grades, policy, 
and analyst roles. 
Mix  Classroom 9 1 UK win 47 18 
UK military 
education 
institution B1 
Officer training 
institution, players 
from OF-2 to OF-4 
grades. 
Military  Office 6 0 Russia win 14 19 
UK military 
education 
institution B2 
Officer training 
institution, players 
from OF-2 to OF-4 
grades. 
Military  Classroom 14 1 Russia win 7 23 
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ACE-CSR conference Conference for UK 
academic cyber 
security community, 
players from academic, 
industry, and central 
government roles. 
Civilian Mix Classroom 6 4 Tie 22 22 
Connections UK 
2017 1 
Conference for the UK 
wargaming community 
hosted at King’s College 
London, players from a 
range of backgrounds. 
Civilian Mix Large room 6 2 Russia win 27 31 
Connections UK 
2017 2 
Conference for the UK 
wargaming community 
hosted at King’s College 
London, players from a 
range of backgrounds. 
Civilian Mix Large room 4 2 Russia win 25 28 
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International 
military education 
institution A4* 
Specialist training 
institution for officers 
and senior government 
representatives, 
players from OF-2 to 
OF-4 grades, policy, 
and analyst roles. 
Mix  Classroom 9 1 Russia win 7 28 
International 
military education 
institution A5* 
Specialist training 
institution for officers 
and senior government 
representatives, 
players from OF-2 to 
OF-4 grades, policy, 
and analyst roles. 
Mix  Classroom 9 0 Russia win 10 18 
International 
military education 
institution A6* 
Specialist training 
institution for officers 
and senior government 
representatives, 
Mix  Classroom 9 1 UK win 26 14 
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players from OF-2 to 
OF-4 grades, policy, 
and analyst roles. 
Australian 
professional services 
firm 
Large firm with global 
presence, players from 
a range of business 
roles. 
Civilian Industry Boardroom 6 4 Tie 16 16 
CyCon Conference 1-
6 
International cyber 
security conference, 
players from a range of 
government, industry, 
and academic roles. 
Civilian Mix Large room (Not formally recorded as these six sessions were not 
officially part of the field work and are not included in the 
total of 33 sessions) 
 
*Game sessions conducted in author’s absence  
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